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Kimberly Renee McNealy 
UNDERSTANDING OF INTERPROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION TO IMPACT 
PATIENT SAFETY IN THE OPERATING ROOM: A GROUNDED THEORY STUDY 
Intraoperative adverse events (IAEs) due to interprofessional miscommunication 
continue to occur despite implementation of surgical checklists and focused 
communication trainings. Much of the previous intraoperative communication research 
has focused on the content and quantity of interprofessional communication instead of its 
context and quality, and current communication interventions seem to have varying levels 
of engagement, effectiveness, and persistence. The purpose of this dissertation study was 
to explore the psychosocial processes involved during the establishment and maintenance 
of interprofessional communication surrounding IAEs or potential IAEs in the 
intraoperative environment and to identify the perceived facilitators and barriers to 
communication. Twenty surgical team members participated in semi-structured 
interviews and described their experiences with interprofessional communication during 
IAEs. 
Grounded theory methodology was used to identify the central process, Testing 
the Water, and two subprocesses, Reading the Room and Navigating Hierarchy. Testing 
the Water describes the situational nature of interprofessional communication as surgical 
team members navigate factors influencing the context and probable trajectories of 
surgical cases and the perceptions of professional rights and responsibilities within 
surgical teams. Participants in this study experienced Testing the Water differently based 
on their professional roles and tenure; findings were organized around three emerging 
groups identified as inexperienced nurses, experienced nurses, and surgeons. 
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Interprofessional communication surrounding IAEs occurred for study participants in 
fluid, iterative phases identified as 1) Recognition, 2) Reconnaissance, 3) Rallying, 4) 
Reaction, and 5) Resolution. Participants recognized IAEs or potential IAEs, gathered 
information through reconnaissance, rallied other team members, reacted to stabilize 
patients, and resolved IAEs through individual or surgical team reflection. 
Study participants reported using strategies during communication to accomplish 
two psychosocial goals, preserving the flow of surgical cases, and protecting the ‘face’ of 
themselves and other surgical team members. Supporting these psychosocial goals 
through increased psychological safety for all surgical team members potentially leads to 
more effective, timely surgical team communication. More effective interprofessional 
communication facilitates the improved situational awareness, collective sensemaking, 
and integrated team mental models that are critical to coordinated responses to IAEs. The 
findings of this study suggest practical implications to increase the effectiveness of 
interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment. 
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 This chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation research. It begins with a 
discussion of the background of preventable patient harm, a statement describing the 
problems preventable patient harm causes in the intraoperative environment, and the 
significance of those problems. The chapter then identifies the study purpose and the 
research questions that were addressed by the dissertation research. Finally, the chapter 
describes the assumptions of this research and provides a brief summary. 
Background 
Public exposure of the unacceptable incidence of medical error in the Institute of 
Medicine’s (IOM) 2000 report “To Err is Human” led to an increased focus on human 
error as a direct cause of preventable patient harm (IOM, 2000; Leape & Berwick, 2005; 
Pronovost et al., 2016). More than twenty years later, the National Academy of Medicine 
(NAM, formerly known as IOM) and others report that levels of preventable patient harm 
are still unacceptably high (Gandhi et al., 2018; NAM, 2018; Panagioti et al., 2019). 
Findings by the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) suggest patient safety 
initiatives succeed only through continuous systemic changes focusing on patient 
engagement, culture, and teamwork (NPSF, 2015). Research indicates the reduction of 
preventable patient harm through changes at both systemic and individual levels is 
possible through the development of healthcare safety culture based on interprofessional 
collaborative practice (ICP) through effective interprofessional communication (Browder 
& Maggio, 2017; Pronovost et al., 2017).  
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ICP within healthcare delivery is defined as two or more people from different 
professions actively engaging to coordinate and provide patient care within a practice 
setting (Morgan et al., 2015). ICP has been identified as critical to healthcare delivery 
through its influence on increased patient safety, improved patient outcomes, and 
enhanced patient and provider satisfaction (Gilbert et al., 2010; Manojlovich, 2005; 
Proudfoot et al., 2007; Welp & Manser, 2016). When healthcare delivery requires a more 
interdependent team approach, the need for effective ICP is increased and influenced by 
macro (policy), meso (organizational), micro (primary care team), and individual (health 
care professional) factors (Mulvale et al., 2016). The primary care team-level micro 
factors include team attitudes, team structure, formal processes, and social processes; 
these factors have been indicated to contribute directly to the complexity of healthcare 
culture (Mulvale et al., 2016). Consciously facilitating the creation and development of 
patient safety culture through effective ICP requires an understanding of both 
collaboration and practice (Thomson et al., 2007).  
Collaboration is a process in which autonomous or semiautonomous actors 
interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures 
governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them 
together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions 
(Thomson et al., 2007, p. 3). The concept of practice in healthcare has been identified as 
the socially-acceptable and socially-institutionalized enactment of professional roles 
(Thistlethwaite et al., 2013). The complexity of ICP results from the negotiations 
performed within the social construction of practice. The social construction of practice is 
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negotiated among professions, exists within and across professional cultures, and is 
influenced by both current circumstances and historical tensions (McNeil et al., 2013).  
Statement of the Problem 
One patient care setting where errors are known to occur is the intraoperative 
environment. More than four thousand malpractice claims resulting from intraoperative 
adverse events (IAEs) are paid every year in the United States at an estimated cost of 
over sixty-five million dollars. Root-cause analyses indicate that over half of IAEs were 
directly preventable through effective interprofessional communication (Hempel et al., 
2015; Mehtsun et al., 2013). An IAE is defined as any deviation or injury caused by 
surgical healthcare delivery rather than underlying disease (Mavros et al., 2014). IAEs 
include a wide range of deviations of care and vary in severity from those requiring no 
additional intervention or treatment to those resulting in the death of the patient 
(Rosenthal et al., 2015).  
Examples of IAEs include incidents such as anaphylactic reaction, electrocautery 
injury, episodes of decreased patient safety, laparoscopic conversion to open procedure, 
procedural delays, unintended bleeding, unintentional dissection or resection, cardiac 
arrhythmia, and occurrences classified as surgical ‘never’ events (Hu, Arriaga, Roth, et 
al., 2012; Rosenthal et al., 2015). Surgical never events are described as IAEs that should 
never occur including retained foreign bodies, wrong-site surgeries, wrong-patient 
surgeries, and wrong-procedure surgeries (Mehtsun et al., 2013; Steelman et al., 2019). 
Undesirable patient outcomes of IAEs include failure to wean off of the ventilator, 
perioperative transfusions, pneumonia, return to surgery, surgical site infection, systemic 
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sepsis, prolonged hospital stay or hospital readmission, and mortality (Mavros et al., 
2014; Nandan et al., 2016). 
IAEs were determined to be such a pervasive problem that in 2009 the World 
Health Organization (WHO) devised a global surgical safety checklist to ensure the 
minimum communication necessary for patient safety occurs immediately before, during, 
and immediately after surgical procedures (Haynes et al., 2009). Surgical safety 
checklists facilitate communication among surgical team members by preventing both 
active and latent process failures and have demonstrated increased safety compliance, 
improved teamwork behaviors, and reduced morbidity and mortality (Bergs et al., 2014; 
Collins et al., 2014; Hempel et al., 2015; Lingard et al., 2008; V. E. Lyons & L. L. 
Popejoy, 2014; Pugel et al., 2015; Russ et al., 2013; Savage, Gaffney, Hussain-
Alkhateeb, et al., 2017; Wæhle et al., 2012a; Weiser & Haynes, 2018).  
The WHO surgical safety checklist includes pre-procedure verification of patient 
identity using two identifiers, description of the consented procedure(s), identification of 
the surgical site with marked laterality (if indicated), disclosure of known patient 
allergies, description of any anesthesia concerns, confirmation of display of relevant 
patient images, administration of antibiotics, explanation of expected blood loss, 
anticipation of any critical events, and introduction of all surgical team members by name 
and role. The post-procedure checklist confirms consented procedure(s) was/were 
performed, verifies needle and surgical sponge counts, documents removal of all foreign 
bodies not intended for implantation, and reports disposition of any surgical specimens 
(Haynes et al., 2009). 
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Although surgical safety checklist implementation has reduced reported surgical 
complications from 11% to 7% and surgical patient mortality from 1.5% to 0.8%, the 
structure provided by the checklist does not consider the communicative complexity 
inherent in the delivery of intraoperative care (Haynes et al., 2009; Marlow et al., 2017; 
Russ et al., 2013; Thiels et al., 2015). The intraoperative environment’s unique physical 
and cultural constraints influence the social construction of interprofessional practice and 
intraoperative communication. Environmental physical constraints are related to the 
interdependent and ‘overlapping’ use of time and space as surgical team members from 
different professions attempt to simultaneously accomplish tasks within a confined 
physical space (Morgan et al., 2015). Cultural constraints are reinforced by established 
professional boundaries that often hinder the establishment and maintenance of the 
effective interprofessional communication needed to drive successful ICP in the 
intraoperative environment (Gillespie et al., 2013). Ineffective interprofessional 
communication has been indicated to directly contribute to the occurrence and severity of 
intraoperative adverse events (Sun et al., 2018). 
Additionally, disengaged or cynical implementation of the surgical safety 
checklist is frequently reported and is potentially counterproductive to team 
communication efforts (Anderson et al., 2018; Birnbach et al., 2017; Borchard, 2012; 
Devcich et al., 2015; Korkiakangas et al., 2016; Rydenfalt et al., 2014; Sendlhofer et al., 
2016; Wæhle et al., 2012a; Ziman et al., 2018). And while event-specific critical event 
checklists have been developed for use during IAEs, they are not widely used and only 
provide users with relatively basic prompts to assist the surgical team in the navigation of 
critical events. (Clebone et al., 2017). Some research even suggests the most significant 
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improvements from surgical safety checklist implementation as occurring primarily in 
developing countries, with the fairly inconsistent results being reported in developing 
countries possibly resulting from temporal changes such as improved teamwork attitudes 
and behaviors instead of from checklist implementation (De Jager et al., 2016). 
In spite of the global safeguards put into place to protect patients, preventable 
patient harm related to human factors continue to result in unacceptable rates of IAEs. An 
initial exploration of how errors related to human factors continue to result in IAEs can 
be accomplished using Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (Collins et al., 2014). Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese Model was originally proposed by James Reason to explain system failures 
(Perneger, 2005). In the model, slices of cheese represent barriers to system failures, and 
the holes in the cheese represent active failures (unsafe acts) or latent failures (Stein & 
Heiss, 2015). While active failures are caused by inappropriate behaviors, latent failures 
are often caused by environmental or system factors (Chrouser et al., 2018). Ineffective 
communication has been indicated to be the most common cause of both active and latent 
failures (Stein & Heiss, 2015). The cheese slices for the intraoperative environment 
might be identified as training, technology, policies and procedures, and checklists (Stein 
& Heiss, 2015). The holes in the cheese slices can be used to represent active failures or 
latent failures in the patient care process that, if aligned, allow harm to reach the patient 
(Perneger, 2005). Effective communication can be used to increase the situational 
awareness needed to prompt the appropriate actions to close the holes (Seshia et al., 
2018). 
The cheese slices described by Reason represent many of the safeguards currently 
used in the intraoperative environment. The training slice would include team member 
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education, repetition, and exposure to components of the situation such as procedure, 
surgical specialty, surgeon, equipment, and level of patient acuity. Technology could 
include the electronic medical record and any computer pop-ups or alerts used to promote 
patient safety (Stein & Heiss, 2015). Policies and procedures include processes such as 
double-checking patient information, patient handoffs, standardized site marking, 
positioning standards, prepping and wait time requirements, and blood transfusion 
protocols. Finally, checklists would include the surgical safety checklist, extended or 
specialized checklists, and structured briefings or debriefings. The fact IAEs still occur 
due to human error in spite of deliberate focus on the ‘cheese’ indicates potential in 
recognizing and closing the holes. Closing the holes requires an understanding of the 
types of human error that contribute to IAEs. 
Human error has been described as being caused by either schematic or 
attentional behaviors (Stein & Heiss, 2015). Schematic behaviors are described as 
reflexive or routine and can be facilitated through the ‘cheese’ barriers identified above: 
training, technology, policies and procedures, and checklists. Attentional behaviors are 
behaviors that contribute to the situational awareness and problem-solving needed during 
IAEs. Situational awareness (SA) is the shared, dynamic, and evolving understanding of 
environmental elements that includes the (1) perception of those elements (information), 
(2) comprehension of their contextual meaning, and (3) projection of their significance to 
the situation (Endsley, 1995; Stanton et al., 2017). Figure 1.1, Errors Related to Human 





Figure 1.1: Errors Related to Human Factors 
 
While active failures are often the result of the behavior of an individual (the person 
approach), latent failures can often be attributed to an unsupportive environment (the 
system approach) (Reason, 2000; Stein & Heiss, 2015). Some studies identify up to 90% 
of error as being either ‘blameless’ or as not being attributable solely to individual 
behavior; this would suggest future potential gains to be more likely in the research of 
latent failures (Reason, 2000; Waring et al., 2016). 
  Research also seems to indicate that most of the benefits available from using the 
person approach have been realized, and that more durable, resilient improvements would 
be better achieved by exploring system factors that impact patient safety outcomes 
(Adams-McGavin et al., 2019; Kolodzey et al., 2019). System factors that impact patient 
safety in the intraoperative environment have recently been categorized using the 
Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIP) work model into safety threats 
and resilience supports (Kolodzey et al., 2019). Resilience in the intraoperative 
environment is the ability to respond to unanticipated circumstances and sustain safe 
practices while avoiding or minimizing patient harm. Examples of safety threats and 
resilience supports are listed in the following table, Table 1.1: Safety Threats and 
Resilience Supports. (Kolodzey et al., 2019).  













Table 1.1: Safety Threats and Resilience Supports 
SEIPS category Safety threats Resilience supports 
External 
environment 
System-level constraints  




1) Inefficient workspace design 
2) Inefficient configuration of 
equipment 
3) Distracting work conditions 
1) Standardization or 
optimization of workspace 
2) Standardization or 
customization of equipment 
setup 
3) Reduction of distractions 
Organization 1) Inadequate resources 
2) Deficiencies in safety culture 
(e.g., inadequate staffing) 
3) Process failures 
4) Deficiencies in training 
1) Acquisition of needed items 
or provision of substitutes  
2) Location of task support 
3) Double-checking of processes 
4) Enlisting of knowledge or 
process support 
Person 1) Failures of attention or 
unsafe acts 
2) Deficiencies in experience, 
knowledge, or skills  
3) Failures of leadership 
4) Issues related to team 
effectiveness 
5) Failures of communication 
1) Recognition and redirection 
2) Contingency planning and 
enlisting of support 
3) Coaching and guidance 
behaviors 
4) Modeling/reinforcement of 
effective team behaviors 
5) Effective communication 
patterns 
Task  1) Excessive workload or time 
pressure 
2) Unexpected secondary tasks 
(e.g., equipment malfunctions) 
3) Unanticipated task difficulty 
 
Delegation and enlistment of 
surgical team support 
Tools and 
technology 
1) Unfamiliarity with setup 
2) Item malfunctioning or 
unavailable 
1) Enlisting of knowledge or 
process support 
2) Provision of backups or 
substitutes 
 
One study reported that even though most of the identified safety threats did not 
originate from the ‘person’ category of the system, 75% of the resilience supports were 
obtained through the person category, suggesting that the majority of system resilience 
within the intraoperative environment is provided through adaptability and interventions 
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at the person level (Adams-McGavin et al., 2019; Jung et al., 2019). This further 
indicates the need to extend the exploration of the influence of systems on IAEs. 
Education and reinforcement of schematic behaviors such as the structured 
communication prompted by the surgical safety checklist have improved patient 
outcomes, but effectively addressing IAEs such as unanticipated and emerging surgical 
deviations or changes in patient status during the procedure requires effective 
unstructured intraoperative communication (Berlinger & Dietz, 2016; Nagpal et al., 
2012; Nagpal, Vats, Lamb, et al., 2010; Rhee, 2017; Russ et al., 2013; Wangoo et al., 
2016a). Unstructured intraoperative communication has been identified as ineffective as 
often as 30% of the time due to information loss or communication breakdowns 
(Greenberg et al., 2007). Ineffective communication can result from exclusion of relevant 
team members, inclusion of inaccurate content, delayed transmission of necessary 
information, or ambiguity of purpose (Garosi et al., 2019; Lingard et al., 2008). 
Ineffective communication includes failures of purpose, occasion, content, or audience 
and often leads to procedural delays or errors, team inefficiency or tension, medication 
errors, equipment issues, workarounds, and waste of resources (Lingard et al., 2004; 
Nagpal, Vats, Ahmed, et al., 2010; Tiferes et al., 2015). One study described the most 
common communication errors as occurring related to surgical progress, equipment 
issues, medications, procedural changes, policy issues, environmental concerns, and 
personnel changes (Halverson et al., 2011). 
Barriers to effective intraoperative communication can include interruptions, 
miscommunications, multitasking, and time constraints (Espin & Lingard, 2001; 
Gillespie et al., 2012b; Gillespie et al., 2017; Göras et al., 2019; Weigl et al., 2018). 
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Research also identifies ineffective interprofessional communication and organizational 
structure issues as common factors in IAEs (Hu, Arriaga, Roth, et al., 2012). Improving 
intraoperative communication potentially requires a deliberate culture change with 
increased disclosure, transparency, and accountability (Lark et al., 2018). Culture change 
interventions using focused interprofessional communication training have demonstrated 
benefits including enhanced organizational outcomes, increased teamwork behaviors, and 
improved patient outcomes; unfortunately, these improvements tend to deteriorate over 
time (Hughes et al., 2016; Weller & Boyd, 2014; Weller et al., 2014). More research is 
needed to better understand how unstructured communication develops between and 
among surgical team members to develop structures and processes that persist over time.  
Significance of the Study 
 Interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment has been 
minimally facilitated through surgical safety checklist implementation and temporarily 
improved through communication training interventions (Erestam et al., 2017; Kuy & 
Romero, 2017). Although surgical safety checklists and training interventions often 
directly address the necessary content of interprofessional communication, they often fail 
to address the relevant context of healthcare culture. Within interprofessional 
collaborative practice, the establishment and maintenance of effective communication are 
often hindered by the professional boundaries and cultural constraints traditionally 
inherent to healthcare delivery (Pugel et al., 2015; Tiferes et al., 2015; Weiser et al., 
2010). These boundaries and constraints are influenced through behavioral expectations, 
personal demeanor, gender, and professional socialization (Chung et al., 2012; Nembhard 
& Edmondson, 2006).  
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 Professional socialization has been identified as one mediating factor that impacts 
the motivations, perceptions, and expectations for interprofessional communication 
within the intraoperative environment; these motivations, perceptions, and expectations 
are often defined and determined by professional role (Disch, 2012; Finn, 2008; Gillespie 
et al., 2013; Grade et al., 2019; Makary et al., 2006) Socialization into professional roles 
is the process by which individuals gain the social knowledge for assuming their roles 
within organizations. Socialization includes developing relationships with others, 
learning the profession’s values, goals, technical language, and understanding the 
profession’s customs, myths, rituals, and traditions (Hall, 2005; MacArthur et al., 2016; 
Thistlethwaite et al., 2013). The traditional socialization of surgeons and nurses 
contributes directly to the identified authority gradient that is present in the intraoperative 
environment (Elfering et al., 2017; Gardezi et al., 2009; Jayasuriya-Illesinghe et al., 2016; 
Walrath et al., 2015).  
An authority gradient “is a real or perceived difference in a health care team 
member’s experience level, expertise, status, or authority relative to another 
member of the team. This difference can prevent the individual from raising a 
concern about a patient to another health care team member”, impacting patient 
outcomes (Walrath et al., 2015, p. 174).  
 
Recognizing and describing the influence of socialization and the resulting 
authority gradients on healthcare culture are essential first steps to exploring the 
communicative contexts involved (Gerardi, 2004). This study fulfills a significant gap in 
the research by providing the necessary communicative context through a better 
understanding of the psychosocial processes surrounding interprofessional 




Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the psychosocial processes involved during 
the establishment and maintenance of interprofessional communication surrounding IAEs 
or potential IAEs in the operating room. Understanding how communicative patterns and 
strategies related to IAEs develop between surgeons and nurses in the intraoperative 
environment would allow for more effective interprofessional communication 
interventions and focused education, potentially further reducing IAEs and directly 
impacting patient safety and satisfaction. For the purpose of this research, 
interprofessional communication within the intraoperative environment was considered 
as a series of inherently complex social interactions among surgical team members 
functioning from and within differing perspectives, positions, perceived power, and roles 
(Foot, 2014). The participant meanings of the social interactions experienced by surgeons 
and operating room nurses were solicited and explored through the use of grounded 
theory methods (Charmaz, 2014; Creswell, 2013). 
Research Questions 
1) How do surgeons and surgical nurses experience the initiation of interprofessional 
communication in the operating room related to IAEs or potential IAEs? 
2) How do surgeons and surgical nurses experience the maintenance of 
interprofessional communication in the operating room related to IAEs or 
potential IAEs? 
3) What do surgeons and surgical nurses perceive as facilitators to the process of 
establishing and maintaining effective interprofessional communication?  
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4) What do surgeons and surgical nurses perceive as barriers to the process of 
establishing and maintaining effective interprofessional communication?  
Assumptions 
The interdependence and close physical proximity of the surgical team produce an 
environment where ICP is even more critical to the effective delivery of patient care 
(Kirschbaum et al., 2015; Ren et al., 2008). Because of this interdependence, the ICP 
required for optimal functioning for a surgical team is often studied using the concept of 
teamwork. ICP was used in this study to refer to the more focused collaboration (or 
teamwork) required during surgical team functioning. 
For the purpose of this research, a surgical team was identified as a group of 
healthcare workers providing service in the intraoperative environment who 1) share a 
permanent/dynamic identity during the provision of care, 2) have an awareness of team 
member roles, tasks, and goals, 3) demonstrate the interdependence of team members, 4) 
integrate teamwork, 5) share responsibility for outcomes, and 6) experience workflow 
that is alternately complex, predictable, and urgent (Reeves et al., 2018). 
Research indicates that ICP is experienced differently by surgical team members 
and that perceptions are based on professional discipline (Grade et al., 2019). 
Interprofessional communication, as a critical consideration of ICP, is also influenced by 
the socialized professional roles of surgical team members; for example, motivations, 
perceptions, and expectations for communication in the intraoperative environment vary 
based on role (Cruz et al., 2019; Finn, 2008; Gillespie et al., 2013; Makary et al., 2006). 
Finally, because the intraoperative environment requires more extensive interdependent 
functioning from professions that are traditionally socialized differently, it was assumed 
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the participant interviews would reflect differences in the motivations, perceptions, and 
expectations related to interprofessional communication surrounding IAEs or potential 
IAEs in the intraoperative environment.  
Summary 
In spite of focused communication improvement initiatives implemented within 
the intraoperative environment, IAEs with serious complications have been proposed to 
continue to occur in 4-10% of the fifty million surgical procedures performed annually in 
the United States (Weaver et al., 2017). While improvement initiatives focused on 
structured intraoperative communication provide a framework to guide basic 
communication, they lack a thorough consideration of healthcare culture and of the 
emerging, dynamic nature of interprofessional communicative relationships (Anderson & 
















Opinions vary about the appropriate role and timing of reviewing the literature in 
grounded theory studies (Charmaz, 2014). Initial suggestions by Glaser and Strauss 
included delaying literature reviews in order to avoid experiencing the data as ‘received 
theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Many scholars now consider a review of relevant 
research as critical to an informed qualitative approach by a novice researcher (Charmaz, 
2014). Thornberg describes an informed qualitative approach as using existing research 
to flexibly, creatively, and reflectively locate the phenomenon within existing knowledge 
and determine any knowledge gaps (Thornberg, 2012). Familiarity with existing research 
has been identified to enrich data analysis by enhancing sensitivity to nuance, providing a 
source for data comparison, and improving theoretical sampling methods (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Critical self-awareness must be used to evaluate existing research and 
avoid its imposition on the new study data (Charmaz, 2014). A deeper understanding of 
the competing or conflicting views surrounding the phenomenon also facilitates a more 
balanced presentation of study results and its place among existing literature (Charmaz, 
2014). The review of the literature for this study was conducted to orient the researcher to 
the existing research of the phenomenon and was revisited and extended after theory 
generation (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). 
A broad literature review was initially conducted to explore the complexity of 
interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment. Effective 
interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment has been described as 
both a facilitating factor and as a result of interprofessional collaborative practice; 
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therefore, a survey of the research in both areas was indicated. Although the terms 
interprofessional collaboration, interprofessional collaborative practice (ICP), and 
teamwork are often used interchangeably, there are subtle differences among them 
(Morgan et al., 2015; Reeves et al., 2018; Xyrichis & Ream, 2008). These differences are 
explored in the following sections. 
Interprofessional Collaboration 
Interprofessional collaboration occurs when members of different professional 
groups use open communication to make decisions, manage conflict, and solve problems 
to positively impact patient care (Careau et al., 2015; Nair et al., 2012). This 
collaboration is often experienced as a brief ‘overlap’ of practice such as during 
healthcare provider consultations, care conferences, or as a result of handoffs between 
specialties or levels of care (Colligan et al., 2015; Rayo et al., 2013). Providers 
experiencing this level of collaboration may share time and space only briefly, if at all, 
with their primary professional responsibilities being satisfied independently. As the 
overlap of collaborative practice is extended due to an increased level of necessary 
coordination to provide healthcare delivery or to a more intensely shared practice setting, 
interprofessional collaboration is perhaps more accurately described as ICP. 
Interprofessional Collaborative Practice 
ICP within healthcare delivery is when two or more people from different 
professions actively engage to coordinate and provide patient care within a practice 
setting (Morgan et al., 2015). This level of coordination of care often occurs as a series of 
related actions and reactions based on each profession’s responsibilities and 
specialization. Providers may collaborate in person, electronically, or by phone to 
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accomplish complementary, but often profession-specific goals. One example of ICP in 
healthcare is when providers from different professions collaborate to provide concurrent 
but ‘overlapping’ care to a trauma patient in the emergency department. A trauma patient 
might require services from the nurses, physicians, radiology and laboratory personnel, 
and consulting surgeons within the practice environment of the emergency department, 
but often these providers accomplish their goals consecutively instead of simultaneously 
during non-emergent patient care. 
Teamwork 
An even more interdependent level of ICP is experienced when teams are required 
to function beyond task work as they interact simultaneously, dynamically, and 
recursively through teamwork toward a valued common goal (Fiscella & McDaniel, 
2018; Salas et al., 2005).  
Teamwork has been identified as occurring within “a collection of individuals 
who are interdependent in their tasks, who share responsibility for outcomes, who 
see themselves and who are seen by others as an intact social entity embedded in 
one or more larger social systems and who manage their relationships across 
organisational boundaries” (Cohen & Bailey, 1997, p. 239).  
 
These relationships across organizational and professional boundaries are constructed and 
managed through interprofessional communication, usually within a shared practice 
setting (Morgan et al., 2015).  
Culture in Collaboration 
The interprofessional collaboration required for healthcare delivery is socially 
constructed through negotiation across professional boundaries based on culturally- and 
historically-constructed professional identities and norms (Collin et al., 2011; Finn, 
2008). Practicing across professional boundaries requires healthcare professionals to 
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negotiate the contradiction between the specialization of their professions and the 
integration necessary for effective collaborative practice (Finn, 2008). Successful 
negotiation and navigation between and among professional boundaries yields increased 
role awareness, SA, team decision-making, and the distributed or collective cognition 
required to create the shared mental models necessary for effective ICP (Frasier et al., 
2015; Nagpal, Vats, Lamb, et al., 2010; Ren et al., 2008; Sonoda et al., 2017).  
Establishing the interprofessional communication necessary for successful collaboration 
is often complicated by the differences in professional socialization experienced by the 
professional groups. Professional socialization has been identified to influence the 
perceptions, motivations, and expectations of interprofessional communication. These 
differences are described as being especially pronounced between the roles of physician 
and nurse (Carney et al., 2010; Gardezi et al., 2009; Sollami et al., 2015; Wauben et al., 
2011).  
Physicians identify collaboration as successful when physician instructions are 
followed and physician needs are anticipated (Carney et al., 2010). This perception often 
results in the use of pragmatic, utilitarian communication strategies intended to better 
explain or delegate aspects of patient care (Haddara & Lingard, 2013). In contrast, nurses 
define collaboration as having their input considered and respected by physicians, which 
often results in the employment of emancipatory communication strategies designed to 
ameliorate issues of medical dominance (Carney et al., 2010; Columbus et al., 2018; 
Haddara & Lingard, 2013). These differences in communication perceptions and 
motivations likely originate from the professional socialization of the physician and nurse 
roles and become potentially problematic as the need for collaboration is increased 
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through the more interdependent practice in the intraoperative environment (James-
Scotter et al., 2019; Khalili et al., 2014; Nugus et al., 2010; Sacks et al., 2015; Schmidt et 
al., 2021; Thomson et al., 2015). Because successful healthcare delivery is increasingly 
delivered through ICP occurring within healthcare teams, current research has been 
focused on the desire to better understand the components, characteristics, and processes 
involved in effective collaborative practice through teamwork.  
Collaboration through Teamwork 
A review of the current teamwork literature demonstrates conceptual similarities 
among many of the most widely accepted teamwork models. Nine critical considerations 
for teamwork have been identified: culture, composition, context, cooperation, 
coordination, cognition, conflict, coaching, and communication (Salas et al., 2015). Salas 
et al. make distinctions among the critical considerations through division into two 
categories: influencing conditions and emergent states. Culture, composition, and context 
are described as influencing conditions because variability within them can, directly and 
indirectly, impact outcomes through their influence on the emergent states. The emergent 
states of cooperation, coordination, cognition, conflict, coaching, and communication are 
dynamic processes involved in the interdependent accomplishment of team goals (Salas 
et al., 2015). Emergent states are constructs that demonstrate dynamic properties of teams 
that vary as a function of inputs, processes, outcomes, and context. Emergent states are 
demonstrated through the affective, cognitive, and motivational states of teams rather 
than through the nature of team member interactions (Marks et al., 2001). 
The critical considerations described by Salas et al. (2015) demonstrate essential 
relationships with healthcare teamwork concepts described by Lemieux-Charles and 
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McGuire in the Integrated Team Effectiveness Model (ITEM) (Lemieux-Charles & 
McGuire, 2006). The ITEM similarly identifies team processes (defined as emergent 
states by Salas et al. (2015) of communication, coordination, and conflict; the processes 
of collaboration (cooperation), decision making (cognition), and leadership (coaching) 
represent the critical considerations described by Salas et al. (2015). ITEM also explores 
the influencing conditions of culture, composition, and context identified by Salas, et al, 
(2015). Minor differences in terminology are explored in the following table, Table 2.1: 
Comparison of Teamwork Processes and Factors; any information omitted was not 
present in the source research. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Teamwork Processes and Factors 
 Critical considerations of 
teamwork 
 
Salas, et al., 2015 
ITEM 













Behavioral teamwork actions 
motivated by the attitudes, 






Shared team understanding 
developed from team 
interactions that includes team 
norms, member roles and 
responsibilities, and familiarity 








Enactment of leadership 
behaviors to set team direction 




Group shared assumptions that 
manifest in member behavior 
based on their beliefs, values, 
and perceived norms 








Includes team configuration, 
diversity, and team member 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes 
Composition 






Characteristics of the situation 
that influence the meaning and 






Resources (human, technology) 
Structure/Characteristics 
 
Compelling components of ITEM not included in the critical considerations by 
Salas et al. are the influence of task design on the functioning of teams and the subjective 
and objective outcomes of that functioning (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). 
Features of task design include interdependence, autonomy, specialized knowledge, 
clarity of rules, work cycle, and the use of quality frameworks. Team effectiveness is 
demonstrated through the subjective outcome of perceived team effectiveness and the 
objective outcomes of quality of care, organizational cost-effectiveness, and patient 
functional status and satisfaction (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). These 
components are critical to a holistic understanding of the level of teamwork necessary for 
improved healthcare delivery, yet current instruments and interventions primarily focus 
on the measurable and observable processes of teamwork without adequate exploration 
of the influence of culture and perceived teamwork effectiveness on the interprofessional 
communication that makes teamwork possible (Feitosa et al., 2018). Interprofessional 
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communication and teamwork in the intraoperative environment have been identified as 
being particularly influenced by culture, indicating the need for a more focused literature 
search to understand them within that context (Sacks et al., 2015). 
Interprofessional Communication in the Operating Room 
A focused literature search was conducted to capture findings from contemporary 
research surrounding interprofessional communication in the operating room. A 
systematic search of electronic databases including CINAHL Complete, Academic 
Search Premier, MEDLINE, MEDLINE with Full Text, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and 
SocINDEX using the search terms operat* OR surg*, communication and team yielded 
an initial 2,629 articles published between 2012 and 2019 in peer-reviewed journals using 
English. After duplicate results were eliminated, the provided titles and abbreviated 
abstracts were reviewed to reduce the number of articles to 265. Full abstracts of the 265 
articles were read and compared using inclusion criteria to further reduce the articles to 
106. Articles from the search were included if they described research related to 
communication among surgical team members within the surgical environment; research 
conducted within simulation was not included. Additional articles were located through 
ancestry and descendant searches using Google Scholar. Complete text versions of 
articles meeting the described inclusion criteria were read and the studies were organized 
according to their identified research focus into four broad categories: structured surgical 
team communication, communication culture in the operating room, facilitators and 





Structured Surgical Team Communication 
Recognition of the parallels between the interdependence found within aviation 
flight crews and within surgical teams combined with the success of the aviation industry 
in dramatically reducing safety errors through communication resulted in the adaptation 
and adoption by healthcare providers of similar forms of structured communication (Kuy 
& Romero, 2017; Savage, Gaffney, Laith, et al., 2017). Structured communication is any 
systematic or standardized approach to communication intended to facilitate the ability or 
opportunity for individuals to communicate effectively (Etherington et al., 2019). Forms 
of structured communication adapted for use in the surgical environment included the 
surgical safety checklist, specialized and extended checklists, critical event checklists for 
unanticipated surgical events, and briefings and debriefings. 
Surgical Safety Checklists 
Effective and consistent implementation of surgical safety checklists facilitates 
communication among surgical team members by preventing both latent and active 
process failures and has demonstrated results including reduced morbidity and mortality, 
improved teamwork behaviors, increased safety compliance, and improved patient 
outcomes (Bergs et al., 2014; Collins et al., 2014; Hempel et al., 2015; Lingard et al., 
2008; V.E. Lyons & L. L. Popejoy, 2014; Pugel et al., 2015; Russ et al., 2013; Savage, 
Gaffney, Laith, et al., 2017; Wæhle et al., 2012b; Ziman et al., 2018). Unfortunately, 
many surgical team members describe the ineffective and inconsistent implementation of 
the surgical safety checklist due to hierarchal culture, time constraints, asynchronous 
workflows, lack of clinical champions to support implementation, lack of sufficient 
implementation training, and disinclination by physicians to openly share case-relevant 
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information (Braaf et al., 2013; Cullati et al., 2014; Dellinger, 2016; Erestam et al., 2017; 
Gillespie et al., 2018; Gillespie, Marshall, et al., 2016; Gurses et al., 2012; Melekie & 
Getahun, 2015; Ragusa et al., 2016; Sendlhofer et al., 2016). Research suggests the 
disinclination to share relevant information is more likely due to perceived time pressure 
or failure to realize the necessity of relaying information rather than as a deliberate 
withholding of information by physicians (Nagpal, Vats, Lamb, et al., 2010).  
Other studies indicate partial checklist compliance is common and suggest the 
components necessary to facilitate fluid interprofessional communication, including the 
introduction by name and role of all participating team members before the procedure 
begins, are among those most often neglected during implementation (Biffl et al., 2015; 
Birnbach et al., 2017; Garland et al., 2017; Rydenfalt et al., 2013; Singer et al., 2016). 
This partial checklist compliance reduces the effectiveness of implementation through the 
reduction of ‘error trapping’ and the resulting time-sensitive modifications needed to 
adjust for intraoperative deviations (Weiser & Berry, 2013).  Error trapping 
“acknowledges that individuals are prone to errors and that checklists help identify and 
adjust for these fallibilities before they cause harm” (Weiser & Berry, 2013, p. 138).  
Additionally, sign-in and sign-out were identified as particularly vulnerable to 
information loss because of the increased time pressures of their timing in the surgical 
procedure (Gillespie, Withers, et al., 2016).  
In spite of these recognized limitations, the majority of study participants reported 
perceptions of value in surgical safety checklist implementation and described effective 
implementation as a “state of mind” that is ideally advocated and coordinated by 
physicians (Cullati et al., 2014; Gillespie, Withers, et al., 2016; Haugen et al., 2015; V.E. 
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Lyons & L. L. Popejoy, 2014; Valerio et al., 2017; Willassen et al., 2018). However, the 
findings identify significant differences among professions regarding perceptions of the 
value of both the individual components of the checklist and of its social acceptance by 
all surgical team members (Birnbach et al., 2017; Molina et al., 2017; Norton et al., 2016; 
Papaconstantinou et al., 2013; Rodrigues et al., 2013; Santana et al., 2016; Wæhle et al., 
2012a). 
Identified improvements from checklist implementation in patient safety and 
surgical team communication seem to be dependent upon team flexibility, continued 
engagement of key stakeholders, and deliberate error detection and recovery during all 
phases of the surgical procedure (Collins et al., 2014; Fudickar, 2012; McDowell & 
McComb, 2014; Oak et al., 2015; Russ et al., 2013; Siu et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2012). 
Unfortunately, research indicates effective implementation of the surgical safety checklist 
is lowest in countries with the most potential for improvement due to the lack of 
perception of checklist value, transparency, and accountability within surgical teams 
(Aveling et al., 2013; De Jager et al., 2016; Vohra et al., 2015).  
Specialized and Extended Checklists 
Specialized checklists can be customized by the surgical team and implemented to 
address provider concerns specific to the procedure, such as unusual positioning 
considerations, potential complications, or nonstandard equipment or medication needs 
(Soler & Smith, 2012; Song et al., 2013). Specialized checklists have been developed to 
protect patients during specific procedures such as robotic urologic surgery, endoscopy, 
management of renal tumors, tumor thrombectomy, and venous thromboembolism 
(Ahmed et al., 2013; Joshi et al., 2012; Perry et al., 2015; Sommer et al., 2018). Extended 
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versions of surgical checklists include additions such as involvement of the patient or 
caregivers in the initial time out, assigned checklist components for specific team 
members, briefing and debriefing, and employment of an electronic checklist display that 
is visible to all team members (Berrisford et al., 2012; Cabral et al., 2016; Kozusko et al., 
2016; Nelson, 2017; Nissan et al., 2014).  
Critical Event Checklists for Unanticipated Surgical Events 
While effective implementation of checklists has demonstrated benefits to patient 
safety, additional protection is required during unanticipated surgical events that 
necessitate deviations from the surgical plan (Gauss et al., 2013; Sanders, 2015). Critical 
event checklists for use during intraoperative adverse events have been developed to 
protect patients who are experiencing or are in danger of experiencing air embolism, 
anaphylaxis, unstable bradycardia, cardiac arrest, failed airway, fire, hemorrhage, 
hypotension, hypoxia, malignant hyperthermia, and tachycardia (Clebone et al., 2017; 
Subbe et al., 2017; Ziewacz et al., 2011). The display of critical event checklists during 
IAEs serves as a cognitive aid to shorten reaction time and reduce critical response 
component omissions through improved communication and collaboration (Everett et al., 
2017; Marshall, 2017).  
As valuable as safety checklists seem to be, unanticipated intraoperative 
deviations occur and require spontaneous, unstructured interprofessional communication 
to heighten SA, update the team mental model (TMM), and deliver optimal patient care 
(Nakarada-Kordic et al., 2016). Although several instruments have been developed to 
potentially evaluate the reactive response to unanticipated deviations in healthcare 
provision, only one has been identified to evaluate the proactive problem detection 
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strategies needed to prevent IAEs through the use of cross-monitoring the performance of 
other healthcare team members to increase SA (Hughes et al., 2014; Marlow et al., 2018). 
The Emergency Medicine Crisis Resource Management (EMCRM) instrument was 
adapted from CRM for use in emergency departments. EMCRM emphasizes anticipation 
and includes unique measures that consider resource awareness, help mobilization, and 
continual situational monitoring by the team (Reznek et al., 2003). More effective 
checklist implementation has been found to be supported by factors that facilitate 
interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment. 
Facilitators for Implementation of Checklists 
Facilitating factors for thorough, effective checklist implementation include 
perceptions of psychological safety, collective responsibility for implementation, 
presence of an active safety culture, and adequate checklist training (Bergs et al., 2015; 
Wangoo et al., 2016b). Even when the necessary facilitating factors are present, effective 
checklist implementation is an inherently complex social intervention that requires 
consistent, deliberate cooperation and enhanced interactions among surgical team 
members (Bergs et al., 2015). Some studies suggest implementation is perceived as more 
critical when the checklist is adapted to be extended or specialized based on the surgical 
procedure because the included content has ‘earned’ its way into the process through 
situational relevance (Burian et al., 2018). Scheduled communication that extends beyond 
the structured communication provided by checklist implementation is often achieved 
through the use of briefing and debriefing by the surgical team. Commonly occurring 
timing for the facilitators of structured communication and scheduled communication is 
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identified in Figure 2.1, Timing for Facilitators of Structured Intraoperative 
Communication. 
Figure 2.1: Timing for Facilitators of Structured Intraoperative Communication 
 
Barriers to Implementation of Checklists  
Reported organizational and cultural barriers to successful implementation 
included participant perceptions of checklist component ambiguity, inappropriate timing 
of implementation, duplication with existing checks, lack of communication by 
physicians, time constraints, the unaddressed presence of ‘unaccounted-for risks’, unclear 
expectations, lack of willingness to assume personal responsibility for checklist 
implementation, lack of agreement of necessity for particular components, resistance by 
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senior clinicians, and lack of merging existing workflow with checklist timing (Bergs et 
al., 2015; Cadman, 2016; Fourcade et al., 2012; Russ, Sevdalis, et al., 2015). 
Briefing and Debriefing 
Structured extension of surgical communication is often accomplished through 
the use of formal briefing and debriefing or ‘huddles’ of the surgical team. Briefing 
occurs before the surgical procedure to clarify procedural expectations, encourage 
questions from the surgical team, and clearly define professional roles (Donnelly, 2017). 
Debriefing occurs after the surgical procedure and allows the surgical team to collectively 
process events to deliver patient care and identify resources for future cases (Finch et al., 
2019; Steelman, 2014). Effective briefing and debriefing have been associated with 
increased team communication, increased detection of defects or deficiencies in care, 
decreased surgical workflow disruptions, decreased patient complications, and 
improvements in perception of surgical safety climate (Bandari et al., 2012; Brindle et al., 
2018; Fong et al., 2016; Hicks et al., 2014; Kleiner et al., 2014). Some reported benefits 
of debriefing include a significant reduction in surgical mortality, substantial gains in 
surgical team productivity and efficiency, a reduction in the number of surgical 
procedures with reported IAEs, and a more favorable safety climate (Bartz-Kurycki et al., 
2017; Rose & Rose, 2018). Debriefing also offers opportunities for the surgical team to 
process near-failures when IAEs are ‘caught’ before they have adverse consequences for 
patients. Processing near-failures as a team makes recurrence of these incidents less 
likely (Bohomol & de Abreu Tartali, 2013). Paradoxical effects of surgical team briefing 
include possible disruption of positive communication, reinforcement of professional 
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divisions, creation of tension, masking of knowledge gaps, and perpetuation of a 
problematic communication culture (Whyte et al., 2008). 
Communication Culture 
Effective interprofessional communication beyond the implementation of surgical 
safety checklists depends upon the establishment and maintenance of a dialogic, 
participatory communication culture (Bleakley et al., 2013; Stein & Heiss, 2015). Three 
identified barriers to a participatory communication culture are (1) demonstrations of 
underlying lack of respect for surgical team members, (2) expressions of the existing 
surgical team power structure or hierarchy, and (3) stresses caused by time pressure that 
decrease collaboration (Tanaka et al., 2019). The establishment and maintenance of a 
communication culture to promote collaboration are inherently complex because of the 
interprofessional composition of surgical teams and the influence of socialization on the 
participating professions (Garrett, 2016). 
Surgical teams are necessarily composed of several healthcare professions 
demonstrating responsibility for both independent and interdependent tasks during the 
surgical process. Surgical teams often experience fluid membership, with team and 
individual changes related to skill differentiation or specialization, authority 
differentiation, and temporal stability (Hollenbeck et al., 2012). These dimensions of 
team composition often translate to a communication culture that is constantly being 
negotiated among professional roles (if team members are unfamiliar with each other) or 
among individuals (if team members are familiar with each other) (Tørring et al., 2019). 
This ongoing negotiation of communication culture directly impacts patient 
outcomes. Research identifies that interprofessional communication problems are 
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associated with over 60% of intraoperative adverse events and suggests many of these 
events as potentially preventable through preoperative briefings, team familiarity and 
stability, and standardized communication (Bohomol & de Abreu Tartali, 2013; 
Elbardissi & Sundt, 2012). Interprofessional communication problems are described as 
being exacerbated by hierarchal factors, with interprofessional communication exchanges 
in the intraoperative environment failing nearly twice as often as intraprofessional 
exchanges (Frasier et al., 2019; Hu, Arriaga, Peyre, et al., 2012).  Interprofessional 
communication occurs between and among different professions, while intraprofessional 
communication takes place between and among providers from the same profession.  
Recognition of the potential challenges inherent in interprofessional 
communication and its importance to healthcare delivery by interprofessional teams 
prompted attempts to better define and understand its complexity by healthcare leaders. 
An essential component in many of these initiatives was the shift in focus from the 
individual healthcare provider to the systems level of care. This shift led to several 
initiatives that outline specific interprofessional practice competencies  (Dolansky & 
Moore, 2013). The Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) initiative developed 
six competencies based on the IOM reports that included expectations related to 
evidence-based practice, informatics, patient-centered care, quality improvement, safety, 
and teamwork and collaboration (Sherwood & Zomorodi, 2014). Examples of the 
proposed relevance of these competencies in the intraoperative environment are given in 












Integrate clinical expertise 
with current evidence and 
patient preferences 
Determine necessary care 
interventions based on 
evidence-based standards 
Informatics Use information to manage 
and communicate knowledge, 
support decision-making, and 
mitigate error 
Collect, monitor, and record 
intraoperative patient data in 
EHR as necessary to provide 
accurate account of 
intraoperative events  
Patient-centered 
care 
Provide compassionate care 
based on patient needs, 
preferences, and values 
Advocate for patient based 
on their stated preferences or 
evolving care needs 
Quality 
improvement 
Use available data to monitor 
patient care outcomes and to 
improve processes 
Identify and address areas to 
benefit from process 
improvement strategies 
Safety Use system and individual 
performance to minimize risk 
of patient harm 
1) Recognize and report 
intraoperative errors and near 
misses 
2) Participate in root cause 
analyses of IAEs 
Teamwork and 
collaboration 
Demonstrate mutual respect, 






with all surgical team 
members based on their 
limitations, roles, and 
strengths 
 
While all of the QSEN competencies are relevant to the intraoperative 
environment, development of the teamwork and collaboration competency is critical to 
the functioning of interprofessional teams. Interprofessional teams have been identified 
as microsystems and as the building blocks within the provision of healthcare (Disch, 
2012). To function as microsystems, teams must work across professional boundaries, 
practice group decision-making, and maintain collective responsibility for outcomes 
through constant collaboration. Collaboration under these circumstances depends on 
effective interprofessional communication. This collaboration through communication is 
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complicated by the fact that nurses and surgeons “come from different cultures, use 
specialized languages, face different societal expectations, hold differing viewpoints and 
goals, and often define success very differently” (Disch, 2012, p. 93).  
Facilitation and maintenance of effective interprofessional communication during 
healthcare provision were determined to be of such importance that the Interprofessional 
Education Collaborative (IPEC) developed eight core interprofessional communication 
competencies. IPEC competencies state that health care team members should choose 
effective communication techniques and tools to enhance team function through 
interactions; organize information so that it is easily understood through the strategic 
avoidance of discipline-specific terminology; communicate respectfully to ensure 
common understanding of relevant information; actively listen to all team members, 
provide instructive, sensitive feedback to team members; initiate respectful 
communication during crucial conversations; recognize rights and responsibilities for 
effective communication within team culture; and maintain awareness of the impact of 
teamwork to patient care (IPEC Panel, 2011) . The focused development of these 
communication competencies is critical to the reduction of interprofessional 
communication failures. Communication failures are influenced by systemic, 
organizational, and interpersonal factors that are perceived and experienced very 
differently based on professional roles (Collette et al., 2017; Elfering et al., 2017; Wade, 
2014).  
Perceptions of Communication 
The perceptions and experiences of existing intraoperative communication vary 
most markedly between surgeons and surgical nurses (Bohomol & de Abreu Tartali, 
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2013; Collette et al., 2017; de Fátima Cordeiro Trajano et al., 2017; Rodrigues et al., 
2013). Existing institutional culture often results in surgical nurses feeling intimidated by 
possible reprehension or retaliation when there is a need to alert the surgical team to 
patient safety issues (Bohomol & de Abreu Tartali, 2013). Surgical nurses have been 
described as requiring ‘moral courage’ to transcend perceptions of repressive institutional 
culture when advocating for patient safety in the intraoperative environment (Dinndorf-
Hogenson, 2015). Surgical nurses are also described as carefully monitoring the timing 
and tone of their interactions with those at the surgical field to be perceived as ‘less 
intrusive’ (Redaelli, 2018). Many surgical nurses report a lack of information reciprocity 
and the frequent absence of acknowledgment by surgeons of attempts at interprofessional 
communication (Carrera et al., 2017).  
In contrast, surgeons experience interprofessional interactions quite differently 
and often describe perceptions of both higher levels of collaboration and better 
interprofessional communication (Prati & Pietrantoni, 2014; Wahr et al., 2013). The 
different perceptions are potentially due to the role expectations and socialization of 
surgeons, who are traditionally responsible for the management of surgical resources 
through informal intraoperative briefing and the effective ‘use’ or delegation of support 
staff (Healey et al., 2010). Surgeons also frequently are not present with other surgical 
team members during the preoperative phase for planning or clarification and may 
experience intraoperative questions as distractions or disruptions (Collette et al., 2017; 
Healey et al., 2010).  This communication dynamic potentially results in patterns of 
unasked or unanswered questions by surgical nurses and the use of authoritarian 
observations, opinions, and statements by surgeons (Kirschbaum et al., 2015).  While this 
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adherence to hierarchy is often detrimental to interprofessional communication, it also 
seems to have been traditionally perceived as necessary to establish and maintain 
effective surgical team leadership (Kirschbaum, 2012). 
Surgical Team Leadership 
  Leadership behaviors identified as required by the surgeon role include 
guiding/supporting/directing other team members, managing tasks and resources, making 
decisions, and maintaining surgical or professional standards; when coupled with the 
evolving technical demands of the surgical procedure, these required behaviors often lead 
to inherently unbalanced dialogue (Bleakley et al., 2013; Parker et al., 2012). This 
unbalanced dialogue can result in tense, non-directed communication that can fail to 
achieve desired results in a timely manner (Barling et al., 2018; Parker et al., 2012; 
Rogers et al., 2013). 
Unexpected findings by Gostlow et al. (2017) identified observational assessment 
scores of surgeons as decreasing over time from peak scores at the end of surgical 
fellowships (Gostlow et al., 2017). Surgeon scores on the Non-Technical Skills for 
Surgeons survey decreased significantly for behaviors such as including others in 
discussion for alternative courses of action in the surgical plan, informing team members 
of potential problems, and establishing a shared understanding or TMM. This could be 
explained as resulting from surgeons assuming more senior roles in the operating room, 
and therefore having the ‘final say’ instead of seeking input from others, or by the 
instrument’s reliance on the observable, explicit articulation of the processes involved 
and evaluated.  Additionally, and perhaps more concerning, the findings reported noted a 
significant decrease over time for all three elements of leadership. The leadership 
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category includes behaviors such as proper introductions of all team members, 
appropriately delegating tasks, and tailoring leadership to support other team members 
(Gostlow et al., 2017). These leadership behaviors are potentially critical to the 
establishment of psychological safety and a team communication culture.   
Unfortunately, research suggests many of the skills required for surgical 
leadership have traditionally been taught primarily through the ‘hidden curriculum’ in 
medical school and residency instead of through deliberate, focused training (Hull & 
Sevdalis, 2015). And although surgeons initiate intraoperative interprofessional 
communication approximately 80% of the time, studies show that surgeons could 
correctly identify team members by name and professional role less than 45% of the time. 
This lack of name knowledge and use often results in ambiguous communication by the 
surgeon that is not explicitly directed toward any particular team member or role 
(Birnbach et al., 2017; Sevdalis, Wong, et al., 2012). The time-sensitive surgical 
leadership expectation without established communicative relationships potentially 
reinforces a vertical, role-based hierarchy that may inhibit interprofessional questions or 
clarifications and result in accommodation or avoidance communication behaviors by 
nurses and junior team members (Etchegaray et al., 2019; Jayasuriya-Illesinghe et al., 
2016; Landgren et al., 2016; Pattni et al., 2018; Skevington et al., 2012; Tsui-Fen et al., 
2017). 
Reliance on accommodation or avoidance communication behaviors by surgical 
team members inhibits both the development of a TMM to anticipate needed actions 
during the surgical procedure and the maintenance of the SA needed to respond to 
unanticipated intraoperative events (Attree, 2007; Rydenfält et al., 2012). An evolving 
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TMM and SA contribute to prospective sensemaking by the surgical team (Bleakley et 
al., 2013; Rosness et al., 2016). Prospective sensemaking occurs when the concern and 
attention of the surgical team are deliberately directed toward events that may happen in 
the future, collective expectations are formed, and interrelated team actions are refined to 
construct a more manageable situation or an optimal outcome (Rosness et al., 2016). 
Certain types of leadership behaviors support or suppress the communication culture and 
the types of communication that enable prospective sensemaking (Barling et al., 2018). 
Leadership behaviors that support effective communication culture include emphasizing 
the collective mission, motivating through enthusiasm or optimism, soliciting and valuing 
other provider perspectives, considering the needs and abilities of other team members, 
and encouraging others to perform beyond expectations based on evolving contextual 
needs (Hu et al., 2016). 
It is important to note that perceptions of operating room leadership often change 
throughout surgical cases depending on the roles and tenure of the surgical team 
members who are present. Circulating nurses are considered responsible for many of the 
initial tasks directly involved with preoperative patient assessments, verifying surgical 
consents, preparing the operating room for cases, and patient transport. Once the patient 
arrives in the operating room, there is often a perceived ‘shift’ of control to the 
anesthesiologist during patient intubation, anesthesia induction, and patient positioning. 
When the surgical residents and surgeons arrive in the operating room, many of the 
necessary decisions become their responsibility as surgical approaches are navigated, 
equipment needs are finalized, and the procedure begins. IAEs can further complicate 
who is perceived as ‘responsible’ for different aspects of surgical patient care, and those 
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responsibilities often continue to change as patients are stabilized, surgery ends, and the 
patient is transported to the postoperative care unit. 
Unstructured Communication 
Timely, optimal responses to intraoperative deviations and unexpected 
circumstances require surgical teams to move beyond the structured communication 
prompted through surgical checklists to effective unstructured communication (Garrett, 
2016). Unstructured communication strategies discussed in the literature include the 
implementation of an informal intraoperative briefing by the surgeon and the use of 
scheduled or unscheduled surgical pauses to encourage evolving TMMs (Erestam et al., 
2017; Healey et al., 2010). Unlike surgical checklists, these strategies do not seem to be 
universally employed, and their use appears to be dependent upon the intraoperative 
communication culture. The facilitators and barriers that impact interprofessional 
communication in the intraoperative environment are explored in the next section. 
Facilitators and Barriers in Interprofessional Communication 
Interprofessional communication facilitators that seem to enable prospective 
sensemaking through unstructured communication include prompts for structured 
communication and deliberate surgical pauses. Scheduled and unscheduled surgical 
pauses contribute to prospective sensemaking by allowing surgical team members time to 
mentally ‘reset’ and encouraging team communication. Unscheduled pauses seem 
especially helpful when in doubt of necessary surgical strategy or after resolution of 
surgical deviations or intraoperative adverse events (Erestam et al., 2017). Research 
suggests that even unscheduled pauses due to ‘waiting’ during the surgical procedure are 
often used by team members to augment SA and update the team’s mental model (Santos 
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et al., 2012). Characteristics of individual team members that seem to function as 
facilitators for interprofessional communication include team member age and 
professional tenure, with communication improvements occurring with increased age, 
length of professional experience, and time worked on the same unit (Önler et al., 2018). 
Current research also identifies many barriers to establishing and maintaining 
effective interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment. Barriers 
include distractions, interruptions, miscommunications, disruptive behavior, and robotic 
technology (Almeras, 2019; Bellandi et al., 2018; Weber et al., 2018; Weigl et al., 2018). 
Distractions and interruptions include noise peaks, telephone calls, music, physician 
pager notifications, door openings, equipment noises or failures, case-irrelevant 
conversations, and visual disturbances such as obscurement of monitors (Keller et al., 
2016; Plaxton, 2017; Seelandt et al., 2014; Weigl et al., 2015; Weldon et al., 2015; 
Wright, 2016). Although research seems to indicate case-irrelevant conversations as 
being adapted or reduced based on the difficulty of the procedure, one study linked case-
irrelevant communication during incision closure with increased incidence of surgical site 
infections (Tschan et al., 2015; Widmer et al., 2018). Other studies report significant 
distractions as occurring as often as every ten minutes intraoperatively and describe 80% 
of these distractions as leading to at least one member of the surgical team being visibly 
distracted from his or her task (Sevdalis et al., 2014; Wheelock et al., 2015; Yoong et al., 
2015). Distractions are suggested to occur as often as every three minutes in the 
intraoperative environment and contribute to up to 50% of surgical error (Mentis et al., 
2016). Distractions and interruptions have been linked to fewer patient safety checks, 
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impaired team performance, extended surgical times, more surgical error, and increased 
surgical site infections (McMullan et al., 2021). 
Miscommunications occur as often as every eight minutes in the intraoperative 
environment (Hu, Arriaga, Peyre, et al., 2012). Intraoperative miscommunications 
include failures of communication audience, content, purpose, or occasion and are more 
likely to occur during interprofessional communication (Hu, Arriaga, Peyre, et al., 2012).  
Miscommunication within the surgical team has been identified as a significant predictor 
of deviation in the expected length of surgical procedures (Gillespie et al., 2012a). Both 
miscommunications and interruptions have been identified to negatively impact surgical 
teams’ non-technical skills, including communication (Gillespie et al., 2017). One study 
identified that as much as 30% percent of case-specific information is lost to 
miscommunication and revealed a positive correlation between procedure interruptions 
and miscommunications (Gillespie et al., 2012b). 
Another barrier to interprofessional communication in the intraoperative 
environment is disruptive behavior. Disruptive behavior ranges from dysfunctional 
behavior that alters clinical care to intimidating behavior that is emotionally or physically 
abusive (Van Norman, 2015; Villafranca et al., 2018). Disruptive or unprofessional 
behavior by surgeons, such as bullying, harassment, and undermining behavior, has been 
linked to adverse patient outcomes (Cochran & Elder, 2014; Cooper et al., 2019; Halim 
& Riding, 2018; Heslin et al., 2019). Disruptive behavior by surgeons has been identified 
to lead to increased care errors due to impaired decision-making by the surgical team, 
heightened surgical team anxiety, and decreased efficacy of communication (Cochran & 
Elder, 2015). One study reported that some surgeons view intraoperative questions by 
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interprofessional support staff as disruptive behavior (Bezemer et al., 2016). Finally, 
while robotic assistance during specific surgical procedures produces clear benefits for 
patient outcomes, it has also been identified as a barrier that impacts decision-making, 
teamwork, and communication in the intraoperative environment (Randell et al., 2016). 
This impact is potentially realized through changes in the physical proximity of team 
members and the resulting decreased SA because of the surgeon’s separation from the 
sterile field (Gill & Randell, 2016; Randell et al., 2014). 
Intraoperative Communication Instruments and Interventions 
Identification of the importance of interprofessional communication in the 
operating room has resulted in focused research to better understand, describe, and 
quantify its contributing factors in spite of the methodological challenges inherent in the 
surgical environment (Jones et al., 2016).  Access to the surgical environment is limited 
by its confined and sterile characteristics, and the interdependent, concurrent action 
makes a comprehensive understanding of communicative interactions potentially elusive 
(Bonzo et al., 2016). Any attempt at evaluating the quality of intraoperative 
communication is further complicated by the significance of nonverbal modes of 
communication such as body positions/movements, facial expressions, visual gaze 
direction, gestures, and tool manipulations (Tiferes et al., 2019). Additionally, team 
processes and communication culture are often specific to the surgical teams being 
studied and therefore are not conducive to standardization or generalization (Tiferes et 
al., 2015).  In an attempt to standardize the study of intraoperative communication, a 
review of a priori coding schemes by Tiferes et al. identified six dimensions of surgical 
team interactions. Dimensions described included information flow, information 
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recipients, surgery phase of occurrence, statement type, topic or theme of statement, and 
communication breakdown effects (Tiferes et al., 2015). Although Tiferes suggested 
these dimensions be developed and incorporated into procedure-specific evaluation 
instruments, as of this writing there is no evidence of that having been accomplished.  
Recognition of the impact of interprofessional communication and its influence on 
teamwork has resulted in the development of instruments to measure relevant behaviors 
(Hasnain et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2015; Hull et al., 2012; Hull et al., 2011; Rubin, 1993; 
Sevdalis, Hull, et al., 2012; Tan et al., 2017; Thannhauser et al., 2010; Valentine et al., 
2015; Wingo et al., 2015). Unfortunately, the reliability, validity, and teamwork content 
of many existing instruments have been described as ‘largely unaddressed’ in the current 
research, with many measures having undergone little or no reliability or validity testing 
(Li et al., 2018; Marlow et al., 2018). Two of the most widely used instruments to 
evaluate teamwork behaviors in surgeons are the Oxford Non-Technical Skills and the 
Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons instruments. 
NOTECHS II 
The Oxford Non-Technical Skills scale (NOTECHS II) was adapted from 
evaluations of non-technical skills in the aviation industry, does not seem to be 
confounded by technical skill assessment, and correlates with other reliable measures of 
teamwork behaviors (Robertson et al., 2014). Non-technical skills have been identified as 
the cognitive, personal, and social skills that combine with technical skills to contribute 
to safe and efficient performance (Hull & Sevdalis, 2015). NOTECHS II scores are based 
on evaluations of observable teamwork behaviors by trained observers; interprofessional 
communication is only evaluated indirectly through teamwork behaviors. NOTECHS II 
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evaluates leadership, support and inclusion of other team members, conflict resolution, 
risk assessment, identification of future/potential problems (briefing), outcome review 
(debriefing), establishment and maintenance of TMMs, and prioritization of SA 
(Robertson et al., 2014). Reliability coefficients for the five subscales of NOTECHS 
range between .77 and .87 (Sevdalis et al., 2008). Inter-rater reliability has been reported 
as a range of 0.68-0.97 within-group, with totals ranging from 0.95-0.99 (Shoemaker et 
al., 2015). Another study reported test-retest reliability of (P > 0⋅09) and interobserver 
reliability of (Rwg = 0⋅96) (Li et al., 2018). NOTECHS has been identified to have 
predictive, concurrent, construct, content, and convergent validity in the operative 
environment (Mishra et al., 2009; Shoemaker et al., 2015). 
Non-technical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) 
Another instrument, the Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) behavior 
rating system, specifically measures the non-technical skills identified for safe surgical 
practice by surgeons. NOTSS groups surgical leadership behaviors into five categories: 
communication and teamwork, decision making, leadership, SA, and task management 
(Yule et al., 2008). These categories consist of observable behaviors that include many 
previously discussed, such as gathering information, anticipating and projecting 
procedural needs (SA), selecting and communicating options, flexibility and responding 
to change, establishing a shared understanding (TMM), and coordinating team activities. 
Reliability for the NOTSS varies based on the number of cases, number of raters, and the 
experience level of raters involved in the research. While the Leadership and 
Communication and Teamwork categories had acceptable within-group agreement with 
raters of varied experience, the other categories improved to acceptable levels only when 
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expert raters were used (Jung et al., 2018). Inter-rater reliability has been reported as ICC 
= 0⋅12–0⋅83 (Li et al., 2018). NOTSS has also been identified to demonstrate longitudinal 
construct validity (Dedy et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2018; Yule et al., 2015). 
Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS) 
In contrast to the instruments that focus only on the teamwork and communication 
behaviors of surgeons, the Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS) is 
designed to be a comprehensive measure of the teamwork behaviors of the entire surgical 
team (Undre et al., 2007). OTAS is based on Dickinson and McIntyre’s Model of 
Teamwork and consists of two sections (Walters et al., 2016). The first section of OTAS 
is a task checklist to monitor the completion of intraoperative tasks related to the patient, 
equipment and provisions, and communication. The second section uses a seven-point 
scale to rate five teamwork behaviors: communication, coordination, cooperation, 
leadership, and monitoring/awareness. Communication includes the quantity and quality 
of information exchanged among surgical team members; coordination evaluates the time 
management of tasks and activities; cooperation measures backup behaviors and support 
of other team members; and leadership includes team direction, SA/monitoring 
behaviors, and assertiveness. Trained observers identify and record collaborative 
behaviors using the checklists (Walters et al., 2016). These collaborative behaviors are 
then scored using a six-point ordinal summary scale, with unexpected emerging 
behaviors recorded on a qualitative assessment form (Rehim et al., 2017). Research 
suggests OTAS is a valid and reliable instrument to assess collaboration within surgical 
teams and even suggests acceptable interrater reliability (ICCs ≥ 0.68) among novice and 
expert raters after focused observational training (Walters et al., 2016). Another study 
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reported significant correlations for reliability for all measured behaviors except 
communication (r=0.35) (Undre et al., 2007). OTAS has also been reported to 
demonstrate both content and construct validity (Hull et al., 2011; Sevdalis et al., 2009).  
Communication and Teamwork Skills Assessment 
Another instrument, the Communication and Teamwork Skills Assessment 
(CATS), was developed based on principles from crisis resource management (CRM). 
CRM was initially developed for use in the aviation industry (as Crew Resource 
Management) and was adapted and medicalized when behavioral parallels were 
recognized between aviation and healthcare delivery. CRM identifies principles of 
individual and team behaviors such as SA, decision making, and team management and 
was designed to quantitatively measure team skills and interprofessional communication 
(Gaba, 2010). CATS uses trained observers to assess interprofessional responsive 
communication through direct observation of teamwork behaviors in cooperation, 
coordination, SA, and communication (Havyer et al., 2016). Cooperation behaviors 
include requesting help or additional resources, cross-monitoring team member 
behaviors, and receptivity to assertions or feedback (Frankel et al., 2007). Coordination 
behaviors include verbalization of the surgical plan and timeframes, briefing, and 
debriefing. SA behaviors include visually scanning the environment and verbalizing 
changes in patient condition or the surgical plan. Communication behaviors include using 
SBAR, performing closed-loop communication, providing verbal updates, and 
maintaining an appropriate tone of voice (Frankel et al., 2007). Additionally, CRM 
addresses behaviors needed when crisis situations arise, such as the establishment of an 
event manager (clear leadership), recognizable escalation of concerns, and the use of 
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critical event language. Behaviors are rated as ‘observed and good’, as demonstrating 
‘variation in quality’, or as ‘expected but not observed’. Each completed observation 
results in an overall score, category scores, and specific behavior quality scores (Frankel 
et al., 2007). Since its initial development, CATS has not been statistically validated and 
information regarding validity and reliability is negligible (Frankel et al., 2007; 
Shoemaker et al., 2015). 
The following table, Comparison of Intraoperative Teamwork Instruments, 
illustrates the similarities among the categories measured by the instruments used in the 
intraoperative environment. While all four instruments measure communication, 
cooperation, and SA, the instruments designed to evaluate the teamwork behaviors 
demonstrated by surgeons measure decision making and do not measure coordination 
with other team members. Table 2.3: Comparison of Intraoperative Teamwork 
Instruments provides a comparison of the instruments. 
Table 2.3: Comparison of Intraoperative Teamwork Instruments 









Communication X X X X 
Coordination   X X 
Cooperation X X X X 
Leadership X X X  
SA X X X X 
Decision 
making 
X X   
 
Communication Training 
Research indicates that surgical teams benefit from interprofessional 
communication training interventions through increased cognitive and affective learning, 
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skill-based transfers, and teamwork performance (Kirschbaum et al., 2015; Salas et al., 
2018). Two training interventions developed to focus on interprofessional communication 
are CRM and Team Strategies and Tools to Enhance Performance and Patient Safety 
(Team STEPPS).  
Crew/Crisis Resource Management (CRM) 
CRM concepts originated during a 1979 NASA workshop from exploration of the 
role of human error in aviation incidents (Kuy & Romero, 2017). Similarities between 
aviation crew performance and the interdependence of surgical teams led to the 
adaptation of CRM concepts to promote safety culture and improved interprofessional 
communication in the operating room. CRM concepts focus on advocacy and assertion 
training, briefings and debriefings, decision-making skills, SA, and team communication 
(LaPoint, 2012). CRM uses interprofessional role-playing group exercises to teach non-
technical skills, including closed-loop communication, creating and sustaining shared 
mental models, decision making, risk recognition, SA, speaking-up strategies, and team 
formation (Savage, Gaffney, Laith, et al., 2017). CRM also directly addresses 
unanticipated surgical deviations through threat and error management (TEM) strategies 
designed to establish SA and resolve the situation as a team (Gordon et al., 2012). 
Tailored checklists are provided to support the trained skills and those required for 
effective crosschecks, debriefings, and standardized time-outs. CRM also describes the 
development of blame-free culture, maintenance of only case-relevant conversation 
during critical surgical phases, and acknowledgment of the potential effects of physician 
fatigue on patient outcomes (Aerden et al., 2014). 
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Studies have demonstrated that CRM positively influences safety culture, reduces 
intraoperative adverse events, and improves surgical patient outcomes but suggests 
periodic reinforcement and retraining to be necessary for continued demonstrated benefits 
(Ricci & Brumsted, 2012; Savage, Gaffney, Laith, et al., 2017; Wakeman & Langham, 
2018). A five-year study of CRM-trained pediatric surgical teams by Savage et al. 
identified significant, sustained improvement in communication, leadership, mutual 
support, and situation monitoring (Savage, Gaffney, Laith, et al., 2017). Another study by 
Kuy et al. described sustained safety climate improvement after CRM training in 24 of 27 
surveyed areas; unfortunately, two of the three areas identified with regression to baseline 
or worse involved “I am frequently unable to express disagreement with staff/attending 
physician” and “in this clinical area, it is difficult to discuss errors”, indicating persisting 
problematic interprofessional communication patterns (Kuy & Romero, 2017). 
Team STEPPS 
Team STEPPS was developed in 2006 by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) and the United States Department of Defense (USDOD) based on 
four teamwork competencies: team leadership, mutual support, situation monitoring, and 
communication (Rhee et al., 2017). These four teamwork competencies are the 
foundation for focused training that provides specific performance criteria for both 
structured communication strategies to improve the implementation of the surgical safety 
checklist and skills training to facilitate the initiation of unstructured communication 
when surgical team members experience concerns or perceive deviations or deficiencies 
in patient care delivery. The structured communication strategies include standardized 
behavioral expectations for the surgical time out that compel engaged participation and 
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leadership, mandatory team member introductions, and verbalization of procedural 
complexity and anticipated events (Rhee et al., 2017). 
Performance criteria for unstructured communicative interactions identify skills 
such as call-out, check-back, and the 2-challenge rule. During call-out, a surgical team 
member verbalizes changes in patient condition or procedural expectations for all team 
members to hear, potentially increasing SA and updating the TMM. Check-back is a form 
of closed-loop communication requiring the recipient of information to repeat it aloud to 
confirm understanding of the content and the speaker’s intention. Finally, the 2-challenge 
rule offers surgical team members ‘challenge’ strategies to state or restate concerns 
regarding patient care; the team member being challenged is expected to verbally 
acknowledge the information (Rhee et al., 2017).  
Additional focused language to be used by team members to ‘stop the line’ (all 
team activity) uses the CUS acronym through one of three statements: “I am Concerned”, 
“I am Uncomfortable”, or “This is a Safety issue”. Team STEPPS training teaches that 
when any team member uses one of the three CUS statements, the issue should be 
immediately acknowledged and addressed. This not only empowers surgical team 
members to make assertive statements when needed, it also provides ‘signal phrases’ to 
indicate the perceived magnitude of the situation to the recipients. 
Reported barriers to the successful implementation of Team STEPPS include 
inadequate training, lack of administrative support, failure to address hierarchal 
differences/incivility in healthcare, and resistance to change from CRM concepts 
(Clapper & Ng, 2013). In spite of these barriers, research by Weld et al. identified both 
improvements in patient safety and in operating room efficiency with significantly 
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shorter anesthesia and case times and significantly higher on-time case starts (Weld et al., 
2016). Reported benefits include increased recognition of surgical team members, 
increased active engagement of surgical team members, increased anticipation of case 
complexity, and improved discussion of resource status (Rhee et al., 2017).  
Lessons from the Cockpit 
The need for immediate improvement in intraoperative communication 
understandably led to the adoption and adaptation of communication interventions and 
strategies that demonstrated significant safety results within the aviation industry 
(Davidson & Brennan, 2019). The interventions currently in use do seem to prompt and 
measure communication that contributes directly to patient safety outcomes, but results 
are dependent upon surgical team buy-in, persistent and consistent implementation, and 
the establishment and maintenance of a positive safety culture supported through the 
organizational structure (Abbott et al., 2018; Cadman, 2016; de Jager et al., 2018; 
Gillespie et al., 2013; Pugel et al., 2015; Rakoff et al., 2017; Russ, Rout, et al., 2015). 
While checklists and structured communication focus on the basic, prescribed 
information exchange needed to facilitate the prevention of or response to IAEs, they 
often fail to recognize IAEs as emergent phenomena that are combinations of 
unanticipated circumstances or developments (Karanasios et al., 2017). As such, IAEs 
require both recognition and articulation of dynamic situations and mutual construction 
of evolving plans of action (TMMs). This mutual construction and implementation of 
needed action are accomplished through effective interprofessional communication. 
While many of the described studies have focused on the content and timing of 
communication, this study focused on the context and the process.  
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The similarities identified between the communication cultures of the cockpit and 
the operating room provided a logical starting point to influence the content and timing of 
structured team communication, but the inherent cultural differences between the two 
types of teams indicate the need for more research to realize further communication 
improvements (Teunissen et al., 2019). Although flight crews enter the cockpit with 
hierarchal constraints, they enter as professionals socialized through the same culture. In 
contrast, surgical team composition results in team members from different professional 
cultures needing to socially negotiate and construct communication culture within the 
intraoperative practice environment. While research indicates the interventions in use 
impact the quantity of interprofessional communication, they do not provide an informed 
understanding of unstructured communication quality. Effective unstructured 
communication patterns and strategies are what are needed to adequately respond to 
IAEs, and those patterns and strategies are perhaps better understood through familiarity 
with relevant existing theory and concepts. 
Theoretical Constructs 
Building grounded theory often requires engaging with existing theory to be able 
to successfully develop theory to a higher level (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Familiarity 
with existing theory offers the researcher opportunities to experience sensitizing concepts 
that deepen researcher perceptions and provide a ‘starting point for building analysis’ 
(Charmaz, 2003). Sensitizing concepts have been identified as providing a general sense 
of reference that suggests direction and structure to the researcher with the understanding 
that they may eventually be displaced or supplemented through the developing theory 
(Bowen, 2006). One theory potentially useful to the understanding of the interactive 
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processes involved in establishing effective communication and teamwork behaviors is 
Structurating Activity Theory (SAT). 
Structurating Activity Theory 
SAT, a combination of Structuration Theory (ST) and Cultural-Historical Activity 
Theory (CHAT), identifies mediated activity as both reproducing and transforming social 
structure over time through system transformations (Seamons & Canary, 2017). ST is an 
organizational communication theory developed primarily by Anthony Giddens in the 
late 1970s. Giddens objected to the presentation of social interaction as a ‘timeless 
snapshot’ and believed the study of social practices, forms, and processes to only make 
sense within the context of time and space (Carlstein, 1981). ST focuses on human 
practice systems and makes the distinction between structure, the resources and rules that 
drive individual practices, and systems, or observable relationship patterns among 
individuals (Canary, 2010; McPhee & Canary, 2014). In ST, individuals use resources 
and rules within systems as they both influence the structures within the system and are 
influenced by them as the system evolves. This focus on social construction within 
systems includes the tenet stating, “ongoing action is influenced by structure while at the 
same time such action produces, reproduces, and transforms structure over time” 
(Canary, 2010, p. 29). Actions and structures are influenced by norms, codes of meaning, 
and allocative and authoritative resources.  
CHAT is an evolving, third-generation communication theory initially conceived 
by abbotian psychologist Lev Vygotsky in response to assertions that psychic processes 
occurred in isolation (Roth, 2007). Instead, Vygotsky proposed social interaction as the 
origin and context of higher mental functions and identified tools as mediators of 
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psychological and social processes (Wertsch, 1990). He described cognitive development 
as occurring through collaboration with others in a zone of proximal development  
(Tudge, 1993). Vygotsky identified a unified framework where a subject interacts with an 
object and artifacts or tools in this zone of proximal development (the environment) 
(Yamagata-Lynch, 2010). The subject within the framework is the individual or 
individuals engaged in activity centered on the activity’s object or goal. Tools function to 
accumulate and transmit social knowledge and can include prior knowledge and artifacts 
that mediate the social interaction (Kaptelinin et al., 1995; Yamagata-Lynch, 2007).  
Many of the basic elements described in CHAT are similar to those of ST. There 
are rules (norms), tools (resources), and recursive, reciprocal influences between 
systems/individuals and structure (Canary, 2010). SAT’s integration of ST with CHAT is 
useful because it explains relationships between social structure and social action 
(Canary, 2010). Heather Canary proposed SAT in 2010 as a theoretical framework better 
able to explain the complexity of the social construction of policy knowledge; the social 
construction and organization of collective knowledge in public policy are similar to the 
social construction of collective practice (teamwork) within healthcare delivery (Seamons 
& Canary, 2017). Canary offers six propositions within SAT to explain SAT’s four 
theoretical constructs. First, social structures both constrain and enable knowledge 
construction within the social context. Second, elements of systems shape knowledge 
construction through interaction and mediated action. Third, mediated action both 
transforms and reproduces structure through system transformations. Fourth, resolution 
of contradictions can generate knowledge construction through interaction. Fifth, 
constructed knowledge is further mediated by the elements of the intersection of activity 
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systems (individuals).  Sixth, structural features both enable and constrain knowledge 
construction as it “produces, reproduces, or transforms social structure” (Canary, 2010, p. 
37). 
Canary describes the four types of knowledge (explicit, tacit, group, and 
individual) as being dimensions that are interdependent instead of independent types. The 
assertion is made that since knowledge is open to alteration, knowledge should be 
considered as a process and not a static possession to be transferred or shared (Canary, 
2010). “Knowledge can be a mediating resource of the system, an integral aspect of a 
subject in the system, or a rule. Knowledge is also an (intended or unintended) outcome 
of activity as people develop knowledge through their interactions within the activity 
system” (Canary, 2010, p. 44). The knowledge process is influenced through four types 
of system-level contradictions. Primary contradictions describe inherent fundamental 
tensions between or among components of systems. Secondary contradictions become 
apparent when new elements are introduced that cannot be resolved without 
transformation of practice or system elements. Tertiary contradictions occur when new 
motives are introduced into systems. Finally, quaternary contradictions result from 
tension between or among the central activities of systems. Engeström and Sannino 
described four possible discursive manifestations of contradictions: dilemmas, conflicts, 
critical conflicts, and double blinds. Dilemmas are identified as exchanges or expressions 
caused by incompatible evaluations between individuals. Conflicts are arguments, 
criticisms, disagreements, or resistance. Critical conflicts are when self-doubt or 
functional paralysis occur because of contradictory motives. Last, double blinds are 
described as processes where individuals perceive an inescapable problem because there 
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are only unacceptable alternatives as solutions (Karanasios et al., 2017). While activity 
theorists view contradictions as indicating the developmental capacity of an activity, 
perception of contradictions as flaws or malfunctions of the system potentially result in 
unfavorable responses. Contradictions can be perceived to destabilize a situation or to 
transform it through expansive learning; this distinction is relevant because the 
perception often determines the response (Karanasios et al., 2017).  
There are individual implications from both ST and CHAT that are potentially 
useful in the grounded theory exploration of the motivations and perceptions involved in 
intraoperative communication. While implications from both theories are relevant to this 
research, considering them in combination more accurately reflects the complexity of the 
social processes involved. The following table, Table 2.4: Relevance of Structuration 
Theory to Research, identifies implications from each theory that were considered during 
the research. 
Table 2.4: Relevance of Structuration Theory to Research 
Structuration Theory Possible relevance to research 
Structure influences - but does not 
necessarily determine - action. 
Are there indications participants believe 
they are acting within/outside of the 
bounds of existing structure? 
Participant knowledge about the 
contributions to structure can be 
discursive or practical knowledge. 
Do participants describe ‘filtering’ or 
limiting their interactions based on 
explicit or tacit expectations? 
Agentic participants should be considered 
as active, reflexive contributors to 
structure. 
Do participants describe their actions as 
proactive or reactive? Do they reflect on 
the interactions and outcomes? 
There are unintended consequences and 
unacknowledged conditions of actions 
that contribute to structure. 
Do participants reflect on how actions 
contribute to structure? On how their 
actions are influenced by structure? 
Social interactions are often guided by 
recurrent practices that constitute structure 
and influence individual identity. 
Do participants describe recursive 
practices that influence structure? Their 
contributions to structure? 
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Structure can be enabling, constraining, or 
both. 
How do participants describe their 
perceptions of the influence of structure 
on interaction? 
Structure is constantly produced or 
reproduced through action. 
How do participants experience the 
evolution of structure through their 
actions? 
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory  
Social interaction is a series of processes 
that is contained within a bounded activity 
system. 
Do participants describe perceived social 
or professional boundaries? Expectations? 
As an individual? As a team member? 
Participants engage in goal-directed and 
object-oriented activity using the tools and 
rules of the activity system. 
Do participants describe conflicts between 
individual goals (professional 
responsibilities or concerns) and the 
object (interdependent surgical patient 
care)? 
Tools can be conceptual or material and 
may include protocols and language 
specific to the activity system. 
Do participants describe perceptions of 
being influenced by the procedural or 
language norms of the activity system? 
Rules are culturally- and historically-
formed behaviors that mediate the object-
oriented activity of the subjects. 
Do participants describe perceptions of 
being enabled or constrained by the rules 
of the activity system? 
 
Although a primary goal of this research is to develop new grounded theory to 
better understand interprofessional communication in the intraoperative environment, 
SAT provides a valuable framework to explore the perceptions, expectations, and 
motivations of surgeons and nurses surrounding the knowledge construction and 
contradictions that occur during IAEs. This exploration potentially allows a deeper 
understanding of the possible differences in perceived value and purpose of 
interprofessional communication when the surgical team is considered as a system. 
Systems Thinking 
Beginning to understand interprofessional communication within the context of 
the system in which it occurs can be facilitated through the use of systems thinking. 
Systems have been described as combinations or groups of interacting, interdependent, 
and interrelated elements that form collective entities (Arnold & Wade, 2015). These 
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interrelated elements work together under particular conditions that influence their 
behavior to perform actions needed to achieve the system’s purpose (Plack et al., 2018). 
While each element of the system is necessary, the elements are individually insufficient 
to accomplish the aims of the system. 
Surgical teams might be even more accurately identified as being complex 
adaptive systems. Complex adaptive systems (CASs) are groups of independent agents 
who are free to act in ways that are not necessarily predictable and whose actions are 
interconnected and interdependent (Holden, 2005). Several assumptions about complex 
adaptive systems are relevant to surgical teams. 
1) CASs are composed of independent agents who operate based on social, 
psychological, and physical rules that are independent of the system. 
2) The rules of the independent agents are not homogeneous. Because of this, 
their behaviors and goals are likely to contribute to conflict. This conflict 
leads to adaptive behaviors. These behaviors may be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. 
3) As the independent agents gain experience and experiment within the system, 
their learning changes the behavior of the system. 
4) The adaptive behaviors and learning result in the self-organization of the 
system. Self-organization results in the emergence of behavior patterns rather 
than blind conformity to the design of the system. 
5) The CAS does not have one single point of control; therefore CAS behaviors 
are easier to influence than to control (Mahajan et al., 2017). 
6) Independent agents interact dynamically and exchange information. 
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7) These interactions are non-linear and not bound by a framework to control the 
information flow. 
8) CAS interactions have both enhancing (positive) and inhibiting (negative) 
feedback loops. 
9) CASs do not function under equilibrium; there is constant change. 
10)  CASs are an extension of their histories, and the system’s actions and effects 
are not easily predictable. 
11)  Complexity within the CAS results from the interaction patterns between and 
among the independent elements (Holden, 2005). 
12)  CASs are resilient when functioning effectively. Resilience is demonstrated 
when CASs “dynamically respond to unanticipated disturbances to sustain 
safe operation amidst conditions that could lead to failure” (Kolodzey et al., 
2019, p. 1). 
The processes and structures of CASs form through interactions and relationships 
that are non-linear, recursive, and systemic (Arrow et al., 2000). It is therefore necessary 
to avoid exploration of CAS interactions and relationships using consideration of the 
surgical team as an isolated system without considering the relevant embedding concepts 
such as other workgroups, patients and families, and the physical environment (Arrow et 
al., 2000). The functioning of the CAS is constantly influenced through both internal and 
external two-way exchanges of information, stimulation, and resources. These 
assumptions about CAS are essential when seeking to understand systems thinking within 
surgical teams.   
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Systems thinking gained recognition through efforts by Barry Richmond to 
distinguish his research from the model- and simulation-based studies of System 
Dynamics (Richmond, 1994). Richmond described systems thinking as a way to learn to 
make reliable predictions or inferences about behavior by developing a deep 
understanding of underlying structure. Richmond identified systems thinking as both a 
paradigm and a learning method, with the paradigm conditioning the learning method and 
the learning method supporting the paradigm. Richmond’s explanation of systems 
thinking as a paradigm potentially has interesting applications to the exploration of the 
surgical team as a system because it addresses vantage point (professional role) and 
thinking skills as they relate to SA and the assignment of meaning. This is illustrated 
below in Figure 2.2: Systems Thinking. 






The vantage point is the position 
of the individual
'relative to the fray'
Thinking skills
Thinking skills include:
1) What aspects of the fray are 
ignored
2) What aspects are attended to 




Systems thinking was identified by Peter Senge as the fifth discipline of 
disciplines that are consistently exhibited by learning organizations: 1) personal mastery, 
2) mental models, 3) shared vision, 4) team learning, and 5) systems thinking (Arnold & 
Wade, 2015; Thornton et al., 2004). Senge described systems thinking as “a discipline for 
seeing wholes and a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing 
patterns of change rather than static snapshots” (Arnold & Wade, 2015, p. 672). Critics 
suggested the concept of systems thinking proposed by Senge failed to address the 
agency of the individual in practice-based learning (Caldwell, 2012). The agency and 
behaviors of the individual were considered by Sweeney & Sterman to result in the 
dynamic complexity of systems (Sweeney & Sterman, 2000). Systems thinking was 
proposed to represent and assess dynamic complexity, identify and represent positive and 
negative feedback processes, identify nonlinearities, and challenge the recognized 
boundaries of mental models. 
Systems thinking definitions soon evolved to include the interdependent 
relationships and patterns among a system’s components and link individual behaviors to 
the environment (Dolansky & Moore, 2013; Stalter et al., 2017).  
Systems thinking is the ability to recognize, understand, and synthesize the 
interactions and interdependencies in a set of components designed for a specific 
purpose. This strategy includes the ability to recognize patterns and repetitions in 
interactions and an understanding of how actions and components can reinforce or 
counteract each other. These relationships and patterns occur at different 
dimensions: temporal, spatial, social, technical or cultural (Dolansky & Moore, 
2013, p. 4).  
 
A recent concept analysis of systems thinking extended the definition as “what 
occurs when the individual’s social, cultural, physical, emotional, and political attributes 
change the system but at the same time are changed by the collective nature of the system 
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(Stalter et al., 2017, p. 326). The analysis identified four defining attributes: a dynamic 
system, a holistic perspective, attempted identification of patterns, and the potential for 
transformation. This potential for transformation among teams has been suggested to 
reduce disempowerment and promote increased collaboration among healthcare providers 
(Stalter et al., 2017). In addition to systems thinking, this research considered the 
importance of two key concepts to the interprofessional communication process: 
situational awareness and proxy efficacy. 
Situational Awareness 
One key concept that influenced this study of interprofessional communication in 
the operating room is situational awareness (SA). SA is the shared, dynamic, and 
evolving understanding of environmental elements that includes the (1) perception of 
those elements (information), (2) comprehension of their contextual meaning, and (3) 
projection of their significance to the situation (Endsley, 1995; Stanton et al., 2017). 
Shared surgical team SA is inextricably related to the dynamic TMM because SA is the 
basis for understanding when and how the team mental model must adapt to respond to 
IAEs. A TMM is the team members’ mental representation and shared understanding of 
relevant knowledge to the team’s task environment. The TMM includes shared team- and 
task-related knowledge that allows the team to interpret information 
 similarly, develop shared expectations for the future, and have similar 
explanations for situations. TMMs also facilitate more accurate direction of resources and 
anticipation of other team members’ needs (Fernandez et al., 2017). TMMs are often 
initially established during structured forms of communication like the implementation of 
the surgical safety checklist and might accurately be described as the shared surgical 
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team plan based on known information and anticipated developments. When new 
information and unanticipated developments emerge, SA ideally provides the impetus for 
appropriate, responsive action by surgical team members. 
An understanding of the SA components and their barriers can emphasize its 
dependence on effective interprofessional communication in the operating room. Any of 
the three components may be influenced by physical or social psychological stressors 
common to the operating room environment (Endsley, 1995). Physical stressors include 
noise, distractions, temperature, lighting, and fatigue. Social psychological stressors 
include mental load, anxiety, uncertainty, fear, and time pressure. The first component of 
SA is the perception or recognition of relevant environmental elements or changes. Team 
members may fail to perceive or recognize relevant information due to limited attention, 
other-focused attention, or available working memory capacity. The second component 
of SA is the comprehension of relevant information’s contextual meaning. Team 
members may fail to comprehend or integrate the contextual meaning of information due 
to limitations in the individual mental model or the use of an incorrect mental model for 
reference. The third component is the projection of the information’s significance to the 
emerging situation. Team members may not be able to understand the significance of 
conveyed information due to the lack of an appropriate, highly developed mental model 
or individual attention and memory limitations. These barriers to SA underline the critical 
role of effective interprofessional communication to ‘bridge the gaps’ in shared 






Responses to IAEs in the operating room environment are often accomplished 
through increased SA and proxy efficacy. Proxy efficacy is one’s belief in the skills, 
abilities, and willingness of a third party or parties to function effectively on his or her 
behalf to facilitate desired outcomes (Bandura, 2001). Proxy efficacy evolved from 
Albert Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory. Bandura initially identified three forms of 
efficacy: personal, collective, and proxy. He furthered his research through the 
development of the concepts of personal, collective, and proxy efficacy as temporal 
extensions of agency; people engage in forethought about the accomplishment of tasks in 
anticipation of events (Bandura, 2001). Personal efficacy is comprised of the beliefs of an 
individual surrounding his or her competence in a given situation. When people feel 
deficient in personal efficacy, they will often rely on proxy efficacy to achieve the 
desired results.  
This reliance on proxy efficacy is vital in the intraoperative environment because 
information is often exchanged with the intention of (1) encouraging others to perform an 
action on behalf or at the behest of the team member, or (2) seeking approval to perform 
actions that might be commonly outside of that team member’s role and responsibilities. 
Examples of proxy efficacy in the operating room could occur if there is unexpected 
bleeding and the surgeon (1) asks the nurse to order blood (since the surgeon is occupied 
at the sterile field) or (2) the nurse asks permission to order blood (since this is usually 
accomplished through surgeon orders). Many surgical team member relationships 
develop to include the assumption of proxy efficacy that works in concert with SA. An 
example of this could be when the circulating nurse notices evidence of unexpected blood 
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loss and orders the blood without having either conversation (asking or being asked). 
Although ordering blood is usually beyond the nurse’s defined role, it often falls within a 
previously established role of proxy efficacy or agency. 
Summary 
 An initial review of the literature underlines the importance of advancing a better 
understanding of how unstructured interprofessional communication develops in the 
intraoperative environment. Effective interprofessional communication has been 
indicated as fundamental to interprofessional collaboration, to ICP, and to teamwork, but 
has primarily been studied within the intraoperative environment through the 
implementation and evaluation of structured surgical communication such as the surgical 
safety checklist, specialized checklists, extended checklists, critical event checklists, and 
briefing/debriefing strategies. While checklists and communication prompts can improve 
interprofessional communication surrounding known information and anticipated 
developments, they fail to address the unstructured communication needed for surgical 
teams to respond to IAEs (Teunissen et al., 2019). Improvements in unstructured 
interprofessional communication are indicated to be established and maintained through 
changes in intraoperative communication culture. 
 Current perceptions of intraoperative communication culture include widely 
variable perceptions of both the intent and the success of interprofessional 
communication in the operating room, and this variability is most significant between 
surgeons and surgical nurses. This variability is often attributed to professional 
socialization and its traditional focus on the role of the surgeon as the surgical team 
leader. Although this professional hierarchy is necessary to provide the structure to 
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facilitate a successful surgical process, it has also been shown to result in reliance on 
accommodation or avoidance communication behaviors by other surgical team members 
(Walrath et al., 2015). The use of accommodation and avoidance communication 
behaviors by subordinate surgical team members inhibits the evolving SA needed to 
respond to unanticipated IAEs.  
 Instruments designed to evaluate interprofessional communication among surgical 
teams in the intraoperative environment focus on behaviors that demonstrate cooperation, 
communication, and SA. Communication interventions attempt to encourage and 
inculcate those behaviors through the use of prescribed prompts and specialized language 
but often deteriorate over time and through team member resistance. Research suggests 
that the improvements attained through checklists and interventions are limited and not 
necessarily lasting. 
Significant, lasting changes in interprofessional communication might best be 
made through gaining a better understanding of how surgeons and surgical nurses 
perceive the social construction and exchange of knowledge in the intraoperative 
environment. This understanding of the social construction of knowledge and its 
influence on the SA needed to respond to IAEs requires ‘taking a step back’ to explore 
how the structures and strategies of interprofessional communication are experienced by 
those involved.  
This study focused on surgeons’ and surgical nurses’ communicative patterns and 
relationships because of the complexities identified in the literature. A recent ethological 
study described the intraoperative surgeon-nurse relationship as demonstrating the least 
cooperation and the most conflict among members of the surgical team (Jones et al., 
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2018). Ethological studies focus on behavior from an evolutionary perspective and 
explore cooperation and conflict as they are influenced by hierarchy and gender (Jones et 
al., 2018). This study by Jones et al. is valuable to this research because it explored 
spontaneous behavior and identified trends related to hierarchy, gender, and professional 
role as they influence cooperation and conflict in the intraoperative environment. Lack of 
cooperation and the presence of conflict within the surgical team potentially contribute to 
IAEs and undesirable patient outcomes through ineffective interprofessional 
communication. Although surgical nurses are almost twice as likely as other surgical 
team members to witness an IAE or near-failure in the operating room, they are often 
hesitant to report either type of occurrence to the surgical team (Makary & Daniel, 2016; 
Mariet, 2016; Molina et al., 2017; Norton et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014; Sydor et al., 
2013). The perceptions and patterns of interprofessional communication between 














The purpose of this study was to explore the psychosocial processes involved 
during the establishment and maintenance of interprofessional communication 
surrounding IAEs or potential IAEs in the operating room. Interprofessional 
communication is established and maintained between and among individuals and groups 
through social interactions influenced by the meanings constructed and assigned by the 
participants. Exploring participant meanings of their experiences through sensitive, 
deliberate data collection to inductively and deductively establish themes and patterns is 
often best accomplished through the use of qualitative methods (Creswell, 2013).  
Grounded theory is a qualitative method designed to explore situated interactions among 
participants through the collection and iterative analysis of data (Wæhle et al., 2012b). 
The systematic, concurrent data collection and analysis occur with the intention of 
moving beyond description of the experiences to formulation of a theory that is grounded 
in the data (Creswell, 2013; Wæhle et al., 2012b).  
Grounded theory is appropriate to the study of interprofessional communication in 
the intraoperative environment because it considers the assumptions, beliefs, feelings, 
ideologies, and values of the participants during interactions that are influenced by 
relational hierarchies (Creswell, 2013). The contextual consideration of these interactions 
was achieved through deliberate focus on a shared problem, IAEs, and how participants 
experienced their interactions attempting problem resolution through interprofessional 
communication (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Wæhle et al., 2012b). This contextual 
consideration included the researcher’s perspective and position through the framework 
of social constructivism (Charmaz, 2014). Social constructivism is an interpretive 
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framework that identifies subjective meanings of experiences as being historically and 
socially negotiated through interaction (Creswell, 2013). The constructivist approach 
does not seek a single ‘truth’; instead, it acknowledges that the perception of truth is 
based on perspective (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). This approach considers and discloses 
the importance and roles of interactions, interpretive understandings, social contexts, and 
viewpoints to the conduction of grounded theory research (Charmaz, 2014).  
Research Design 
 Design of a grounded theory study requires researcher responsiveness and 
vigilance throughout the process to ensure methodological coherence and rigor (Morse et 
al., 2002). Coherence and rigor were provided through deliberate, consistent consultation 
with method experts using evaluative criteria addressing credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Design of the study was based 
on the following assumptions: (a) surgical staff initiating and maintaining 
interprofessional communication during IAEs share a common experience, (b) 
interprofessional communication during IAEs is a psychosocial process that evolves over 
time, and (c) the psychosocial process is influenced by the social context in which the 
interprofessional communication occurs. The psychosocial processes inherent in 
involvement with IAEs and their descriptions were potentially sensitive to participants; 
any resulting reluctance was addressed through transparency, assurance of participant 
confidentiality, and demonstrated engagement with the existing surgical team culture 
(Dundon & Ryan, 2010; Råheim et al., 2016). The following sections describe the 
research methods used for the study through the identification and description of 
participant and setting selection, relevant tools, data analysis, and data quality. 
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Participants and Setting 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained prior to the conduction 
of this research through the IRB required by the research site. Approval to recruit 
participants was sought and obtained through the hospital research council and the 
perioperative unit director. Participation was voluntary, participant risk was minimal, and 
no adverse events were anticipated or reported from participation. Participants for the 
study were selected through the use of both purposive and theoretical sampling. 
Purposive sampling is used initially in grounded theory to recruit participants who are 
going through or who have been through the relevant psychosocial processes and to more 
accurately determine the scope of the phenomena (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Analysis of 
initial participant interviews facilitates subsequent theoretical sampling designed to 
increase understanding of the developing categories and refine their focus (Charmaz, 
2014). Theoretical sampling strategies function to explore emerging theory and may 
include changes in selection of participants, study sites, or interview style to define 
“pivotal qualities of the studied experience” (Charmaz, 2014; Draucker et al., 2007). 
Theoretical sampling continues until theoretical saturation is achieved; this saturation 
determines the adequacy of the final sample size (Charmaz, 2014; Gentles et al., 2015). 
Because sample size in grounded theory cannot be determined or anticipated a 
priori, a tentative participant sample of 15-20 surgeons and 15-20 nurses was proposed 
(Aldiabat & Navenec, 2018). The initial participant sample included men and women (1) 
of any race or ethnicity (2) functioning within the professional roles of surgeon or nurse 
within a pediatric setting (3) with varying levels of career experience and (4) team tenure 
in an effort to illuminate relevant theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2014). Potential 
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participants were excluded if they expressed reluctance to candidly describe their 
experiences surrounding communication during IAEs or reported being unable to recall 
qualifying intraoperative events. 
Twenty participants were recruited for study interviews. There were five surgeon 
participants; two were female and three were male. They ranged in age from thirty-five 
years old to ‘over sixty’. The surgeons had between two and thirty-five years of 
experience as attending surgeons and indicated they worked with primarily the same 
surgical team members between 25-50% of the time (one surgeon), approximately 50% 
of the time (one surgeon) and approximately 75% of the time (three surgeons). The 
fifteen nurse participants were all female. Nurse participants ranged in age from twenty-
three to over sixty-five years of age and had between three months and thirty-six years of 
intraoperative experience. They reported working with primarily the same surgical team 
members less than 25% of the time (three nurses), between 50%-75% of the time (five 
nurses), approximately 75% of the time (six nurses), and approximately 95% of the time 
(one nurse). Nineteen of the participants were Caucasian and one participant was African 
American. 
Participants were recruited from an urban academic pediatric hospital for in-depth 
interviews encouraging narrative description of their perspectives and experiences with 
interprofessional communication surrounding salient events in the operating room. An 
urban academic pediatric hospital was used for several reasons. First, urban academic 
hospitals traditionally provide healthcare to higher-acuity patients whose surgical care 
potentially results in higher complexity and increased likelihood of IAEs.  
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Second, research suggests a lower incidence of ‘speaking up’ behaviors in academic 
hospitals, perhaps due to the fluid, uncertain nature of the medical hierarchy where 
residents function as both practitioners and as learners (Schwappach & Sendlhofer, 
2018).  A lower incidence of speaking up behaviors potentially offered more 
opportunities to explore situations where ineffective communication contributed to IAEs. 
Third, the unique physiologic challenges of the pediatric patient such as smaller airway, 
lower blood volume, and tendency toward hypothermia require both more timely 
recognition and resolution of any developing IAE (Lagoo et al., 2017). Fourth, the 
reported personal attributes of pediatric surgeons potentially translate to more effective 
interprofessional communication practices. While surgeons traditionally score higher on 
extraversion and conscientiousness than other physician specialties, they score lower on 
agreeableness (Drosdeck et al., 2015; Hoffman et al., 2010; Preece & Cope, 2016; Turska 
et al., 2016). Pediatric surgeons have similar high scores on extraversion and 
conscientiousness but score higher on agreeableness, openness, and emotional stability 
than general (adult) surgeons (Hazboun et al., 2017). Surgeons with tendencies to be 
more open and agreeable potentially offer candid interviews of more effective, deliberate, 
and balanced interprofessional communication. Increased emotional stability would 
likely also be reflected in the leadership communication strategies required for surgical 
management during IAEs.  
After hospital approval, initial recruitment for the study was initiated through 
contact with the hospital’s perioperative unit director to obtain access to work email 
addresses for potential participants. A recruitment email describing the study, the goals of 
the research, and the voluntary nature of participation provided initial contact with 
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participants. Participants who responded to the recruitment email were scheduled for 
private interviews at their convenience.  
Tools 
 Tools used during data collection and analysis included the initial interview guide, 
demographic questionnaire, and visual mapping with Venn diagrams. The initial 
interview guide was composed of data-generating questions designed to elicit an 
experiential description from the participants (Charmaz, 2014). (Appendix A) Use of the 
interview guide during the pilot study solicited relevant, expressive narratives from the 
participants; an in-depth evaluation of the transcripts before the dissertation research 
begins guided necessary revisions. The interview guide was evaluated throughout data 
collection and analysis to determine its continued effectiveness in addressing the purpose 
of the research. Evaluation of the interview guide was accomplished using reflexive 
questions described by Charmaz and consultation with committee members (Charmaz, 
2014). (Appendix B) A brief questionnaire was used to collect relevant demographic 
information such as participant professional role, age, years of experience, gender, and 
team experience specifics.  
Visual mapping with Venn diagrams allows representation of logical relationships 
including any overlapping between and among categories (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). 
Modified Venn diagrams are also useful to identify and display shared aspects of 
concepts and processes (Verdinelli & Scagnoli, 2013). This identification and visual 
representation of the concepts involved in interprofessional communication was used to 
facilitate a better understanding of the relationships between and among the concepts and 




Semi-structured interviews took place over the telephone or via Zoom®. Prior to 
the interviews, participants in this study were counseled regarding their right to decline to 
answer any questions or to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. All 
study participants were provided with digital copies of the informed consent by electronic 
mail prior to their interviews, and demographic information was gathered at the 
beginning of each interview. 
Participants were asked data-generating questions during audio-recorded, private 
in-depth interviews lasting approximately one hour in locations negotiated based on 
participant comfort. Participant privacy was protected through the interview settings and 
confidentiality was assured through custody/access to the recordings, use of IRB-
approved transcription and password-protected storage, and de-identification of private 
information within the transcripts. Presentation of results was aggregated and de-
identified. The researcher made observational, methodological, and theoretical notes to 
provide context and to inform and refine the interview process through consultation with 
the dissertation committee (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). These field notes were expanded 
post-interview and incorporated into memos to accompany the transcribed interviews. 
The researcher reviewed and compared all transcripts with the original audio recordings 
for accuracy of content and the transcribed and de-identified interviews were imported 





Audio recordings of participant interviews were uploaded for transcription to a 
password-protected transcription service approved by Indiana University School of 
Nursing. Transcripts were checked against audio recordings for accuracy. The transcribed 
participant narratives were downloaded and imported into the coding software for 
analysis. Analysis of the transcribed participant narratives during data collection was 
accomplished through use of an iterative, line-by-line coding process to organize the 
experiences into initial codes (Charmaz, 2014). Next, constant comparison analysis of the 
emerging initial codes was used to identify the significance of meanings and actions from 
the data. This information was then organized through focused coding into conceptually 
linked categories. Conceptualization of the relationships between and among the 
categories was accomplished through theoretical coding to begin theory integration and 
an initial description of the psychosocial processes (Charmaz, 2014). Theoretical coding 
of the psychosocial processes involved in surgeon-nurse communication is often useful to 
identify the temporal and structural orderings of the processes and to describe the 
participants’ respective strategies for the establishment and maintenance of 
interprofessional communication. The theoretical codes were analyzed and organized into 
categories using the constant comparison method as patterns, relationships, and variations 
were explored. These categories were then ‘unified’ around a core category as it emerged 
and was identified from the data to explain the central phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990). 
Data analysis also included the development and exploration of interview and 
theoretical notes to ensure the maintenance of conceptual detail and transparent analysis. 
Interview notes served to identify the context, conditions, and consequences of the 
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phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Theoretical notes provided a record of the 
generation of the emerging theory’s categories, conceptual relationships, and generative 
questions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). 
Data Quality 
Although evaluation of qualitative findings varies from the evidence of statistical 
significance available in quantitative research, assuring rigorous methods and adequately 
acknowledging the influence of the researcher on the analysis and presentation of the data 
can provide accurate and plausible findings (Levitt et al., 2017). The accepted 
quantitative concepts of validity and reliability are often identified within qualitative 
research as ‘trustworthiness’ and are addressed as credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). (Appendix C -
Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research). 
Credibility 
 Credibility in qualitative research has been described as ‘truth value’ and is 
related to the quantitative concept of validity (Morse et al., 2002). Credibility is 
influenced by evidence of a fundamental appreciation of and adherence to the 
philosophical nature of the chosen qualitative approach, the credibility of the researcher 
(as an ‘instrument’ in the process), and by the credibility of the data. Credibility of the 
researcher is established through evaluation of disclosed 1) experience, 2) training, and 3) 
perception of self (Patton, 1999). Credibility of the researcher in this dissertation was 
established through transparency during researcher disclosure and by addressing and 
adjusting for any perceived researcher bias (Creswell, 2013).  
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 Credibility of the data can be achieved through prolonged researcher engagement, 
triangulation, and consensual validation (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Prolonged 
engagement of the dissertation researcher with the participant culture in the intraoperative 
environment facilitated collection and analysis of relevant, rich data. This prolonged 
engagement was accomplished through extended participant interviews to provide 
adequate opportunities for study participants to reveal how meaning is assigned to 
interprofessional communication (Charmaz, 2014). Triangulation during data collection 
and analysis was accomplished through selection of the sample in a manner that ensured 
the identification and representation of varied participant perspectives and through 
substantiation with relevant existing literature and theories (Creswell, 2013; Cutcliffe & 
McKenna, 1999; Fusch & Ness, 2015). Possible negative cases that emerged from the 
data were analyzed to explore whether the contradictions were related to the individual, 
the described situation, or the identified themes (Charmaz, 2014). These cases were 
evaluated to determine if they were outliers or were true negative cases that need to be 
integrated into the theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Finally, consensual validation was 
achieved through solicitation of expert advice and insight by consultation with committee 
members and through the use of member checks with a diverse group of study 
participants (Charmaz, 2014; Marshall & Rossman, 2014). 
Credibility criteria in qualitative research are influenced by the research purpose 
and are evaluated by the intended audience (Patton, 1999). Audience evaluation of 
credibility depends on production of a cohesive, transparent research report that 
recognizes multiple perspectives and facilitates logical conclusions and inferences 
(Cohen & Crabtree, 2008; Levitt et al., 2017). Several questions were potentially valuable 
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to audience evaluation of credibility and were deliberately addressed during the research 
process and within presentation of the findings. Strategies to address these questions are 
described in italics below. 
1) How well did the described data and research process reflect the stated 
research focus? Consistency with the stated research focus was confirmed 
through consultation with content and methods experts on the research 
committee. 
2) Were participants with varied perspectives and experiences included? 
Inclusion of participants with varied perspectives and experiences was 
facilitated through deliberate theoretical sampling during participant 
recruitment and data collection. 
3) Were suitable meaning units chosen for analysis? Suitable meaning units for 
analysis were identified by the preservation of both content and context of the 
narrative within text segments that are narrow enough to isolate meaning, but 
broad enough to avoid condensation or fragmentation (Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004). The suitability of meaning units was periodically verified 
with members of the research committee.  
4) How well was the data represented? Was the researcher excluding irrelevant 
data and including all relevant data? Consultation with members of the 
research committee members after coding of initial transcripts facilitated the 
adequate representation of relevant data, with follow-up consultation as 
needed during data analysis. 
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5) Did the audit trail identify how similarities between and among categories are 
being evaluated? Transparency regarding evaluation of data categories and 
relationships was facilitated through the researcher memos. 
6) Were representative quotes included in the analysis to serve as referential 
adequacy? Representative quotes identified by participant role and assigned 
participant number were included in the presentation of the findings (Tong et 
al., 2007). 
Transferability 
While quantitative studies seek generalizability, qualitative research is more often 
considered to have potential transferability to other settings or groups (Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004). Generalizability describes how widely a theory can be used to explain 
or predict the studied phenomena but grounded theory is often most accurately 
applicable, or transferable, to specific groups or situations (Walker & Avant, 2011). Since 
this transferability must be evaluated and determined by the reader, the dissertation 
findings included thick description of the demographic characteristics and selection of 
participants; clear identification of the context, setting, and culture; and an extensive 
audit trail detailing the process of analysis. Transferability was also facilitated through 
constant, concurrent data analysis to encourage inquiry to guide theoretical sampling and 
conceptual saturation (Morse et al., 2002). 
Dependability 
The quantitative concept of reliability is often described within qualitative 
research as dependability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). One strategy to develop dependability 
in qualitative research is by establishing intercoder agreement (Creswell, 2013). Although 
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coding was the responsibility of the student researcher, dependability was facilitated in 
the dissertation research through verification of both the codes and of the coding process 
with committee members during all stages of the study. An audit of dependability has 
been described as an examination of the process of how the data were collected and 
would include an evaluation of the adequacy of the methodological approach (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1982). This audit of the approach was facilitated through use of a reflexive 
researcher journal including a log of daily research activities, methodological research 
decisions, evolving perceptions, personal introspections, and developing insights to 
document the research process. A separate audit of the products of the data collection and 
analysis was performed to evaluate confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1982). 
Confirmability 
Confirmability helps to establish the value of data that has been analyzed and 
interpreted by the researcher. Confirmability within this study was established through 
provision of an audit trail that includes the rationale for research decisions (Morse et al., 
2002). While this cannot guarantee the analysis is independent of researcher motives or 
values, it does provide the reader information that can guide evaluation of the method and 
findings (Bitsch, 2005). Confirmability was also facilitated through researcher reflexivity 
using memos to address and examine personal assumptions and any epistemological 
concerns during analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). These reflective memos became 
part of the audit trail. An audit of confirmability would also include examination of: (1) 
the appropriateness of the size of the data units used in the coding process (2) the 
reasonableness of the categorization of the data (3) the verification that any conclusions 
drawn from the categorization are documented, and (4) the transparent triangulation of 
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the conclusions by the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 1982). The auditor(s) could then 
evaluate whether the identified conclusions flow logically from the data to form a 
cohesive, meaningful understanding for the readers. 
Summary 
This chapter identified the methodology that was used in the dissertation research. 
It described the grounded theory study design, the purposive and theoretical participant 
recruitment, the data collection through semi-structured interviews, and the iterative data 
analysis that was used to answer the identified research questions. Findings from the 
study potentially contribute to a better understanding of the psychosocial processes 
involved in the establishment and maintenance of effective interprofessional 
communication in the intraoperative environment, providing an important step toward 















 Chapter four describes the results of a grounded theory study and the development 
of a theoretical framework that identifies how surgical team members experience the 
initiation and maintenance of interprofessional communication during IAEs. 
Introduction 
Participants in this grounded theory study shared the common psychosocial 
problem of initiating and maintaining interprofessional communication during IAEs. 
Twenty surgical team members participated in private interviews that lasted between 
thirty-one and seventy-nine minutes. Participants reported having between three months 
and thirty-six years of professional experience and provided information freely in 
response to the interview questions. Some study participants were prompted during the 
interviews to encourage more detailed memories of the communication surrounding 
IAEs. Participants described the processes and strategies by which interdisciplinary 
surgical teams communicated during IAEs. I have labeled the core process as Testing the 
Water. Testing the Water is a common-use metaphor identified as attempting to 
determine whether an action is likely to be successful before one attempts the action 
(Cambridge, n.d.). This metaphor captured the core process described by study 
participants because communication was driven by their perceptions of how the surgical 
team would likely respond to their communication attempts.  
This metaphor relates to the experiences of the study participants in many ways. 
Participants in this study described entering a room and looking around to determine the 
‘temperature’ and ‘intensity’ of the ‘water’ they were preparing to swim in as members of 
the surgical team. Some participants first warily dipped in a toe, some waded in slowly, 
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and some jumped in fearlessly. Others entered the water only to extricate themselves as 
quickly as possible because of hazards they did not anticipate. Were there ‘waves’ 
present? Was the water cold, or was it inviting? Were there ‘rocks’ that could potentially 
hurt them if they made mistakes choosing where and how they would enter the water? 
Once in, were they only able to tread water, or could they safely swim? Were there 
riptides (sensitive topics) that could pull them under water or carry them off in directions 
they didn’t intend? Were there stronger swimmers there who could help them find their 
way? Some swimmers were so confident that they barely noticed the characteristics of 
the ‘water’ as they jumped in and performed the experienced strokes needed to get them 
where they wanted to go.  
Study participants described multiple ways to Test the Water that were 
determined by professional role, length of professional experience, and the evolving 
nature of IAEs. Testing the Water is an ongoing process throughout interprofessional 
communication in the intraoperative environment; it is an attempt at an informed 
negotiation of coordinated action. The two interdependent subprocesses that comprise 
Testing the Water were Reading the Room and Navigating Hierarchy, and both of these 
subprocesses are experienced throughout the phases of communication surrounding IAEs. 
The phases of communication include the recognition of a problem or potential problem, 
reconnaissance to gather information, rallying to coordinate action, reaction to the 
problem(s), and resolution of the problem(s). A conceptual rendering of Testing the 





Overview of Framework 
Figure 4.1: Testing the Water 
 
Although the process of interprofessional communication during IAEs is depicted 
above as a linear process, in practice, the study participants engaged in Testing the Water 
in a variety of ways, and the process was fluid and often iterative. The study participants’ 
interviews revealed three major topics related to interprofessional communication among 
surgical team members during IAEs: the essence of communication, Testing the Water, 
the phases by which communication unfolds (recognition, reconnaissance, rallying, 
reaction, and resolution), and the facilitators and barriers to effective interprofessional 
communication. The discussion below addresses each of these major topics using 
illustrative participant quotes, beginning with a detailed exploration of the two 
interdependent subprocesses of Reading the Room and Navigating Hierarchy.  
Reading the Room 
Reading the Room is identified as the awareness and deliberate consideration of 
the factors influencing the context and probable trajectory of a surgical case. The factors 
influencing the context and case trajectory include characteristics of the patient, process, 
practice, procedure, plan, and potential problems. Most study participants identified 
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Reading the Room as essential to understanding the context that determines expectations 
of interprofessional communication within the surgical team. Participants surveyed the 
operating room to become familiar with cases and decide how to gather any information 
needed to perform their professional roles safely. If study participants became aware they 
were unfamiliar with relevant aspects of the case, they recognized the need to obtain 
additional information from the surgical team. Reading the Room is an ongoing process 
that often begins when surgical team members find out their case assignments. Once in 
the operating room, study participants continued to use Reading the Room to remain 
aware of any changes during cases, and many participants described intentional, 
heightened awareness related to Reading the Room during the recognition of IAEs or 
potential IAEs. 
Patient. Participants in this study gathered information about patient status and 
complexity through written or verbal handoff reports, reading the electronic medical 
record, and monitoring patient vital signs. They also sought information from the surgical 
team. At times, however, the information they obtained about patients was inadequate. 
For example, one participant related the following. 
Another one is kind of the same thing, but this nurse, she came down with the 
baby.  She had (gotten an) absolute horrible handoff because they had just done 
shift change.  And so, she knew nothing about this patient.  Anesthesia asked her 
what lines are going where and what's running.  And she was like, I don't even 
know.  I just got this kid five minutes ago and came down, and we were like, 
okay.  And then I was like, do you know if consents are in the chart?  And she's 
like, I don't know, I didn't even look.  Or is the baby marked (with the surgical 
site)?  And she's like, I don't know.  I didn't look.  And we were like, what do you 
know?  So that was horrible.  It was the worst handoff I've ever witnessed. (…)  I 
just pass it (the problem communication) off to charge at that point.  We took the 
baby back to the OR and I called charge, and I was like, hey, just so you know, 
like, this was really horrible.  I don't know if you want to tell whoever a manager 
(for the other unit) was at that time.  It wasn't the same one.  So, I kind of just 
moved it up the chain there. (…) She didn't know if they even had any 
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allergies.  My report said no, but I just wanted to verify that.  And she was like, I 
don't think so, but I don't know.  So, there wasn't anything that went wrong during 
the case because of that, but it definitely could have.  (…) So that's the only time 
ever in my career that I've had a nurse, literally not know the answer to anything I 
asked.  (TN9, Pos. 39-45) 
 
Process. Processes are actions performed in a particular order to achieve desired results. 
Study participants identified understanding the usual processes followed by the surgical 
team, surgical specialty, perioperative unit, and the hospital as influencing patterns in 
interprofessional communication. While familiarity with relevant processes reduced the 
need for communication, increased communication was necessary during unfamiliar 
processes or when processes were changed unexpectedly. For example, one participant 
remarked: 
I was in ortho one day, and one of the surgeons, Dr. Vxx, was coming over. He 
had a case at (another hospital), and then he was gonna come do a case (over 
here). And he had told our charge nurse that he would be ready. I think it was at 
like two o'clock, or something and they were an inpatient. So, we went ahead and 
sent for the patient. But it had been a few hours since he had told her that he 
would be ready at two o'clock. And I went, I was going to go out and bring the 
patient back to the room, but then I should have checked with him before we sent 
for the patient, but I just, I don't (know. I) spaced it and thought he was ready and 
made that mistake -- until before I brought the patient back to the room, I 
contacted him and asked him if he was ready to bring back. And he actually was 
like, actually, we're delayed here. And it'll probably be another one to two hours 
before I can come over there. So, then we ended up having to send the patient 
back upstairs, which really was terrible for them. And everyone involved - and it's 
just a mess. But it definitely could have been prevented had I communicated 
earlier, or maybe he had communicated to us that they were delayed over at (the 
other hospital). So, there was just kind of a lapse of people not double-checking 
things like that (TN10, Pos. 3) 
 
Another participant explained how an unanticipated process deviation led to the surgical 
team having to scramble to try to keep up with the demands of their case. 
  
So, normally when we have a vented baby who is an inpatient, charge will (call 
upstairs to) pack them up.  And then, when the OR is ready, we will call the 
inpatient nurse and have them come down the elevators.  I meet them there.  Well, 
this day, a charge called to pack them up.  But the nurse took that as ‘come 
down’.  So, she came down the elevators, and we were not at all ready (or 
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finished) turning over the room for that case.  We were not at all ready to receive 
this patient.  So, she called me as we’re turning over and said, hey, we're down at 
the elevators.  And I said, who told you to come down?  And she said, well, the 
charge nurse just called me and told me to pack them up, so, we came down. And 
I said, ‘pack them up’ does not mean the same thing as ‘come down’.  We’re not 
ready for you.  And so, yeah, this kid was vented.  Instead of going back up, she 
just stayed in by the elevators, in that little waiting area for 15 to 20 minutes until 
we were ready in the OR.  And so, then we had to hurry up and try to open as fast 
as we could and get the (anesthesia) circuit connected as fast as we could so that 
we could go retrieve this vented, one-week-old baby who was waiting 
downstairs.  So that was not great communication on that floor nurse’s part 
because she didn't understand what ‘pack up’ versus ‘come down’ meant.  She 
definitely made anesthesia unhappy, and the charge nurse that day was also 
extremely unhappy with that.  (TN9, Pos. 31) 
 
Practice. Practice is used to identify the usual methods involved in a team member’s 
work activities; it can also describe how a surgical team works together. Participants in 
this study experienced different interprofessional communication patterns depending on 
their familiarity with the common practices of other surgical team members or the team 
as a whole. Team members who worked together infrequently or randomly required 
increased interprofessional communication compared to team members working in expert 
teams.  One participant working with unfamiliar team members described how a lack of 
awareness of her team’s usual practice led to an IAE. 
So, the patient had a ChloraPrep allergy and everyone in the room was told and 
aware of it. And we have ChloraPrep in the anesthesia IV start kits, as well as 
that's our primary prep agent. So, we took away the ChloraPrep that came up in 
the case cart, put it back outside (the operating room) and took out the one that 
was in the anesthesia IV start kit, put the alcohol (prep) up for them. And we did 
our time out normally and announced that ChloraPrep was an allergy, but the 
surgery resident was not in the room when that was done. And anesthesia did their 
stuff. That part went fine. And we even put a ‘do not use’ (sign) on the anesthesia 
ChloraPrep up by the head. So, no one would use that. And we're all done with 
that part. And then a resident goes to prep. He can't find the ChloraPrep on the 
bed. So, despite us moving it away, he goes to the cabinet and gets it out, and 
starts prepping with the ChloraPrep. And I had my back turned to him because I 
was scrubbed, and when I turned back around, I was like, you can't use 
ChloraPrep. The patient is allergic to it. And then he proceeded to say that it was 
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on the bed. He (said he had) found it (on the bed) anyway, even though he didn't. 
He got it out of the cabinet himself. (TN4, Pos. 3) 
 
Procedure. The word procedure is being used in this study to define the surgical 
intervention(s) taking place. Increased communication was required during unfamiliar 
procedures, complicated procedures, and procedures involving multiple surgical 
specialties or surgeons. Increased communication was also identified to be necessary 
when working with unfamiliar equipment or instruments. A study participant explained 
her confusion with the following: 
It was probably like my second service, so I was on GU. And was scrubbed into a 
case. For this particular case, it was a really large kid. Like a seventeen-year-old, 
football player-sized guy that we were doing a penis case on. And um, so I'm still 
trying to convert my ways back to the pediatric way of doing things. Like with 
instruments. Because I'm thinking that he's an adult, so I need to use adult-sized 
instruments. And so, my preceptor was like, 'no, no, no, still use the same tiny 
little instruments, blah blah' and honestly, I'm like not really sure what we're 
doing. We were putting in some kind of suprapubic catheter or something, and I 
hadn't done that (…) And so I really wasn't quite sure what we were doing. (…) 
And so, he's asking me for stuff. (…) So, he's having conversations with all these 
residents. And then, so, we get the catheter in or whatnot, and he asks me 
for...some water. And I was like, 'okay'. So, in my mind, I'm thinking, 'all right, so 
we just put a (Foley) catheter in, so this must be for the balloon, right?' (…) So, 
he's asking me for water, I'm kind of confused, I'm looking over at, you know, the 
people who are supposed to be watching me, and paying attention, and they're 
not. And I'm like, 'okay, well...' So, I drew up, like, water-for-irrigation water. 
And he wanted like, and this is my bad because I should have known when he 
asked for like a hypo (needle) for it. Um, but I literally as I was handing it to him 
-- I was like, this is WATER.' And he's like 'kaay', and he's not paying attention 
because he's having conversations with his residents. And so, I gave it to him, and 
he starts injecting it into the patient. And so then, the circulating nurse is like, 
'whoa whoa whoa -- what are you doing? So, he stops, and she's like, 'what is 
that?' And I was like, 'he asked for water'? And she was like, 'that's not the kind of 
water he wants' And I'm like literally, 'I told him this is water'. (…)  I haven't put 
a suprapubic catheter into a person, so, with my line of thinking, he's going to fill 
a balloon up (for a Foley catheter) (TN2, Pos. 17-19) 
 
Plan. The plan for a case considers the characteristics of the patient, the proposed 
process, and the expected procedure(s). Study participants needed increased 
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communication during situations where plans were evolving, such as during exploratory 
procedures or procedures involving patients with traumatic injuries. One participant 
described how an IAE occurred even after the surgical team discussed the plan during the 
time-out. 
I don't even know if it was a resident or if it was an advanced care provider like a 
CRNA or whatever. But we kind of went through our time out in the usual 
fashion, and we were getting ready to do like a T&A and maybe some other 
things I can't remember. Oh, and like a possible laser and whatnot. And we all just 
sort of, our ENT physician talked about O2 saturation for the laser would be a fire 
risk and also the bovie (electrocautery) and stuff because he does the T&A with 
the bovie and suction instead of a coblator wand. So, he makes sure to sort of 
make a distinction about that the O2 needs to be down to like less than 40 or 
something -- or the CO2, excuse me. So, he kind of rattled all that stuff off, and 
we all kind of went about our business. (…) We started with a bronchoscopy, not 
the T&A, and we were lasering, and I think the anesthesia person, (now) how did 
this happen? Somebody said something about the CO2, and I think maybe it was 
the attending anesthesia person, but at any rate, they came in, and they're like, 
‘hey, uh?’ (…) At any rate we had thought that we had communicated what we 
wanted CO2 to be when we were doing the lasering and everybody seemed to be 
listening and understand, but (for) most of us this is what we do all the time. 
(TN12, Pos. 5) 
 
Problems. Problems during a case may be anticipated or unanticipated. Anticipated 
problems were often disclosed when surgeons explicitly described their plan for the case. 
One participant identified how the advance description of anticipated problems was 
critical to ensuring optimal patient outcomes. 
We had a kiddo with a rare skin disorder, I can't remember what it was called. Not 
just skin.  It was a disorder where he, like his skin was just like sloughing 
off.  Like he didn't have any protection.  So, he didn't have thermal regulation. He 
didn't have infection control.  His skin was just like - it was blisters.  And it was 
like very sensitive.  He didn't really have very many layers.  And the ones he did 
have, you couldn't shear anything across them, but it happened internally too.  I 
think his esophagus did the same thing.  And so, they had to be careful with the 
(endotracheal) tube and everything like that.  So, it was really interesting.  It was 
rare. I'd never seen anything like it.  The doctor came in beforehand and had 
talked to a colleague at - there was a specialty clinic for this in another state.  And 
he had known the head or one of the docs at that clinic.  So, he came in with 
printed protocols and gave them to each of us, the anesthesiologist, the nursing 
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staff, everybody, and kind of said, okay, here's the plan.  This is what we're going 
to do.  Because we couldn't have tape, you had to pick the kid up - you couldn't 
shear their skin when you're moving them over.  The ET-tube had to be certain -- 
they had to do certain things with that.  We had to go over each certain thing to 
make sure everything was perfect for this kid because he could have really long-
term effects from, you know. (…) So, we just had all these extra precautions, and 
it was sort of stressful, but all the disciplines had to work together for the safety of 
that kid.  And so, we bounced ideas back and forth.  ‘Hey, do you think…?’ We 
prepared for a long time before we even brought the kid back (to the operating 
room).  And said, ‘hey, do you think we should use this Coban instead to wrap the 
IVs, or is that going to be too much pressure?’ You know, and we just kind of all 
went back and forth and tried to plan the best we could about, what should we do 
about this?  What should he lay on?  Is this soft enough?  We don't want this 
pulling.  And so, we kind of all sat around and tried to figure out all of those 
different things so that when he came back, and we were all prepared. We were 
all on the same page.  And everything went really well. (TN13, Pos. 31-35) 
 
Navigating Hierarchy 
Navigating Hierarchy is the process by which participants in this study considered 
the rights and responsibilities of the surgical team members. Although surgical team 
members have rights and responsibilities during a case, many are not explicit or are 
inconsistent among surgical teams. Study participants navigated hierarchy by evaluating 
the timing of communication, maintaining the tone of the room, managing tension within 
the surgical team, considering the topic of communication, and respecting the tenure of 
surgical team members. Most participants used these strategies in varying orders and 
combinations depending on the urgency of the communication.  
Evaluating Timing. Participants in this study identified timing as a significant 
consideration in interprofessional communication, regardless of professional role or 
tenure. The appropriate timing for communication can depend on the tenure of the team 
members initiating and receiving the communication, the tone of the room, the tension in 
the room, and the topic to be discussed. Timing also impacts which surgical team 
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members are perceived as having a ‘right’ to speak as the perceptions of hierarchy, 
control, and responsibility change throughout the surgical process. Study participants 
reported teaching new nurses how to consider the tone and tension present in the room to 
evaluate timing when they need to ask important questions. One participant related the 
following: 
I tell them don’t ever be afraid to ask the question that they (the surgeons in that 
specialty) are very open to questions and being questioned, to read the room if 
they’re trying to ask a question or not. (They need to make sure) that the surgeon 
or whoever was in the field didn’t seem stressed, wasn’t being asked a bunch of 
questions at the same time, or it wasn’t really like a tense part of the procedure. I 
will also tell people if you’re not sure, call me and ask me. Ask the person that’s 
scrubbed in do you think this would be a good time for me to ask the question. I 
tell people to call me, whether I’m on vacation, whether I’m at home, whether I 
just left. I said it doesn’t matter. You can always call me 24/7 for anything. I 
would rather you ask me the question than spend one minute being uncomfortable 
or not knowing what the next move you should make is. (TN6, Pos. 65-67) 
 
Maintaining Tone. The tone of the intraoperative environment also influences 
interprofessional communication patterns. The tone of an operating room might be very 
focused, collegial, or even chaotic, and the tone may change many times during a surgical 
procedure. Sometimes the tone in the intraoperative environment can be altered or 
unusual due to tension; in other situations, the tone might be determined by the 
preferences or tendencies of the physicians involved. Participants in this study used 
communication strategies to avoid disrupting tone when the room was focused, such as 
during difficult parts of the procedure. Participants also were reluctant to alter tone 
through potentially unsettling communication when the tone was perceived to be 




So, in addition to like body language, current conversations that are happening, if 
the kid is desatting obviously you don't go into a room making a whole lot of 
noise. Chit-chatting and trying to start conversations. So yeah, you're going to go 
off of patient condition, what's currently happening, maybe what portion of the 
case they're in, um, if it's like a tense portion of the case -- you're not really 
stirring up a lot of conversation and what-not. Yeah, so those are like your 
environmental cues. (TN2, Pos. 110) 
 
I would say I look at the scrub nurse to see if she feels chaotic or if she's making 
any faces, like rolling her eyes about like, what's going on or what the surgeon is 
asking for because he's asking for a million things kind of thing. You can kind of 
notice like a good flow between the scrub and like the surgeons, if it's a good 
case, or if they're having things thrown at them and things aren’t going (well), I 
don't know. You can kind of tell how it's going by looking at their interaction. I 
would say you can kind of tell how things are going based off of how the 
anesthesiologist is either sitting back in their chair and nice and relaxed looking or 
(is standing) up by the patient. If the circulator, her body language, if they're 
standing up running around or if they're nice and relaxed. So, I think probably 
body language is what I look at on top of what you said to kind of study how 
tense people are. If they're relaxed, then things must be going good. (TN15, Pos. 
82) 
 
Managing Tension. Tension has been described as both an “inner striving, unrest, or 
imbalance often with physiological indication of emotion” and as a balance maintained 
between opposing forces or elements (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Tension in the 
intraoperative environment is often attributed to the inherent interdependence of the 
surgical team while providing care during surgical procedures and is frequently increased 
during IAEs or potential IAEs. Tension originated both internally and externally and was 
indicated to impact team members both individually and at the team level.  While internal 
tension was most often exacerbated by performance considerations, sources for external 
tension included equipment malfunctions, performance lapses by other team members, 
patient status changes, and other unanticipated events. Participants in this study initiated, 
avoided, and delayed communication to reduce tension among surgical team members. 
93 
 
One study participant experienced a situation where unacknowledged tension contributed 
to a delayed response to a potential IAE.  
I don't know what (about the situation) was more tense. There was simply 
something in there that was more tense.  The blood loss didn't seem to be any 
more extreme at all, but the room just was no longer like, oh, we're getting this, 
we're chipping away at this.  It was tense.  And no one communicated to the 
surgeon that they were uncomfortable with the situation.  And that was the near 
miss.  During the operation, I had a little more wherewithal of what was going on 
with her because I wasn't doing most of the operating.  I was assisting, and so my 
brain was able to process what else was going on.  And it sounds as if the 
anesthesiologist in the room was uncomfortable with the amount of blood loss and 
the amount of time it was taking to have the tumor taken out.  The 
anesthesiologist at no time communicated that to the surgeon. (TS1, Pos. 5) 
 
Another participant described using humor to alleviate tension in the operating room. 
 
If I feel like it's appropriate, I'll kind of say like, I'll make it kind of lighthearted 
and say like please don't kill me, but I don't know how to do this.  Or like don't 
laugh at me, but then I do this right?  So, I kind of try to preface it with a 
statement like that, kind of a little jokey about it, or I don't know.  I guess it 
depends on the situation.  If I can, I try to make it a little lighthearted.  If it's a 
pressing urgent or emergent situation where there's like no time to make any kind 
of jokes, then I'll just straight up ask them, even though I'm scared, but I'll be like 
I don't know how to do this, or I don't know where this is, or I don't know how to 
load this stitch.  I guess I would just say that.  But if I can, I try to soften it a little 
bit, I guess. (TN8, Pos. 45) 
 
 
Considering the Topic. Participants in this study considered the proposed topic when 
initiating interprofessional communication. While some topics were perceived as being 
‘open’ to being introduced for discussion by any member of the surgical team, other 
topics were identified as being more complicated. More complicated topics included 
issues related to team member performance, team member error, or to topics that were 
perceived as another role’s responsibility. Some participants in this study with less tenure 
experienced situations when they lacked enough confidence in their experience and 
expectations to know if a topic was relevant to the case or to the surgical team. This lack 
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of confidence was also mentioned when introducing a topic could be perceived as 
challenging another team member’s tenure or role. Study participants with less tenure 
frequently struggled to understand relevant topics well enough to know how to approach 
asking questions when they were concerned about what was happening in the operating 
room. “I feel like when you first start somewhere new, at least for most people, they don't 
feel confident in their abilities or confident in having those conversations. Because they 
don't exactly know what to ask.” (TN4, Pos. 63) Many study participants were concerned 
about reactions of other surgical team members, especially the reactions from surgeons. 
Two participants related the following experiences: 
Some of the doctors do make it more difficult.  You feel like you can't say 
anything because they're so rude or harsh.  But no, I can't think of a specific 
example where I would be like, oh my gosh, that's harming the patient, and I 
didn't say something.  But some surgeons do make it more difficult to point things 
out, or they might take it the wrong way -- that they're in the wrong, or that kind 
of thing. (TN13, Pos. 47) 
 
I do know that like sometimes I am a little bit nervous about like -- say it's 
something that I might think that a surgeon's going to be annoyed about or like, I 
dunno, someone might just be frustrated with the situation. They might take it out 
on me. And sometimes I am like, I don't really want to say this, but I'll still do it. 
(TN10, Pos. 23) 
 
Respecting Tenure. Tenure has been described as the act, manner, or right of holding 
something (Merriam Webster, n.d.). While tenure is connected to team member role, it is 
also determined by team member experience within the surgical team, surgical service, 
profession, and hospital. Tenure often extends the rights and responsibilities related to 
team member roles and influences the perceived ability to recognize and respond to IAEs. 
The ability to recognize and respond to IAEs through tenure was identified as a 
consideration during interprofessional communication. More experienced study 
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participants had higher tenure within the surgical team and were more likely to be 
directly involved in sustained interprofessional communication during IAEs. Less 
experienced study participants, regardless of professional role, were more likely to delay 
or avoid interprofessional communication; this was especially true when IAEs were the 
result of errors or omissions by higher-tenured team members. Higher-tenured study 
participants considered tenure of their audience and whether those team members 
possessed the knowledge and experience to complete the required actions and would 
often go ‘over’ or ‘around’ inexperienced team members to obtain the assistance they 
needed. Many participants in this study felt having tenure protected them from unwanted 
changes in perception by other team members when they needed to initiate 
interprofessional communication. Two participants shared the following experiences: 
I think because I worked here as long as I have, I know that the surgeons know 
that I'm competent and I feel I've earned a lot of their trust, so if I don't know 
something (and have to ask a question), I think they'll let it slide, whereas five 
years ago, I would think they just think I'm a complete idiot that doesn't know 
anything and is useless to them, basically. (TN8, Pos. 47) 
 
If I were a few months into it (as a new nurse), I would have still said it, but I 
definitely would have been more nervous to say something.  Or I would have 
second-guessed myself more and be like, oh, like, do they actually have an 
allergy? And go look at the chart again.  But I knew that they did because I had 
just received handoff from the pre-op nurse.  And so it was fresh in my head. 
(TN9, Pos. 29) 
 
Testing the Water during IAEs 
Communication surrounding IAEs occurred in several phases identified as 
recognition, reconnaissance, rallying, reaction, and resolution. Recognition is when 
surgical team members become aware of a problem or potential problem. Reconnaissance 
is when surgical team members seek more information about the problem. Rallying is 
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when surgical team members attempt to enlist and coordinate others to solve the problem 
or potential problem. Reaction is the response to the problem in the form of actions by 
the surgical team members. Finally, Resolution includes focused communication after the 
problem was solved. These phases of communication were experienced differently by the 
study participants based on professional role and tenure, and not all participants 
experienced each phase during IAEs. The length of the phases experienced also varied 
among participants. A discussion of how participants in this study experienced 
interprofessional communication during these phases follows. 
Communicating during Recognition 
  Participants in this study often initially became aware of developing or potential 
IAEs through ‘becoming uncomfortable’ or ‘sensing a change in the room’. At other 
times, participants noticed situations as they monitored patient status, caught a ‘lapse’ 
when checking behind other team members, or realized they had made mistakes when 
providing care. Changes in patient status were experienced as the least complicated 
problems to address because indications were usually visible through patient monitors or 
were recognized by the surgical team at the sterile field. Double-checking behind other 
team members was more complicated for study participants to address through 
interprofessional communication because of the hierarchal considerations involved in 
performance monitoring. Additionally, participants were often hesitant to admit their own 
mistakes because of perceived potential reactions from the surgical team. Recognizing 
and addressing problems in the intraoperative environment almost always required 
coordinated actions from other team members and led to delays in the surgical process. 
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The two most common communication strategies identified by participants in this study 
were Making the Case and Saving it for Later. 
Making the Case. Although study participants tried to find the best time to communicate 
with the surgical team, they recognized delaying communication was not always possible 
when the topic was urgent. Participants who decided to make their case deliberately 
reduced delays in interprofessional communication because of the urgency of the 
situation. One participant reported her rationale about appropriate times to address the 
surgical team: 
I do regularly tell the orientees, never be afraid to ask a question. It's always better 
to ask than to not.  And even if someone does get a little bit upset with you if it's a 
bad time, try to wait for a better time if possible.  But there's not always going to 
be a better time.  And it's always better to upset someone a little bit than to risk 
your patients.  (T N14, Pos. 113) 
 
Study participants often considered the perceived hierarchy when Making the Case, and 
many relied on ‘evidence’ to convince others when they recognized potential IAEs. One 
participant described the following: 
So, I had a pretty good relationship with this guy, but he was definitely the 
attending (surgeon), and I was the resident. And so, when I first brought it up, I 
said, ‘I'm not sure, but I don't think that that looks like the right level to me.’ And 
he was like, ‘It's fine. This is the correct level.’ Then we were looking around 
more, and I was like, ‘well, there's no disc osteophyte complex here. This looks 
normal to me.’ And he was like, ‘I think it's okay. I think this is the right level. 
Look at the imaging.’ And then when he looked back at the imaging, he thought, 
‘oh, wait, maybe we are off. I'm not a hundred percent sure.’ And so because I 
persisted and said, ‘well, I think this looks normal. I think that looks abnormal. 
You know, I don't think we're in the right spot. Let's just look at it from a different 
perspective.’ Then he sort of agreed and ultimately was very thankful we had 
diagnosed that. (TS3, Pos. 42) 
 
Some nurse participants were less direct when Making the Case and described ‘playing 
dumb’ to Navigate Hierarchy. These participants pointed out potential problems or errors 
in ways that encouraged others to consider (or reconsider) their actions before problems 
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impacted patient care. This strategy was used to encourage others to rethink planned 
actions or to double check behind themselves instead of feeling confronted by another 
team member. Several study participants shared their use of this strategy: 
I do think about whether I’m going to say something overtly or whether I’m going 
to frame it as a question or pretend like I’m being stupid. I’ll pretend like hey, 
why would we do this instead of that, or help me understand why we’re doing it 
this way today or something like that. I decide whether I’m going to just flat out 
say it or I’m going to ‘backhand’ say it. I think I know I’m going to get them to 
the same answer either way, but I kind of just determine the timing of it. I’m just 
going to say something, but if I have time to tease it out, I’ll go that route instead.  
(TN6, Pos. 59-63) 
 
I mean, I've done that in some situations. Yeah. Or I'll say, I thought that this is 
what we were doing. Yeah. Kind of the same way because that way you're not just 
saying, hey, you're wrong. You're kind of just like making them double check 
themselves. (TN10, Pos. 27) 
 
Yeah.  That's kind of what they taught us to do.  Instead of throwing somebody 
under the bus, making a scene out of it or making it a confrontation, it's just kind 
of like oh, I've never seen it done that way. You know?  And then maybe it makes 
them think more about, oh, am I doing it right? Just the way you say it, I think can 
help with the way it comes off, also it's not confrontational then that way.  You're 
sounding more dumb or just curious, oh, how do you (do that), show me how that 
works, or I have never seen it like that. (TN13, Pos. 77) 
 
Saving it for Later. Study participants with lower tenure often evaluated whether 
information exchanges ‘could wait’ when initiating communication. Reading the Room 
to understand how things were going with the procedure and with the patient allowed 
participants to delay communication when problems could be solved without assistance 
from the surgical team at the sterile field. A participant described her thinking during this 
strategy: 
I would just say, I try to think like, is this something that needs to be taken care of 
immediately? And if not, maybe I can call, say it's like a page or something, call 
that person back in five minutes. Or I'll just say, hey, I'll call you back whenever 
they're available. Or like sometimes if I'm in a room and I'm not in those rooms a 
lot and I don't really know what's going on in that procedure, I'll leave in, like if 
my scrub nurse is in there a lot, I'll ask them. And sometimes they'll find a better 
99 
 
time for me to be able to tell them. But it is kind of more of a ‘is it gonna affect 
this other person or this other thing if I don't answer the question right now’ is 
kind of what I think. Like, can it wait? And if it can, then I'll kind of feel out the 
rest of the situation to see when's an easier time to ask. (TN10, Pos. 72) 
 
Inexperienced study participants often asked others to determine if the timing was right 
and considered the potential impact of the information before initiating communication.  
Even topics usually dealt with immediately were sometimes delayed through problem 
solving by the participants. One participant shared the following story. 
Recently actually there was a time where I was scrubbed into a tumor case and we 
were in the middle of it and I looked down on my, like my big Mayo, the high 
Mayo and on the corner, there was a hair on the Mayo and I was like, Oh, my 
gosh.  I remember at that moment we were in a very serious part of it, 
though.  There was some bleeding going on and it was just very serious, and I 
remember calling (a more experienced nurse) over, being like Exx, hey, I'm 
whispering to her, there's a hair right here.  What do you want me to do?  What do 
you think would be best?  Because we were just like in a critical situation where 
Dr. Cxx was actually just like -- I'm trying to control bleeding.  She (the other 
nurse) was like, hey, let's just throw all those instruments right there in that 
corner.  I'll get you an op site, we'll cover the site and then we'll let Dr. Cxx know 
as soon as it's a good time.  So, I was just really nervous, like of course, like dang 
it, there's a hair and we're in the middle of it and the brain is open and we're also 
just not in a great situation.  I was thankful to have her to help me kind of guide, 
like let's not tell him now, but we will wait until things calm down and then we'll 
let them know and so that's exactly what we did as soon as things calmed down.  I 
let them know like, hey, just so you know, about ten minutes ago we found a hair 
on the corner of the Mayo, I wanted to let you know that we took all the 
instruments that were in the area off, covered the area, changed gloves, but didn't 
want to tell you at that time, because it was critical and he just said that he really 
appreciated it (that we waited). (TN7, Pos. 50) 
 
While some of the developing IAEs were obvious to study participants, at other times the 
situations were more complex, and participants needed more information to make sense 
of what was happening. When study participants felt they lacked an understanding of the 





Communicating during Reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance is used to describe the process used by participants in this study 
to get information to understand how to respond to IAEs or developing IAEs. Participants 
who felt they were being ‘left out of the loop’ or were ‘missing a piece of the puzzle’ 
sought clarification of their perspectives through Reading the Room or Navigating 
Hierarchy to get more information. Study participants looked for environmental clues, 
doublechecked behind other team members, and communicated with others to get the 
information they needed to understand how best to respond to IAEs. The most common 
strategies identified by participants during Reconnaissance were Looking for Clues and 
Seeking Clarification.  
Looking for Clues. Most study participants looked for clues when they noticed or sensed 
something was wrong during a case. Participants paid increased attention to 
environmental cues such as patient monitors and to nonverbal behaviors of other team 
members to achieve heightened awareness during developing IAEs. Looking for clues 
often allowed study participants to discover objective ‘proof’ of problems or potential 
problems that supported their perception of needed interventions. Many participants were 
able to troubleshoot problems found through looking for clues and avoid involving team 
members at the sterile field. One study participant related the following: 
I think it's more of the tension, you kind of read how the case is going and how 
they're acting.  Like when you go into a CV room and there's no music and it's 
quiet and they're on the pump and everybody seems tense.  You're not going to go 
in there talking loudly or that kind of thing.  It's just, I guess I get the cues from 
body language and how people are talking, how the room feels.  I think that's 
about it.  I mean, I don't really look at much else for communication.  And then 
you can also get it from if you're giving someone a break or that kind of thing, 
when they start to give you a report and how they're talking and if it's more frantic 
or if it's quieter or louder, or that kind of thing, you can kind of get cues there 
also.  (…) I usually talk to the circulator.  The scrub seems to be busy 
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usually.  Like, especially if you're not sure if something's going wrong, they're 
probably right in the middle of it.  So no, I just usually talk to the circulator and 
then just try to read out how they're acting.  I don't necessarily do anything 
different.  I mean, obviously if they start asking for things or whatever, jump in 
there and get it.  But other than that, I probably just like, stay quiet unless they 
need help. (TN13, Pos. 53-55) 
 
Seeking Clarification. While Reading the Room often provided the heightened 
awareness needed to respond to an IAE or potential IAE, study participants frequently 
needed to obtain additional information from other team members. Some participants 
were uncomfortable with asking questions they ‘thought they should know’ and made 
assumptions to guide their actions. Inexperienced study participants avoided asking 
particular team members questions directly, and instead chose other team members based 
on their perceived receptivity or reactions. Two participants related the following stories. 
I definitely would probably stick with asking either circulator or nurse. Even if I 
didn't know them very well -- just because I knew that they knew I was learning. 
Not all the time does the surgeon realize who's an orientee and who's not and (it’s 
the) same with anesthesia. So, I would probably feel the most comfortable with 
sticking to someone who I knew I was learning. And (knew) that's why I was 
asking them questions. I would probably obviously go to someone who was 
orienting me that day and who was kind of in charge of me already. But I would 
feel comfortable probably with asking anyone who was a nurse or scrub. (…) 
Well, I think one of the things that I've kind of found, I just ask questions about 
everything, but sometimes the people orienting us don't realize the most basic 
things might not be something we know. And even like, maybe they just think, 
because I'm an experienced nurse, I know some things, but you know, it's a 
different hospital. Things work differently and the OR is like a completely 
different ball game. (TN15, Pos. 96) 
 
My feeling on it is I think the surgeon and nurse relationship is really important, 
because if the nurses feel comfortable around a doctor, they're more likely to 
speak up or ask a question.  But if the nurses are like scared of a doctor, then I 
think they're less likely to speak up about something or ask a question if they're 
unsure, because they don't want to get yelled at. (One time) there was a trauma in 
the ER in the evening.  It was a gunshot wound and they had the chest open in the 
ER, the kid was basically actively dying.  They didn't even have time to bring it 
up to the OR.  And the surgeon asked for a sternal retractor, and I didn't know 
how to assemble one and I was freaking out and I was too scared to tell her that I 
didn't know how to assemble it. (…) Luckily (another nurse) was there and she 
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saved me.  She just kind of figured it out, but I remember freaking out, because I 
didn't know how to put it together.  I asked the resident, or the fellow, and he was 
kind of busy working and he couldn't really put it, assemble it.  Luckily (the other 
nurse) was there and she was able to do it for me.  But if not, I would have either 
assembled, handed it up to her wrong - assembled wrong, or had just had to tell 
her, I don't know how to assemble it and she probably would have had to stop 
what she was doing and do it herself. (TN8, Pos. 27-29) 
 
Communication while Rallying 
Rallying is calling upon surgical team members to coordinate the necessary 
actions to respond to an IAE or potential IAE. Study participants rallied to align team 
priorities and to delegate important actions during IAEs. When participants rallied the 
team, they experienced heightened communication and redirected focus to the patient. 
Because rallying often includes bringing additional team members in to meet the 
increased task demands during IAEs, some study participants perceived rallying as a lack 
of ability to handle the situation or even as a failure. Three common strategies during 
Rallying were Getting Everyone on the Same Page, Giving Everyone their Piece of It and 
Getting Hands in the Room. 
Getting Everyone on the Same Page. Getting everyone on the same page is relating 
information to align the surgical team’s priorities. Aligning priorities to update the team’s 
mental model is often the first step of rallying to respond to IAEs. Participants described 
their experiences with the following stories. 
And I think sometimes it goes to what I think is the core of most nurse-physician 
problems, which is the most important thing in one person's head may not be the 
most important thing in the other person's head and may not be the most 
important thing in the group of things that needs to happen in the room. Even 
though it's the most important thing on your list. Like going back to intubating. 
The most important thing in the room then is when he's putting the tube in. It 
might be important in my line of stuff that I have to answer this page, but that's 
probably trumped by what he's doing with listening to the heart rate and sticking 
the tube in and listening for breath sounds. That probably is more important than 
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me calling the social worker back on my pager, even though that is the thing that I 
have to deal with most immediately. (TS2, Pos. 59) 
 
There was good communication because the surgeon team talked to the anesthesia 
team and said, this is what we're seeing. He stood up, assessed, and just 
immediately came up with a concrete plan with bite-sized pieces that were 
integral, but they were stair-stepped and in order of what needed to happen - very 
clearly with each person directed to a job appropriate to their station and 
immediately calling for the assistance of another two sets of hands, get the 
resident in the room, have them immediately mix up the nor-epi. You get me this 
pentobarb. Get somebody else from out there and start reading in three units of 
blood. So, he gave everybody concrete things to do. Very calmly, mobilized two 
extra set of hands into the room. And everybody had a job to do. Everybody knew 
what they were doing in what order. And it worked out very nicely. (TS2, Pos. 
35) 
 
Giving Everyone their Piece of It. Giving each person their piece of it is specific, 
directed delegation designed to make the best use of team members’ skills and abilities.  
Directed delegation is critical during IAEs because often emergent needs are 'duties' that 
could be done by many of the people in the room, but if the duties are not specifically 
assigned, there's a possibility that either many team members or no team members will 
attempt to do what is needed. One participant described how directed delegation allowed 
the surgical team to respond rapidly in a critical situation. 
We were operating on a very high grade and arteriovenous malformation (AVM) 
on a patient we all knew pretty well. And the patient had been embolized before 
the surgery and the first iteration of those embolization materials were very stiff 
materials. And so sometimes when you came around the bottom of the AVM, as 
you manipulated it, because the stuff wasn't soft, it would maybe tear through the 
vein. And when doing an AVM the last thing you come to is the veins because if 
you clamp the vein off first, the AVM kind of explodes in your face. So, this 
particular patient, we had come all the way around the AVM. We were working 
underneath it. And as we were manipulating it, one of those things tore, and I'm 
not kidding, the brain came puffing out of there like the Jiffy Pop popcorn on TV 
twenty years ago. And we looked over at anesthesia and the anesthesiologist was 
an incredible guy, very, very good. And (he was) one of the attendings, he is very 
skilled, very good, very calm. Had seen everything, done everything, whatever. 
And we just turned and were like we've got a torn vessel and we've got some 
bleeding here and the brain swelling. And he just kind of walked up, or he was 
seated in his chair by the anesthesia machine. He kind of stood up, looked over 
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the thing and then just very calmly looked over at the circulator and said, I need 
three syringes of pentobarb. And he said, get my resident in here right now. And 
the resident came in and he said, mixed up a bag of epi right now. He said the 
blood pressure's going to drop. And he turned to the circulator and said, go grab 
somebody out front, bring three more bags of blood in. And he said, I'm going to 
push. And the circulator by then was back with the three syringes of pentathol. 
And he said, the blood pressure is going to drop. He said, we're going to put the 
head down, you guys hold the brain. And he said, all right, I'm going to 
administer the pentathol. He's like one going in, two going in, keep telling me the 
blood pressure out loud and the resident's reading (those numbers). And he's like, 
I've got the epi strung or I've got the nor-epi strung up. And he basically shoved in 
three grams of pentobarb. I’m sorry, three syringes, which was 1500. And we just 
watched the brain deflate like a soufflé. Blood pressure - absolutely tanked out. 
And the nor-epi drip was right there ready to go and boom, boom, boom, boom, 
boom. Up came the blood pressure. And the circulator or the scrub already had 
the (aneurysm) clips up in that. And we were then -- because there was a blood 
pressure and we weren't having to worry about doing CPR, we're able to very 
rapidly come underneath the thing (AVM), get it. We were actually able, we kind 
of kept working as the blood pressure dropped because when the blood pressure is 
lower there’s less bleeding. And we're able to remove the last of it. And then 
basically I think everyone stood there for a few minutes and waited for their heart 
rate to come down. (…) But what was so incredible about that was 
communication wise is he was very direct. You know, again, it was a bad 
situation. We communicated to him, he stood up, he looked at it and immediately 
grasped what was going on. And he did what they always talk about that you're 
supposed to do in codes. Right? You know, you don't say ‘get this’ and four 
people lunge for it. Of course, there aren't that many people in the OR who could 
do that even if there was. But he was very direct about, I need this many syringes 
of that. I need a resident. Have him come right here right now. I need you to mix 
up an epi drip or nor-epi drip, be ready to start this immediately because the blood 
pressure will drop. You know, you've handed me these syringes. I need you to be 
reading blood in as we have ongoing blood loss. So, I want you and you to go 
take care of that for us. And it was very interesting because it was handled so 
nicely. I mean, it was horrifying. I mean, because you know, it was just watching 
the brain kind of explode out at you thinking, oh my gosh, she's going to die now. 
And he took something that was just catastrophic and with very calm, very, very 
directed and concrete things to do, never missed a beat and said, this is what I 
need each of you to do. We're going to do these things in this order. You watch 
for this, you watch for this, you start this if this happens and boom. We were 
good. So that's my good one. (TS2, Pos. 31) 
 
Getting Hands in the Room. Getting Hands in the Room is the process of getting extra 
help in during an urgent or emergent situation. Although all surgical team members have 
the responsibility to rally the surgical team during IAEs, not all study participants felt like 
105 
 
they had the right to rally others. Some nurse participants were nervous about calling 
codes even when it was obvious to them that anesthesia providers needed help. Having to 
call a code can often be experienced by anesthesia residents as a ‘failure’ because it 
means their supervising anesthesiologist and many other providers come into the room to 
help. One participant related the following story. 
Yeah, I've been in a couple of cases where it wasn't like the patient's coding. Like 
we're not having to do compressions, but I have been in a couple of rooms where 
maybe our patients starting to de-sat really quick in a spinal surgery and our 
pressures have started to drop. And some people are kind of like unsure when 
they're in that, should I pull the code button? Should I not? And I've been in the 
room when there are people with me and they just look and they say, just pull it 
just in case because that way you do get those other people there. And when they 
come in it adds hands and they're faster to help. And then it's better safe than 
sorry. You know, I'd rather pull the button and too many people come in the room 
rather than to not (call a code) and would have needed it. (TN10, Pos. 11) 
 
Participants in this study who were scrubbed during procedures often relied on those not 
working at the sterile field to summon additional staff to help during IAEs. One 
participant identified struggling to get the help the surgical team needed into the room. 
So, we were doing the operation and the anesthesiologist was a resident, to be 
honest with you, that we were a little uncomfortable with. So, all through the case, 
he kept re-inflating the endotracheal tube. And we were like, what's going on? 
Well, there was a leak. And we're like, that's a lot of air you keep putting in there. 
No, it'll be fine. There's a leak. There's a leak. And we had the front bone, which 
means the spinal cord was exposed, retractors were in place and the patient started 
moving and desatting. They couldn't ventilate the patient. And so, my staff and I 
are like - call anesthesia. So, my staff is kind of looking at this and I said, call the 
anesthesia staff and the resident is like, no, no, no, I got it. And I'm looking and 
the stats are going to sixties, fifties. And the patient is clearly awake. And my 
attending is laying over the patient to keep him on the table. And he just kind of 
quietly says, call for a trach tray. And so because we weren't ventilating and 
wouldn't get, the patient was tanking, patient was moving. Clearly the patient was 
becoming hypoxic, and it was apparent the patient was awake under there. And 
so, we said (to the circulating nurse), hey again, call. And so, the resident for 
anesthesia goes to the nurse, he goes, no, no, no, everything's fine. That's under 
control. And we're like, no it's not. Basically, our room was across from the 
anesthesia front desk. And I went over, I was still scrubbed. And I started kicking 
the door until someone came to the door and I said I need a bunch of people in 
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here right now. And they came in and basically the patient had to be reintubated. 
What had happened was that ET tube had been filled with air so many times that 
the cuff had herniated around and was occluding the bottom of the tube. So, the 
patient was a gas - or the patient had a gas anesthetic. So that's why the gas wasn't 
going and that's why the patient was lighter (receiving less anesthetic gas). (…) 
So, I think again, in that one, it was interesting because, and I don't know if this is 
the kind of thing you're looking for, but communication wise, we were very clear 
and very urgent. You've got to call the anesthesia staff and then the anesthesia 
resident was like, ‘oh no, everything's fine’ to the nurse. And she hung up the 
phone and then we're like, no, you have to call. And then by then we needed the 
trach tray. So, like I said, the form of communication was then me kicking the 
door to get someone's attention while my attending was holding the patient on the 
table and trying to keep the guy from becoming a quad by moving around with an 
unstable spine. Because again, the bone was out, and he was trying to sit up and 
the nurse was running for the trach tray. So that's my bad one. It ended well, that 
was really pretty horrible at the time. And I think it highlights too, sometimes the 
conflicting information you get from two different teams with somebody else in 
the middle. When one person is saying it's an issue and the other one (saying it) 
isn't, and that leaves the person who's being directed to make a call, which is kind 
of unique to the OR. Right? Because otherwise I could pick up the phone and say, 
I want this person in here except (that) I'm scrubbed. And you have to have this 
proxy communication. Right? So, it is a situation that is unique to proceduralists 
or the operating room whereby you have to have in something like that, where it's 
so time sensitive, but yet you're not the one making the call because you can't, you 
didn't break scrub because you don't know if you're going to have to immediately 
stick your finger in there and do something. But yet getting that message out is 
very difficult. You have to get that message out. And like I said, unfortunately I 
resorted to the lowest possible form of nonverbal communication, which was 
kicking the door because I couldn't yell loud enough through the door. And there 
were other things happening in there. So, I just kicked the door and the person 
sitting at the desk was a couple feet away from me and they immediately jumped 
up and came in. So yeah, that one was interesting (TS2, Pos. 7) 
 
Communicating while Reacting  
Surgical team members rally to coordinate an informed response to IAEs; that 
response is the team’s reaction. Reactions include correcting mistakes, stabilizing the 
patient, troubleshooting problems, and responding appropriately to the priorities of other 
team members. Two common strategies used during the reaction phase were Doing the 
Dance of Surgery and Switching Gears.  
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Doing the Dance of Surgery.  The coordination of purposeful, independent movements 
within the shared space of the intraoperative environment has led to the surgical process 
being compared to a dance, and this need for coordination increases during IAEs. 
Participants in this study increased communication to make their next actions evident to 
other team members and ‘took turns’ to allow providers in other professional roles to 
perform actions to stabilize surgical patients. One surgeon related the following 
experience. 
 
We made the final decision to kind of turn her a little bit on the operating room 
table and do a laparotomy in addition. But when we did that, we found that her 
left kidney was essentially mangled - it was just busted off from her renal vein. 
And that was just pumping blood into her abdomen. We got control of that. And 
then I got my hand in her abdomen and actually to be able to put it up into her 
chest. She had a traumatic rupture of her diaphragm as well. And once we got 
control of the kidney bleeding and got that taken care of, we were able to sort out 
what the problem was with the diaphragm and control that. And all along the 
communication was great between us and anesthesia because you know, we have 
to be. You know there's always sort of this dance back and forth about are they 
doing okay? Right? Because if they are bleeding and the anesthesiologists can't 
catch up, a lot of times, what we can do is just sort of pack off the area with lap 
pads and hold pressure there for a little bit of time, until the anesthesiologist can 
get their blood products and things like that into the patient and get their blood 
pressure up. And that's where we can go back to work and try to figure out where 
the source is. So, there was that sort of dance back and forth a little bit during the 
operation where she would be like, oh, this patient's really hypertensive. And I 
need a little bit of time to get some blood product in. And so, we would stop and 
just hold pressure for a while. Let them put some blood and fluids and stuff like 
that in and the patient's blood pressure would come up and I'd start working again. 
(TS4, Pos. 24) 
 
Switching Gears. Responding effectively to IAEs often demands a ‘refocus’ for the 
surgical team. Surgeons deliberately changed the tone of the intraoperative environment 
to reflect the need for an increased focus on the patient and performance of any actions 
that were needed. One study participant described how he changes his tone when he feels 
it is necessary. 
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I think the way that I (under normal circumstances) communicate with everybody, 
everything is calm and very relaxed and understanding. And when things change 
at the operative field and I have become terse and direct and loud, I say, turn off 
the music. Everybody focus. There's never been a time where people have been 
like, yeah, whatever, man. So, I think that dichotomy of operative tone is pretty 
important. I mean, I know there are some surgeons who are constantly upset and 
like, this is wrong. Everything's going to happen. And they use very jolting, just, 
tones. And not even that they're mean or anything. It's just that they're very 
abrupt. The music is off. It's very quiet. And I think that if that's the way you 
operate, sometimes it might be harder for people to understand that there's a real 
problem when there is a real problem. (TS3, Pos. 54) 
 
Communicating during Resolution 
Resolution includes interactions or actions taken after IAEs have been addressed. 
Many study participants reflected internally, debriefed with specific team members, and 
debriefed as a team to understand the trajectory of IAEs. Some IAEs also required 
disclosure through incident reports and root cause analyses with hospital administration. 
Most study participants felt these shared explorations of IAEs were beneficial and 
informative and said they often led to individual or group practice or process changes. 
One participant identified how miscommunication led to a reportable IAE. 
Yeah.  Recently, we were doing a cranial reconstruction.  All those kids have to 
have ultra-fresh blood.  There was a, Kxx was circulating, Lxx came in to give her 
lunch, or break, something somebody did, and she said, the blood is on its 
way.  The blood came while Kxx was gone. (When she came back from her 
break) the person told Kxx, the blood is here.  It's good.  It's in the room.  They 
left.  We're doing a timeout, Dr. Bxx says, what kind of blood do you have?  Kxx 
say, I have ultra-fresh blood.  She said, Great.  About an hour later the 
anesthesiologist wants to just check the blood in to make sure that it's checked 
in.  Opened the cooler - it's not ultra-fresh.  The person giving her the break said 
the blood was here.  She heard her say it was okay, but she didn't really double 
check.  Neither one had communicated that.  I was in there, and I said, let's make 
a quick phone call.  I said, we also need to tell the surgeons.  We tell Dr. Bxx, we 
tell anesthesia we don't have the right blood.  Lxx may tell you about that one 
because that one was pretty significant.  We called the blood bank; we got the 
right blood.  Got it over.  I think they waited for a few minutes, but that was a 
mistake and a communication error, probably. Kxx goes, what do I do?  And I'm 
like, umm.  She's like, they told me it was ready, and they told me it was okay, but 
it wasn't, and I said, Kxx, you have to look at it every single time it comes in 
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here.  You can't trust anybody.  So, then I said, you have to call blood bank.  You 
have to tell them you have the wrong blood.  You have to fill out an incident 
report, figure out why we have the wrong blood, and send it back and get the right 
blood.  And I said, we also need, I said, Sxx, we need to tell you that we don't 
have Ultra-fresh blood.  And she's like, well, in the timeout you told me we did.  I 
said, I know that we did, but we don't.  And there was some miscommunication, 
big time, there.  I think there was a miscommunication and a 
misinterpretation.  You know?  I don't know why I think it was Lxx, but I feel like 
it was.  Hey, I just got your blood.  It's here.  It's good to go.  Kxx interpreted that 
as, It's Ultra-fresh.  It's what I ordered.  It's here.  It's good - and didn't look at it. 
(…)  After the case) we talked about it.  We went back and talked with the person, 
I think it might've been Lxx, talked with her, and then it became a big, big deal 
with our team.  Going over it again and how you have to look at it.  So now the 
whole process has changed because of that.  Instead of saying, we have two units 
of blood, during the timeout, the cooler's opened, they take it out, they look at it, 
they read it, and then they put it back in.  Even if they've already done it, they do 
it again.  So, because of that incident, no harm was done, thank goodness, but 
because of that we do that process now. (TN3, Pos. 37-43) 
 
 Another participant described being involved in a sentinel event. 
(The attending surgeon) stayed for a while to help with the closing, but the count 
was just beginning because there was a lot of stuff to count. Anyway, he did ask if 
we could do final timeout after he broke scrub to go talk to the family. Well, I 
said to him, I can't do a final timeout because we haven't completed our count. At 
that time, I think they were done closing fascia. He went and talked to the parents 
and then the fellow continued to close as the second circulator and the scrub were 
continuing to count. The sponges and needles had been done first, and the wand, 
and all that, and that was fine, but the instrument count took much longer than it 
took to close. They were continuing to close skin, and at that point, the skin was 
not completely closed. The fellow was notified that there's a missing instrument 
that we can't account for. (…) The scrub said, we're missing a piece of the 
Bookwalter (surgical retractor). Then they said, okay, but they continued to close. 
Then skin was closed and the scrub and the second circulator, and by this time, 
I'm involved, and we actually had some outside help come in to try to help go 
through the trash and the linens and make sure, because it wasn't a very big piece. 
Then she said, the scrub nurse said, we can't find this piece. I don't know where it 
is. The fellow said, Well, all right. Well, let's get an x-ray., which we did. Nobody 
was really expecting to find it there, but the x-ray revealed that there was a 
retained instrument. Then, the pediatric staff surgeon was notified and came back, 
and the patient was reopened, and the object was retrieved so the count could be 
reconciled. Then they had to re-close the patient, and by this time, the staff 
surgeon was back in the room. Actually, he was grateful that it was found in the 
operating room. (At the root cause analysis) I would say that the core team, the 
people that were at the root cause analysis, or whatever you call it where you have 
to map up your plan about how to fix it, were the director, a hospital person, and 
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they weren't an attorney but some specialist in this sort of thing that kind of ran 
the meeting, and then the staff surgeon, and then the three core nurses that were in 
there during the procedure. Then the staff surgeon was very, very, very supportive 
of the nursing staff, felt they did the right thing, and he was like, I don't even see 
why this is ‘never’ incident (sentinel event) because it was resolved before the 
patient left the room. That was a moot point because apparently, it's considered 
that anyway, so it met the criteria. No, he was very supportive of the nursing staff, 
very open with the director and the hospital specialist. I don't know. I felt very 
supported at that point. (TN1, Pos. 93) 
 
Psychosocial Goals  
Two psychosocial goals often achieved by Testing the Water appeared 
consistently throughout the study participant interviews. Participants in this study used 
conscious and subconscious communication strategies to preserve the flow of cases and 
to protect the ‘face’ of themselves and of other surgical team members. The psychosocial 
goals of preserving flow and protecting face were indicated to be the underlying 
motivations for many of the described communication strategies of interprofessional 
communication during IAEs. 
Preserving Flow. There is a rhythm in the operating room when things are going well; it 
has been described as flow. An exploration of flow began in 1975, when 
Csikszentmihalyi identified a state of optimal functioning that included intense 
concentration, a loss of reflective self-consciousness, and a distortion of temporal 
experience (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Participants in this study experienced 
both intra- and interpersonal flow in the operating room and indicated reluctance to 
disrupt existing flow states when it could be avoided. This reluctance to disrupt the flow 
states of surgical team members was often demonstrated through delayed or deliberately 
timed interprofessional communication, especially when the need for communication 
conflicted with difficult parts of surgical procedures. Study participants experiencing 
111 
 
intrapersonal flow often indicated their increased focus and distorted temporal experience 
as producing decreased awareness and increased response time to developing situations 
outside of their immediate tasks. One participant related details of a case where the 
attending surgeon appeared to be unaware of what was going on outside of the surgical 
field as he was operating. 
And so, this continued, and people are uncomfortable and there's a lot of tension 
in the room.  And I don't know if the surgeon knew about it or if he was so 
focused on the operation in front of him, that you can be oblivious to it.  And 
that's very easy to be oblivious when you are hyper focused on one thing.  That's 
so easy that I've had days where like I blink after ten minutes and I throw out like, 
wow, I forgot to blink because I'm so focused on taking out this tumor.  (TS1, 
Pos. 5) 
 
Protecting Face. Participants in this study also navigated interprofessional 
communication with the goal of protecting face, both for themselves and for other 
members of the surgical team. Face has been described as situational personal standing 
that may be achieved or ascribed, and that can be lost when an individual fails to meet the 
expectations of his or her position or role (Ho, 1976). Study participants experienced a 
continuing awareness of protecting the face of others and of themselves during 
interprofessional communication. This awareness resulted in communication that 
considered and respected the rights and responsibilities of other members of the surgical 
team. Nurse participants often were apprehensive about asking questions because of their 
perceptions of potential responses from the surgical team. Many study participants were 
wary of asking clarifying questions regarding surgeon preferences or unfamiliar 
instruments; this was identified as being particularly true when they felt they ‘should 
know’ the answer. Two participants shared the following stories. 
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I was going to say maybe if people are afraid to ask a surgeon to clarify 
something, but I don't know how much of a problem that really is.  Like a fear of 
getting yelled at or belittled or whatever. (TN8, Pos. 53) 
 
Depending on the surgeon, I have seen some be a little bit more temperamental 
than others.  So that's always a factor. It's just the surgeon that you're working 
with, (you) can feel more comfortable asking (questions) with others than with 
them.  It's hard to think just because, I don't know, they have all this additional 
schooling and you're there to make sure that they have what they need.  And 
sometimes you feel bad if you don't have it, or if there's something that you feel 
you should know at that point, that you don't.  And you have to ask about it and 
you kind of feel stupid for having to ask that question that you feel you should 
know. (…) Yeah, but on those (questions) I usually ask the nurse.  Just (say to 
them) -- I know I should know this, but I can't remember. (TN14, Pos. 119) 
 
Other study participants experienced situations where team members provided incorrect 
information to the surgical team instead of admitting a lack of knowledge in order to save 
face, as demonstrated with the story below. 
I had a case one day where the surgeon wasn't around and anesthesia, it was like 
an elbow or fracture or something, and anesthesia was wondering whether or not 
the surgeon needed paralysis. So, they wanted to see whether or not they needed 
to intubate or just do an LMA (laryngeal mask airway). And so, they ended up 
asking the resident and he just told them that they didn't need paralysis. So, they 
just put it in an LMA. And I think he was just kind of guessing -- he wasn't really, 
he didn't say I don't know, let me ask. He just told them. And then the surgeon 
came in and they actually ended up needing paralysis. And so, they needed to 
intubate. So that was a little rough because now they're going to have to switch 
their airway. They're going to have to change their plan for the anesthetic. And it 
totally could have been avoided had he just said, I'm not sure. Let me ask or let 
me verify. You know?  I think the surgeon like walked in and noticed and then 
was like, said something about they need paralysis and I'm pretty sure anesthesia 
said, we asked the resident. Something, like we asked the resident, but he said he 
only needed LMA. And they were like, I don't know. It's hard to remember, but 
you could tell they (the surgeon) were frustrated, but I think he was more 
frustrated with the resident than the anesthesia obviously, because it wasn't really 
their fault. Then (the surgeon) just told (the anesthesia provider) that we're going 
to need to switch it. (Interviewer) Did you see a conversation between the surgeon 
and the resident about this? Like did they talk about it in the room? (Participant) I 





Facilitators and Barriers 
Another stated goal of this study was to identify and explore participants’ 
perceptions of the facilitators and barriers to interprofessional communication during 
IAEs. The perceived facilitators and barriers are explored in the following sections 
through excerpts from study participant experiences. 
Facilitators 
 Participants in this study identified many facilitators of effective interprofessional 
communication during IAEs. Facilitators mentioned by participants included setting the 
stage, looking down the field together, using backup behaviors, initiating purposeful 
pauses, using directed communication, using closed-loop communication, and 
encouraging input from surgical team members.  
Setting the Stage. Setting the stage is when a member of the surgical team provides or 
updates the TMM to help surgical team members understand what is happening and what 
actions are required of each member of the surgical team. Setting the stage is critical in 
situations where inexperienced team members might be unsure of what is happening or of 
the specific order of actions that are needed to stabilize a surgical patient. Setting the 
stage also allows for a more informed inclusion of additional unit staff who come into an 
operating room to assist during IAEs. Two study participants described how Setting the 
Stage improved communication during their cases. 
The sinus bleeding where you're like, okay, put your finger on this. All right. 
Okay. Situation is controlled. And then again, you set the stage for what happens 
next. All right. Anesthesia do you have blood ready? And again, I need everybody 
paying attention. Okay. I need you to make me a little roll of thrombin gel foam 
powder and load sterile Nurolon sutures. And I need you to stand there in case I 
need anything else. So, let's just all pay attention and do this part here. So yeah, I 
don't know. But yeah, sometimes I think all of us are guilty of tunnel vision. 
Surgeons included. (TS2, Pos. 83) 
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And then they know that communication has been established. They know, okay, 
if we're doing an emergent trach and I've never done an airway trach case that my 
surgeon can shout out what he's going to need next, or she (can) -- before it's 
needed. So, I have a chance to -- if they know I haven't done it, then they know 
I'm not gonna have any assumptions on what's next. They need to tell me. So that 
helps then they can communicate with me better so I can help them. Help me help 
you. (TN11, Pos. 84) 
 
Looking Down the Field Together. Looking down the field together is when an 
experienced member of the surgical team provides information surrounding the proposed 
surgical plan that emphasizes the goal of providing care through coordinated teamwork 
instead of role-based task work. Looking down the field together also encourages 
recognizing team member interdependence and the importance of collective focus on 
delivering safe, efficient patient care. One surgeon reported how he attempts to provide 
an accurate mental model for even the most inexperienced or peripheral team members. 
I would encourage surgeons to break up their procedures into component parts 
and then write them down and what resources they're going to need. I have 
anecdotal evidence that that limits the amount of unnecessary things (surgical 
supplies and instruments) that are opened, decreases cost, and facilitates an 
understanding among the surgical team that everyone's on board with the 
procedure. And I would encourage physicians mostly to have more collaborative 
relationships with everyone in the room, not just the anesthesiologists, but the 
anesthesiologists, the nurses, the techs, the students, everybody. Everybody needs 
to be engaged and onboard, and all looking down the proverbial field together to 
accomplish the most safe surgeries. (…) So, for these big complex cases that have 
infinite different little steps that nobody knows how to do and everyone's very 
anxious about, (I) actually send out a Word document the day before, a couple of 
days before, that has every single step and what we're going to need. And if 
anyone has any questions about that, I'm available to talk about it at any time. 
And that actually gets printed out and put on the wall. And then we look at it and 
refer to it constantly. And then I use an intraoperative whiteboard where I write 
up all the steps in less detail, but still like a component step of the procedure, like, 
this is incision, paraspinal muscle dissection, bone removal, dural opening, tumor 
resection, dermal closure, you know, that sort of thing. And then what we'll need, 
what resources are we going to need? Are we going to need the CUSA? Are we 
going to need Tisseel, DuraGen, Surgiflo? What are the specimens? Write the 
specimens up there. And that way everyone feels like they're part of the 
procedure. They know what's going on. And when the support nurse comes by to 
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say, where are we at (in the procedure)? And they say, We're at step six on the 
board of twelve. And that's how we're moving down (TS3, Pos. 46) 
 
Using Backup Behaviors. Participants in this study identified implementation of backup 
behaviors as essential in preventing adverse patient outcomes in the intraoperative 
environment. Backup behaviors included providing relevant information or performing 
supportive actions that assisted others to perform their professional roles. Backup 
behaviors were even more critical when less experienced surgical team members needed 
support during IAEs. One surgeon identified how backup behaviors prevented a potential 
sentinel event. 
Everything's fine, patient's intubated, and I turned the child's head to start to 
position him.  And so, the (normal sequence of) positioning, as you are well 
aware, is you position the child, and then I was going to use stealth, so 
intraoperative navigation to also mark out where this thing was and where I 
wanted to be and so I knew inside of the child's head where I was.  And then 
(usually) after we do all that, then we clip the hair, mark the skin incision, and 
finally we do a timeout to confirm the current patient, the operation, the 
sidedness.  And so, after the child's intubated, has the lines in place, I turned the 
child's head and start to get positioned.  And the anesthesia fellow said, are you 
sure that's the right, like I thought we were doing the other side for the 
operation.  And I stopped, I look at the child, I look at my images and I say, you 
are absolutely correct.  Thank you for pointing that out to me. (…) It has changed 
the way that I do my timeout in that I do my timeout very early.  I don't do it 
when the drapes are on.  I now do a timeout before the child is prepped.  Initially I 
would kind of say yeah, we can agree this is the correct side.  Now I will make 
my scrub, my circulator, and my anesthesiologist all confirm this is the correct 
side of the child that we are operating on.  And so, this event of which I don't 
know if the terminology is ‘near miss’ because it wasn't a near miss.  We had 
several steps to go before it became a near miss.  But this event that was very 
powerful and it has changed in that I will now over communicate about the 
sidedness of the children that we are operating on probably for the rest of my 
career because of this event.  That's it. (TS1, Pos. 31) 
 
Another experienced participant described how she used backup behaviors to support an 
inexperienced surgical team attempting to manage an emergent IAE. 
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I walk in the room and literally I see blood pouring out of the kid's mouth and 
running down the side of the table like you've never seen before. And this poor 
girl (as a new nurse) is there by herself. And the resident had gotten into like a 
feeder vessel for the carotid on one side, trying to take out the tonsil and in 
retrospect we found out that it was, what did they call it? Like an aberrant carotid 
feeder or something that was basically in a place where they didn't suspect that it 
would be.  (…) you know, everybody's running into the room, and it was just like 
you know, get another suction, hold pressure. And we ended up having to go 
straight to IR (Interventional Radiology). And I just literally -- and this actually 
was when one of our surgeons was a little bit newer and I'm going to say it was 
probably like within his first three months of being here or something, the staff 
surgeon. And it was later in the evening and probably getting time for me to be 
going home or whatever, but I just remember thinking I'm not going to leave, 
especially because this guy is pretty new. A lot of people don't know him here. I 
want him to feel supported and feel like he has the help that he needs and stuff. 
(…) And I remember just trying to reassure my (nurse) orientee because she was 
horrified and didn't know what the hell was going on, you know? And just 
reassure her that, I mean, clearly it wasn't anything she had done wrong or 
whatever. And then just paying attention to that that staff surgeon who was fairly 
new and just trying to support him and get whatever we could. (…) There were a 
lot of people that were able to come in the room (to help), but you know how you 
can just tell that somebody is pretty nervous about something, even if you don't 
know them real well. I could tell that this guy was really probably freaking out 
and then the resident was almost in tears. He was so, so upset about it because 
nothing like that had ever happened to him before. I remember like some of the 
girls hugging him and just while we were in IR kind of like consoling him about 
the fact that this was even happening (TN12, Pos. 53) 
 
Initiating Purposeful Pauses. Surgical procedures often feel very driven by timing, 
tension, and tone. The initiation of purposeful pauses allowed study participants to adjust 
their mental models and better prepare for needed actions during IAEs. Some participants 
deliberately paused before performing actions that would require increased coordination 
of the surgical team. One surgeon related the following story. 
I was concerned about opening the dura that there would be circulatory collapse, 
that the heart rate would stop, they would go asystolic.  So, with that, the whole 
room was aware of it because I might need a circulator or someone to do CPR.  I 
needed anesthesia to be aware, so they could have the drugs.  So, there was a 
pause before I did the movement that I thought could stop the heart. So, there was 
actually a little timeout in the middle of the operation and things were less 




Using Directed Communication. Navigating the arrival of additional team members to 
assist during IAEs can be problematic due to the duplication of professional roles, lack of 
clarity about responsibility delegation, and the use of non-directed communication one 
study participant described as ‘yelling into the void’. Yelling into the void is when 
delegation or requests are non-directed, and the speaker cannot be sure that they were 
heard or will receive the response they need from the communication. The opposite of 
yelling into the void is using directed communication. Directed communication is 
accomplished by using the recipient’s name or, when that isn’t possible, assigning 
responsibilities by role. When directed communication was not used, study participants 
often tried to guess what support was required and needed actions were missed or efforts 
were duplicated. Many participants related stories where directed communication played 
a role in the experienced IAEs. 
And I feel like the last time I was in sort of that situation -- that people were more 
concise with what they need. At least the last time I was in a situation, like the 
anesthesiologist looked at me and said my name, and then, I need whatever. Not 
just a general, hey I need this when you only have one other person in the room. 
And I feel like when we're in trauma situations, people sort of fall into, I'm going 
to be the runner person, I'm going to be the person that does the charting, I'm 
going to pay attention to the scrub person. I feel like we have dedicated people to 
what we're doing and it's not like always people go, I want you to do this, you to 
do this, and you to do this. People just sort of feel or see that there's a need and 
then that's what they start doing. (TN4, Pos. 53) 
 
Honestly, in any kind of trauma, emergency situation, to me, consistently the 
biggest problem is too many people in the room and I think everybody thinks that 
they need to be in there to help, but that's like one of the biggest problems I think 
we have, is having too many people in there and somebody will yell out for 
something and three people are scrambling to get it, or nobody gets it, because 
someone thinks somebody else is getting it.  So, I think what we really need to 
work on in our code situation is turning to somebody and say, Johnny, I need 
three vials of epi.  Kelsey.  I need four packages of laps.  Dr. Anesthesia, I don't 
know your name, but I need you to hand me that cord behind your back.  Like 
people speaking directly to each other I think, instead of just kind of yelling out 
loud, like, oh, I need three more packs of sutures or this or that.  I think talking 
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directly to a person, calling that person by name, which obviously that's helpful 
since we all know each other, but we, in our OR, we have so much 
turnover.  There's a lot of new people, like the doctors don't know the newer 
people, or if the OR is helping out in cath lab, the general surgery nurses don't 
know the cath lab nurses by name and so forth. (…) But I think the turnover 
causes a problem, because people don't know each other and so you can't always 
call somebody by name.  I think the biggest help would be calling somebody by 
name. (TN8, Pos. 53) 
 
Using Closed-loop Communication. Closed-loop communication was indicated to be 
critical to effective IAE response by many participants in this study. Closed-loop 
communication includes a specific message, an acknowledgment by a recipient called a 
‘check back’ that includes relevant details from the original message, and then a 
verification by the original speaker that the interpretation of the recipient was correct 
(Davis et al., 2017). Closed-loop communication is important during IAEs because it 
ensures that the message has been received, understood, and that appropriate actions are 
being implemented. A participant reported how closed-loop communication improves 
IAE responses. 
If it's tense case we're not chattering or we're not needlessly conversing. But you 
know, if they're focused and they're in there (at the sterile field), I'm not going to 
disrupt them. I want them to be focused on that patient because that's what's best 
for that patient. (But) when they've got bleeding and then yeah, (the scrub is) 
yelling out what she wants. (…) But if it's a tense emergent (case), then yes, 
you're communicating, you're saying it loud and proud. So, people hear you and 
I'm repeating it back to them. So, it's clear who in the room is getting that. You 
know? So (the scrub) asks for laps, okay, I'll get them. I'm communicating back. 
So, she knows I heard her, and I'm focused on her and everyone else in the room 
knows not to waste their time getting laps because I'm doing that. But if it's a very 
delicate thing and then if she needs suture, then she might hold her packet up to 
me without saying anything and I'll know she needs her suture. And so, I'll grab 
that for her, and you know how it is. (TN11, Pos. 80) 
 
Closed-loop, directed communication was identified as being especially important when 
less experienced team members were recruited to assist during IAEs because it facilitates 
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a better understanding of the TMM and allows even inexperienced team members to 
accept responsibility during unfamiliar situations. One study participant described being 
able to fulfill responsibilities based on her abilities specifically assigned to her by an 
experienced team. 
I don't remember why the kid coded, I think it was a pulmonary embolism or 
something (like) that, but I remember the code being successful and going very 
well because of the communication that I witnessed.  And even though I wasn't an 
experienced nurse and I felt I wasn't -- I didn't have a lot of help to offer -- it 
ended up being that I was able to help a lot due to the correct people being in that 
situation.  So, what I witnessed that went really well was that everyone was 
communicating very clearly and efficiently and making eye contact and pointing 
to people and saying, you go get this, you go get this.  Anytime I heard anesthesia 
talking to the doctors, they would say, how much volume have we given?  They 
would reply with, I have given this much volume.  This is what we gave.  Very 
concise, to-the-point closed loop communication, which was wonderful to see 
(TN9, Pos. 5) 
 
Encouraging Input from the Team. Another facilitator to interprofessional 
communication described by participants in this study was when surgeons actively 
encourage input from surgical team members, including questions. One participant 
identified how communication culture in the intraoperative environment can impact 
newer team members’ ability and willingness to ask questions. 
I just feel like I wish that some people wouldn't be so afraid to ask questions, but I 
think it's also kind of like a culture thing with the way that some surgeons or 
residents kind of address people when they do ask questions. I just sometimes 
wish that people would be a little friendlier and more welcoming to questions. 
(TN10, Pos. 39) 
 
Another nurse described how a surgeon she works with deliberately builds a culture of 
communication safety through an introduction of all surgical team members at the 
beginning of the case that includes a reminder he is receptive to team member input.  
 
I think being able to feel like you can communicate with someone I think is really 
key here. Making it an environment where it's safe.  In our timeouts with (this 
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particular surgeon) at the end of every timeout he goes, this is a team.  If you see 
something, say something.  Speak up now, or even throughout the case.  Say 
something.  Oh, my gosh.  Talk about a transformation (of the culture), in my 
opinion. (…) He just does a nice job.  He asks for help.  (TN3, Pos. 158) 
 
Barriers 
 Participants in this study experienced many barriers to interprofessional 
communication during IAEs or potential IAEs. Reported barriers to effective 
communication included having unclear roles, having unclear responsibilities, having 
tunnel vision, receiving incomplete or incorrect information, being ‘overridden’, 
experiencing distractions and interruptions, delaying or avoiding confrontation, and 
‘throwing people under the bus’.  
Having Unclear Roles.  Surgical team member roles during IAEs are often unclear 
because additional team members often come in to provide support, which can result in 
confusion regarding responsibilities. A study participant described having too many 
providers in the room for a patient who was being coded. Since many of the usual roles 
present had more than one provider representing that professional role in the room, it 
became increasingly unclear whether important things were being done and by whom. 
That was a code in the cath lab.  I think they were there were cathing, I don't 
know what happened, I don't know if they tore something.  The kid was 
bleeding.  I think that kid ended up passing away too, but this happened at like 
five o'clock in the afternoon, so there were probably thirty people in the OR, and 
it was really hectic because there was probably five or six cath lab nurses, 
probably four or five anesthesiologists and then two or three residents or 
fellows.  There was a cath lab doctor and then the CV surgery doctors came over, 
so there were probably two of them in there.  The CV nurses came over, probably 
two of them in there.  The charge nurse came in there.  The general surgery nurses 
came because they were going to try to put the kid on ECMO, so there's two or 
three more of them, then the general surgeon.  I ended up leaving the room 
because I realized there's too many people in here.  I think they're getting -- 
people are having to yell over each other. Maybe I think the side conversations 
going on.  Number two, somebody asks for blood, to get blood from the blood 
bank.  I called up the blood bank and then like five minutes later, somebody was 
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like is the blood here?  And they're like yeah, it's already in the room, so between 
the cath lab nurses, the OR nurses, OR assistants -- and some of them don't know 
each other very well and they weren't communicating with each other about what 
was being done, so extra phone calls were being made and there was confusion of 
where the blood is and so things like that. (TN8, Pos. 19) 
 
Newer surgical team members entering an operating room to assist during IAEs often 
struggle to determine their role; that struggle can be further complicated by their limited 
experience. One inexperienced nurse participant was asked to assist in an unfamiliar 
specialty during an IAE. 
And things (situations) that where that's not my room, it's not my area.  It was in 
(another surgical specialty).  I'm not familiar with what's in those rooms and 
where to get it.  And I'm not familiar with the nurses who work there or the 
doctors who work in (Interventional Radiology) IR.  So, I was only a body. I felt 
very out of my element, but because I was communicating mostly with the 
anesthesia nurses and with the coordinators the OR people who are scrubbed in, I 
mostly just hung around them and got things for them because I knew where they 
were and I was able to help more.  But I feel like in those situations where it's 
very high stress everything's on the line and I didn't really have a part because no 
one there knew my name besides a handful of people that were in that room.  So, 
in that scenario, yeah, I definitely feel I don't really have a role until someone 
directs something at me like that. (TN9, Pos. 65) 
 
Having Unclear Responsibilities. While many of the responsibilities in the 
intraoperative environment are understood to belong to specific roles, other tasks are 
performed as part of the process and are not assigned to a specific team member. One 
surgeon participant related an incident when he was almost finished operating before he 
realized that no one had prepped the patient.  
I think the one downside to doing prep is that there's no check on the prep. Not a 
responsibility, per se, of someone in the room. So, in other words it's not the 
necessarily the resident's job to the prep, and not necessarily the scrub’s job to 
prep. At a lot of other hospitals that we go to, the circulator basically preps the 
patient and maybe the surgeon, I’m not sure. But so, there's no defined person that 
does the prep. And I think that's what happened in this particular situation, I 
thought the resident did the prep, I guess the resident thought the circulator was 
going to do the prep. And as it turns out, nobody did the prep. So basically, it was 
a patient who had leukemia was getting a central line in place. (…)  And 
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essentially what had happened was that we were moving along with the operation. 
We had already done the needle stick. We had already fed the wire and created 
the tunnel for the line. And it was sort of the process of doing that when I kind of 
looked down and saw the skin didn't have the sort of normal blue color like I 
would expect for a ChloraPrep prep, which is blue for central lines here. And I 
said, did anybody prep this patient? And everybody kind of looked at each other 
and was like no, no, nobody prepped the patient. And I kind of looked further. I 
kind of lifted up the drapes. No, there's no blue or anything on the patient. (TS4, 
Pos. 16) 
 
Another study participant was repeatedly ignored when she told the surgical team she had 
an incorrect count.  
So, we were doing a large reconstructive case with an adult-sized patient and 
there were lots and lots of instrumentation that needed to be counted and lots and 
lots of what we call soft stuff (surgical sponges) to be counted. We were closing 
and it was the staff (surgeon) and a fellow. They were closing rather fast. I let 
them know that I was not finished counting. I was not even close to finished 
counting and I would appreciate it if they would hold on a minute and let me 
finish the count. There was a piece of a retractor set that I don’t know if it was 
never there or if it was missing. So, we were like well, let’s go ahead and get an 
x-ray. While they were doing the x-ray, anesthesia said it looks like there are 
sponges in there. I said, of course there are sponges in there. I told you guys I was 
not done counting yet. So, we were looking for the metal piece of the retractor 
and obviously the piece of the retractor was not on the x-ray. We decided that that 
was okay, that we were going to proceed because it would have been a fairly large 
piece that would have been seen and they got right back to closing. I was like, 
excuse me. I’m still not done counting. I would really appreciate if you guys 
would stop what you are doing and let me finish before we go any further and 
they did not. They were asking me if I would give them the surgical glue to close 
before I was still even done and I thought they were absolutely insane. (TN6, Pos. 
3) 
 
Having Tunnel Vision. Participants in this study experienced tunnel vision in situations 
where their immediate task required a level of focus that resulted in reduced SA during 
IAEs. Sometimes participants became so involved in their personal task work that 
processes that require teamwork were done independently. One participant described the 
following situation: 
We went and looked in the cooler and there was only one unit of blood in the 
cooler and (the other nurse) was like, wait, I didn't know that a bag of blood got 
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hung already.  So, then we looked, and I looked in the cooler and the unit that was 
still sitting in the cooler was the one that was checked in.  Then I asked her, I said 
did you check in that blood that was hung?  And we looked up and the blood had 
already gone through, like the whole bag had gone and you could see the slip, still 
hanging on the bag of blood, so it wasn't even checked in. At this point we both 
kind of freaked out for a second and went right over to anesthesia and the resident 
and she asked him, she said, hey, when did you even grab those?  (…) The 
resident ended up, he voiced that he thought they were both checked in and so he 
didn't even consider checking or even telling the circulator that he was going to 
grab a unit of blood.  So, the anesthesia resident came over, just opened the cooler 
while the circulator was busy doing something else and grabbed a unit and hung 
it.  We finally, all three of us just checked in that bag that was already hung and 
everything thankfully was correct, and it matched for the patient, but that was just 
something that was super scary, and it really could have led to something really 
bad.  Obviously, the patient could have died or had an adverse reaction or 
anything with that unit of blood.  It was just a huge, we had to fill out an incident 
report and everything, just because obviously the resident was super-sorry, but 
still like we just voiced that we really needed the communication of, hey, can I 
hang this unit of blood?  Just making sure, because everyone knew that only one 
was checked in, but instead the resident just went in and grabbed a unit without 
even telling the circulator that they were going to do that and the circulator was so 
busy at the time that she didn't even realize it was being hung or else she would 
have stopped and been like, hey, like is that the one that's checked in?  But 
instead, the wrong unit was hung.  (TN7, Pos. 4-5) 
 
Other study participants experienced tunnel vision at a sensory level because of the 
narrowed attention at the surgical field. One surgeon related the following story. 
I was assisting, and so my brain was able to process what else was going on.  And 
it sounds as if the anesthesiologist in the room was uncomfortable with the 
amount of blood loss and the amount of time it was taking to have the tumor taken 
out.  The anesthesiologist at no time communicated that (directly) to the 
surgeon.  And it was a junior surgeon, and it was a big case for a junior 
surgeon.  But this (being uncomfortable) is communicated to our circulator, and 
our circulator is also the charge nurse at the time, who still is.  And so, this is 
communicated to the circulator, and she was visibly uncomfortable and walking 
around the room while this is going on.  And what my perception of the situation 
was, was that no one wanted to offend this junior surgeon doing a very difficult 
case and tell them that they were getting uncomfortable with it.  And so, it was 
clear that the anesthesiologist was communicating with nursing.  Nursing was 
communicating with other neurosurgeons who were in (another) operating room, 
but not actually in our room and telling them that they were uncomfortable with 
the situation. (…) And I don't know if the surgeon knew about it or if he was so 
focused on the operation in front of him, that you can be oblivious to it.  And 
that's very easy to be oblivious when you are hyper focused on one thing.  That's 
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so easy that I've had days where like I blink after ten minutes and I throw out like, 
wow, I forgot to blink because I'm so focused on taking out this tumor.  (TS1, 
Pos. 5) 
 
Receiving Incomplete or Inaccurate Information. Many participants in this study 
received incomplete or inaccurate information that led to IAEs or potential IAEs. One 
participant described an inexperienced nurse bringing a surgical patient back to the 
operating room and realizing she did not have the information she needed to safely 
catheterize her patient for surgery. 
I came into the room kind of to the same sort of, I could tell from my circulator 
who has only been a nurse a couple years and been on my team for a couple years, 
and she was just like, I don't know what to do.  I don't know how to cath this 
person.  I don't know what's going on, and there's no note on the chart.  There's 
nothing anywhere. (…) She was trying to call the nurse in day surgery to say, you 
didn't put what size catheter.  You didn't put which one was the Monti.  You didn't 
put which one was the MACE. (…)  So, I helped her guide her through that.  We 
could definitely call the pre-op nurse, but at this point we're probably just better 
off just to own it and call the mom and find out what we need to know.  So that 
was again another possible problem that could've happened because 
communication was not written down, because this nurse didn't communicate 
with the mom before she came back.  Just teaching her to go directly to the parent, 
as hard as that is, to admit that you didn't get all the information. We were able to 
kind of stop that from being a big problem. (TN3, Pos. 4) 
 
Another study participant experienced how ambiguous communication led to their team 
not receiving the assistance they needed to stabilize a patient. 
And so, at this point, communication went from being wishy-washy to everyone 
in the room, to (a situation where) we were directly communicating with 
anesthesia telling them that things are bad.  We need you to do several measures 
to try and decrease the pressure inside of the child's head.  And a second call was 
made to said surgeon of saying, we don't need your advice.  We need your 
hands.  We need your help.  We need you right now.  We have concerns.  This 
child's life is in danger.  And at that point, said surgeon came into the room, and 
instead of helping, and instead of guiding, took over the operation, whatever that 
means.  That doesn't matter much, but it took two calls and unfortunately, poor 
communication to eventually get what we wanted, which was help.  And after 




Surgeon participants were most likely to identify anesthesia providers as the 
source of incomplete or inaccurate information that impacted their practice in the 
intraoperative environment. Anesthesia providers have the responsibility of monitoring 
vital signs throughout surgical procedures and the monitors are not easily visualized by 
surgeons from the sterile field. Often the first indication for them that patient status is 
deteriorating is an awareness that the associated monitor noises are changing, which 
causes them to disrupt their focus in order to check on the patient. One surgeon related 
the following story. 
There are definitely days I wish that anesthesia would communicate more vital 
signs.  I wish I knew more about cold patients.  Sometimes for our patients, it gets 
really cold, and I don't know until I look up and I see that the kids like 34 
degrees.  Because I can operate in a room with 100 degrees.  Everyone can, no 
one's going to pass out.  So just little things that probably aren't going to change 
the outcome of the case, but could, so being cold we think can cause increased 
wound infections, bleeding problems, et cetera, et cetera.  So, I wish I would 
know about that.  And there's other times where you always hear the heart rate 
monitor in the background, and it's dropping or it's getting quick, and you don't 
know what's going on. (TS1, Pos. 51) 
 
Not Going Directly to the Source. Less-experienced study participants often solicited 
advice from peers when they needed clarification in the intraoperative environment. 
Although this strategy allows them to avoid potential discomfort caused by revealing a 
knowledge deficit to other members of the surgical team, it can also result in receiving 
inaccurate or incomplete information. Specialty coordinators are nurses who are chosen 
to oversee surgical services based on their experience and expertise. One study 
participant who functions as a specialty coordinator on her unit expressed her frustration 




Oh, like even here, we as coordinators, literally we'll have people asking like their 
little friends for help on how to do whatever this neurosurgery case is that comes 
into their room instead of asking Exx (an experienced specialty coordinator) or 
me. I don't understand why they don't immediately seek out the expert. But they 
instead ask their buddies. I want to talk about it at one of our staff meetings. It's 
that bothersome to most of us in the OR. And it ends up wasting time. And if 
you're in a case and the surgeon's waiting on something that nobody understands 
what to do or where to get it from -- why would you not immediately just ask the 
person who is paid to know these things? (TN12, Pos. 85) 
 
Being Overridden. Many participants in this study felt their communication was 
overridden when they expressed concerns during developing IAEs. One surgical team 
realized a small piece of an instrument was not accounted for, but when they repeatedly 
notified the surgical fellow who was closing the incision, she continued to close instead 
of pausing until the piece could be found. This ultimately resulted in a sentinel event. 
Then they (the surgical fellow) said, okay, but they continued to close. Then skin 
was closed and the scrub and the second circulator, and by this time, I'm involved, 
and we actually had some outside help come in to try to help go through the trash 
and the linens and make sure, because it wasn't a very big piece. Then she said, 
the scrub nurse said, we can't find this piece. I don't know where it is. The fellow 
said, Well, all right. Well, let's get an x-ray., which we did. Nobody was really 
expecting to find it there, but the x-ray revealed that there was a retained 
instrument. Then, the pediatric staff surgeon was notified and came back, and the 
patient was reopened and the object was retrieved, so the count could be 
reconciled. Then they had to re-close the patient, and by this time, the staff 
surgeon was back in the room. Actually, he was grateful that it was found in the 
operating room (TN1, Pos. 33) 
 
Experiencing Distractions and Interruptions. Many participants in this study were 
distracted or interrupted during cases and reported actively ‘tuning out’ other 
conversations to try to maintain their focus. One participant related the following story. 
I think something that is, unfortunately, I think something that is not helpful in 
our rooms and it's just all the chit chat. Like there's just a lot more banter and 
sarcasm and just talking than I was raised with when I first worked in the OR and 
I think unfortunately, it's just sort of a, I don't I don't want to say it's a 
generational thing necessarily, but it is just something that I'm uncomfortable with 
a lot anymore. And it's probably not just my service, but it's definitely a problem 
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in (my service). There's just a lot of, yeah, just a lot of chitchat that doesn't really 
need to be happening. (TN12, Pos. 75) 
 
One surgeon participant identified how the timing of questions from surgical team 
members can disrupt focus within the surgical team.  
Because think about this for a second. Would you ever ask the pilot of a 747 
flying from JFK to Singapore to weigh in on the flight path of a plane that's flying 
from Los Angeles to Houston? Would that ever happen? (…) It would be 
inconceivable that you would ask a pilot to weigh in about another flight. You 
know, particularly in a time that as we are driving down the road, we're not 
supposed to be texting or surfing or fiddling with all of these things in our cars. 
But yet what is asked of the anesthesiologist and the surgeon to a degree is to do 
six things at once and manage a whole bunch of other things. While you could 
argue that doing an operation or providing anesthesia has every bit as many 
intensity and concentration requirements specific as driving a vehicle would have. 
And some people might argue even more so. (TS2, Pos. 67) 
 
Operating on Autopilot. Many participants in this study were involved in IAEs where 
assumptions were made based on what the surgical team ‘does all the time’. Study 
participants relied on a shared understanding of common practice and missed 
opportunities to share knowledge, to communicate about the team’s plan for the case, and 
to perform backup behaviors with inexperienced team members. A participant identified 
her experience with a surgical team running on autopilot in the following story. 
I'm just thinking about the other day we did a time-out. And it was a bunch of us 
that are used to working together, aside from like the anesthesia (provider). (…) 
At any rate, we had thought that we had communicated what we wanted CO2 to 
be when we were doing the lasering, and everybody seemed to be listening and 
understand, but (for) most of us, this is what we do all the time. That was, so it 
was a little rote, but either the person - I think the person running the laser was not 
like a person that does it very regularly. And for some reason, somebody brought 
it to our attention that the anesthesia people had not reduced the CO2 to what the 
surgeon had recommended. And I remember us all being like, ‘oh, my gosh, I 
thought we talked about that.’ And the laser nurse was like, ‘oh my God.’ Maybe 
it was that she didn't understand how important it was or whatever, but anyway, 
we all kind of stopped what we were doing and made sure that the change was 
(made and) then noted. And they waited and got everything to where it should 
have been as far as that (C02 level) using the laser in the airway. But I don't 
know. (…) Basically, what I'm trying to say is that everybody in the room thought 
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we all understood what we're supposed to be doing. And yet what we had talked 
about did not actually happen. I mean, we all had gone through and did what we 
just sort of rotely do without having actually paid attention to that one detail that 
was sort of important, especially in a risky airway kind of a kid. (…) And I think 
it's just a little bit indicative of how we can be sort of lax about our timeouts and 
just each of us saying our own little spiel and not really paying attention that 
putting that into practice. (TN12, Pos. 17) 
 
Delaying or Avoiding Confrontation. Participants in this study delayed or avoided 
confrontation in the intraoperative environment to prevent conflict from impacting patient 
care. One participant observed a circulating nurse ignoring a sterility issue because of the 
response she expected if she confronted a nurse she found intimidating.  
I'm amazed sometimes that the people that I think would say something, don’t.  I 
came in the room last fall and (a nurse) had draped a prep stand with, almost like, 
a towel.  Like a hand towel thing.  It came in a disposable gown thing, and I go, 
Ixx, what's going on there?  What are you doing?  And, anyway, she had some 
reason or excuse why she did it and I gave her a back table cover or something 
and said, you have to use something else.  You can't use that.  (Another 
experienced nurse) Hxx was in the room, and I'm like, Hxx, why did you not say 
anything?  And she said, well, I just figured she would just have some excuse and 
it would be uncomfortable, which really surprised me, because Hxx's pretty 
strong.  So, I think when you have people that are very intimidating - it silences 
people, too.  Even what's right.  Had you prepped with that prep stand it would've 
not been sterile.  And Hxx knew that.  It was hard for her to stand up to Ixx and 
say, this isn't right.  You’ve got to do something else.  I think that's a big problem. 
if you don't intervene and stop that kind of behavior.  You know?  (TN3, Pos. 
172) 
 
Throwing People Under the Bus. Throwing someone under the bus is commonly used 
to describe sacrificing the interests of someone to preserve one’s own interests (Merriam-
Webster, n.d.). This expression is used in the intraoperative environment to identify when 
a team member or members speak or act in a way that results in another team member 
losing face. Participants in this study felt they were thrown under the bus when they were 
publicly ridiculed for asking questions or were left out of important conversations that 
result in them being less prepared than other team members. Nurses in the intraoperative 
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environment frequently alternate between functioning as the circulating nurse or the 
scrub nurse for procedures. One participant described having roles in the room changed at 
the last minute, without her knowledge, which impacted her readiness to begin the case.  
And then another thing is just kind of like last minute schedule changes where 
they're not communicated to you.  I had a coworker that was complaining to me 
about this today, that she got switched at the last minute and she was going to 
scrub, and they didn't tell her.  And she had all of her stuff set up to scrub and 
everything.  And then the other nurse came in like fifteen minutes before the kid 
was supposed to come back and said, oh, hey, I'm scrubbing and you're 
circulating. So, she didn't have any of her circulating stuff done beforehand.  And 
I guess it was like a double case where two different specialties were doing the 
case and they didn't have consent for one of them.  And so, I mean, it was 
partially her fault because she didn't make sure they had both consents before they 
brought her back.  But she was so flustered because she just got thrown in and had 
to go out and get the kid and didn't have time to look in the chart or do 
anything.  And so that was just like a last-minute schedule changes and things like 
that, where they just throw you in a room and you have to, oh, hurry and get the 
kid and be on time to the room and make sure the kid is safe, but you don't have 
time to prepare anything to make that kid safe.  And so that's another definitely 
breakdown. (...) But this nurse just felt like she wasn't prepared for any of that, 
because she just got a last-minute schedule change, and nobody told her until right 
before and she was preparing for this other role and then she didn't have time to 
set up her role.  And the other nurse that came in to scrub, she had all of her stuff 
ready for her, obviously all of her surgical and everything set up.  And then that 
nurse didn't help her in turn, like get her stuff ready.  So, she just felt very stressed 
and not ready for the kid. (TN13, Pos. 15) 
 
Another study participant was accused of not giving her relief nurse important 
information after being rushed during handoff. 
But there are a couple of nurses in particular that they, if they come in to relieve 
you and you're trying to give report, that they try to hurry you out the door. And 
there was one instance where, you know, I told the nurse what I needed to tell 
him, but I think he missed it. I think I was in ENT, and it was something about 
where the position of the bed needed to be, or something like that. And then when 
I got back, he was like, I got hosed because it wasn't set up the way they wanted 
it. But I told him it needed to be a certain way. But he was rushing me, and he 
wasn't paying attention. But, again, no harm to the patient or anything. Oftentimes 
when people try to rush, either they're not listening or you don't tell them 




Disruptive Behavior. Participants in this study sometimes experienced disruptive 
behavior by other surgical team members. Disruptive behaviors experienced included 
verbal abuse, intimidating physical actions such as throwing or grabbing instruments or 
supplies, and physical abuse. One nurse related the following experience. 
So, I was scrubbed helping (another surgeon) and we took the bone off, and he 
(the second surgeon) came over, he was scrubbed in, and he said to me, I want 
you to help me scrape the bone off with this SafeScraper.  And I go, oh, I've never 
done that.  I don't know how to do that.  (He said) Well, come over here.  I can 
show you how to do it, I can show you how to do it.  It was not in my scope of 
practice nor was I doing it the way he wanted me to do it.  I said, I can't. (He said) 
You're not trying.  You're not even trying.  He began to yell at me that I wasn't 
trying, that I wasn't paying attention, that I just couldn't get it.  He grabbed the 
bone from me, and he grabbed the scraper, he said, I'll just do it myself.  I'll do it 
myself.  You can't do it.  And then that was at the back table, then we were back 
at the field, and I was just completely quiet just waiting for (the other scrub nurse) 
to come back, because I'm like, I've got to get out of here.  That's when he began 
questioning me again, you're mad at me, aren't you?  You're mad at me.  And I'm 
like, I'm not mad at you.  I'm not talking to you about this right now.  We're 
taking care of this patient.  (He said) You just don't pay attention to what I tell 
you to do.  And I'm like, we're not talking about this right now. It was so 
humiliating, and the room was full of people.  It took every tiny bit of my 
emotional energy to provide safe care to that patient, and to make sure I didn't 
hurt that patient.  So, it's kind of like you have a certain amount of reserve of 
emotional intellect at a time like that, I think.  It was like a flight or fight.  I just 
put everything of what I had into making sure I didn't hurt the patient until I got 
out of there.  I don't know, I think it totally compromised my ability to do the best 
job I could do, again, for that patient, because I couldn't think as clearly, I couldn't 
respond as quickly because I was paralyzed that somebody would actually talk to 
another human being like that. (TN3, Pos. 75) 
 
Study participants did not have to be the target of disruptive behavior to feel that 
communication within the surgical team was negatively impacted. One participant 
witnessed a prolonged argument between surgeons that made the surgical team members 
hesitant to initiate communication throughout the rest of the case. 
Because it was two different specialties.  So then both docs were in there and they 
were arguing, yelling at each other, asking who was going to go first.  Then the 
one doctor was like, well, I've got my consent, I'm going.  And the other doctor 
was like, I was out there.  But she was not out there, she had not gotten consent 
131 
 
yet.  And I guess it was just a big, very blown-up situation. (…) I don't know how 
they ended up picking who went first, but both doctors were very upset.  The rest 
of the case was very tense.  It was not good.  You know, they should have 
probably had that planned ahead of time who was going to go first and not left 
that til the last minute.  They shouldn't have left consents till the last minute, 
obviously.  (TN13, Pos. 19-21) 
 
Conclusion 
 The findings from this research study include a framework that identifies and 
explores the psychosocial process of Testing the Water used by participants to initiate 
and maintain interprofessional communication during IAEs. Most participants in this 
study experienced interprofessional communication during IAEs as a situational, iterative 
process where communication strategies were used to influence responses of the surgical 
team. Because the study participants varied in professional role and tenure, the 
application of the strategies and their consequences were experienced differently. Nurse 
participants with less experience were more likely to see something and not recognize or 
understand its importance, not know what to ask, or to be afraid to ask other team 
members questions to clarify their understanding. Nurse participants with more 
experience were quicker to recognize and clarify problems, used strategies to avoid 
seeming confrontational, and used patient advocacy to override their concerns about 
using speaking up behaviors. Surgeon participants experienced interprofessional 
communication very differently than nurses because of the professional rights ascribed to 
their role. Surgeon participant stories detailing problems with upward communication 
were primarily from situations where they were junior members of the team during 
residency or fellowship, or during times when they were working with other physicians 
and hierarchy was unclear. As attending surgeons, interprofessional communication 
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concerns were most likely to be caused by not receiving information in a timely matter 
and by surgical team members not understanding the communication used for delegation.  
The differences identified among participants in this study reveal opportunities to 
improve interprofessional communication through increased perceptions of psychological 
safety. Increased perceptions of psychological safety are indicated to reduce the time 
needed to recognize and respond to IAEs. Future research including the other 
professional roles constituting the surgical team would be valuable to further develop the 
framework and explore its potential application to intraoperative communication training, 
interventions, and evaluations. The findings also identified facilitators and barriers to 
effective interprofessional communication that were consistent with current 
















  The purpose of this study was to explore the psychosocial processes involved 
during the establishment and maintenance of interprofessional communication 
surrounding IAEs or potential IAEs in the operating room. This qualitative exploration 
was guided through the use of grounded theory to answer four related research questions. 
1) How do surgeons and surgical nurses experience the initiation of interprofessional 
communication in the operating room related to IAEs or potential IAEs? 2) How do 
surgeons and surgical nurses experience the maintenance of interprofessional 
communication in the operating room related to IAEs or potential IAEs? 3) What do 
study participants perceive as facilitators to the process of initiating and maintaining 
interprofessional communication? 4) What do study participants perceive as barriers to 
the process of initiating and maintaining interprofessional communication? Answers to 
these questions were largely satisfied by the findings presented in the previous chapter.  
An overarching finding of the study was the perception that interprofessional 
communication during IAEs is largely situational as surgical team members navigate care 
provision through action teams within an interdependent, evolving practice environment. 
This situational approach to interprofessional communication was titled Testing the 
Water and was experienced through subprocesses identified as Reading the Room and 
Navigating Hierarchy. Another important finding was that study participants experienced 
the initiation and maintenance of interprofessional communication differently based on 
their tenure and professional roles. These differences in participant experience extended 
to the perceived facilitators and barriers to interprofessional communication. This chapter 
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contains analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of the findings and relates them to relevant 
concepts in current surgical team communication literature. 
Discussion 
Study participants described their experiences during semi-structured, private 
interviews that were recorded, transcribed, and imported into MaxQDA software for 
analysis. These experiences were analyzed through the constant comparison method to 
identify patterns between and among participating individuals and professional groups. 
Patterns indicated the tenure and professional roles of the study participants significantly 
influenced their communication experiences. The described experiences also suggest the 
existence of common phases of interprofessional communication during IAEs. These 
phases are recognition, reconnaissance, rallying, reaction, and resolution. Not all study 
participants experienced each phase during IAEs, and the phases were often recursive and 
repeated throughout the surgical team’s coordinated response. 
  The identified communication phases have been used to organize an exploration 
of the findings. These communication phases also relate directly to concepts frequently 
described within interprofessional healthcare communication research. A comprehensive 
review of teamwork and communication literature preceded this study to allow the 
researcher to identify knowledge gaps and to situate this study within current 
interprofessional communication research. This chapter will focus on connecting the 
study findings to concepts that directly impact the surgical team’s response to IAEs. The 
concepts that are most critical to a surgical team’s response to IAEs include SA, 
sensemaking, and TMMs. This chapter will explore these concepts as they are interwoven 
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into the discussion of the communication phases of recognition, reconnaissance, rallying, 
reaction, and resolution.   
Initiation of Interprofessional Communication During IAEs 
Initiation of Communication During Recognition 
The first research question sought to answer how study participants experienced 
the initiation of interprofessional communication. Many participants in this study had to 
initiate interprofessional communication during the recognition phase of developing or 
potential IAEs. Their experiences initiating communication were influenced by their role, 
tenure, and the need for the involvement of other surgical team members to assist in their 
responses to IAEs.  
Identified patterns suggest the existence of three groups that were represented 
during all phases: inexperienced nurses, experienced nurses, and surgeons. Inexperienced 
nurse participants were often confused and anxious during the initiation of 
communication during IAEs. Inexperienced nurse participants also often doubted they 
had the experience or knowledge to identify and evaluate potential problems and risks 
during IAEs. Inexperienced nurses were more likely to double check relevant information 
before initiating communication with other surgical team members. Many inexperienced 
nurses also initiated communication with peers to confirm their perceptions before 
addressing or alerting the surgical team. Some inexperienced nurses relied on others to 
communicate concerns to the surgical team for them. Inexperienced nurses were most 
apprehensive about initiating communication about IAEs resulting from team member 
error or performance issues.  
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Experienced nurse participants were more likely to understand potential problems 
and risks during IAEs. They were also more likely to troubleshoot problems and to know 
when (or if) communication with the surgical team could be safely delayed. Experienced 
nurses relied on prior knowledge to know how to phrase and direct their requests for 
information; because of their prior knowledge, they frequently were able to shorten or 
skip the reconnaissance phase for familiar problems. Many experienced nurses also 
tailored their communication to the recipients and often used strategies to avoid seeming 
confrontational or embarrassing other surgical team members.  
Surgeons often experienced the recognition of IAEs based on their level of 
involvement at the sterile field. Many surgeons were not involved in the recognition 
phase if problems originated outside of their immediate focus. Some surgeons recognized 
changes in the room that indicated problems but relied on team members with a broader 
perspective of events to provide information about developing situations. Most surgeons 
who recognized problems felt they had the experience and knowledge to intervene in 
IAEs. Surgeons often required supplementary situational information to rally the surgical 
team to appropriate responses to IAEs. All groups desired increased information 
exchange during the recognition phase to more effectively perform their professional 
roles. All groups also felt the initiation of communication was more complicated during 
IAEs resulting from team member performance and were more likely to describe 
communication as problematic when the performance belonged to an ‘equal’ or ‘higher’ 
ranking surgical team member. Findings related to interprofessional communication 
during the recognition phase were consistent with current team communication literature.  
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Situational Awareness. The concept of situational awareness (SA), sometimes identified 
as situation awareness, is critical to the understanding of interprofessional 
communication during the recognition of IAEs or potential IAEs (Green et al., 2017). 
Accurate SA within individuals occurs at three levels; having SA includes perceiving 
elements of the environment, comprehending meaning, and then projecting that meaning 
to the situation (Endsley, 1995, 2004). “SA can also be described as a person’s ability to 
maintain an adequate internal representation of the status of the environment in complex 
and dynamic domains where there are sudden fluctuations in conditions” (Green, 2017, 
p.721). Accurate SA occurs when team members correctly perceive what is happening, 
what the observed event does or could mean, and what needs to happen next to respond 
effectively. The following table, Levels of SA, depicts how surgical team members might 
experience the levels of SA described by Endsley. It is important to note that an accurate 
perception of the elements in the environment requires the ability to sift out what is 
relevant, to understand the significance of the elements, and to integrate that significance 
with the individual’s existing or developing goals and mental model. This is explained 
below, in the table titled Table 5.1: Levels of SA. 
Table 5.1: Levels of SA 
Level One  Level Two Level Three 
Perception of the 
attributes, dynamics, 
and status of 









Projection of future status to 












Study participants asked 
themselves: 
 
What does this mean? 
What could it mean? 
Study participants asked 
themselves: 
 
What might happen next? 
What should we do? 
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In this study, many participants perceived elements or changes in the environment 
but were not able to comprehend their meaning or potential importance. This lack of 
comprehension often meant that inexperienced surgical team members had ‘information’ 
but did not possess the experience-based knowledge to discern its importance, and there 
were frequent delays as they tried to make sense of evolving situations. Other study 
participants who had the experience to comprehend and project the meaning of 
environmental elements or patient status changes often did not perceive relevant 
information when they were focused on the sterile field or other tasks. These differences 
in SA during IAE recognition often resulted in experienced surgical team members not 
having the information that was necessary to guide critical decision-making processes 
during procedures (Brennan, Holden, Shaw, Morris, & Oeppen, 2020; Madani et al., 
2017). 
Inexperienced surgical team members potentially find themselves ‘stuck’ at the 
perception level of SA because making sense of evolving situations requires the “effortful 
processes of gathering and synthesizing information, using story building and mental 
models to find some representation that accounts for and explains the disparate data” 
(Endsley, 2004, p. 324). Making sense of many developing situations requires prior 
experience with similar or comparable situations; the absence of those experiences 
necessitates bringing relevant observations to the attention of other, more experienced 
surgical team members. 
The overall SA of the team is only as good as the lowest SA of any of its 
members, and this should be remembered. It is sometimes the least qualified 
person who realises that something is wrong, again highlighting the importance of 
the team briefing to empower everyone to speak up. A useful practice that can be 
discussed at the briefing is to stop when something does not seem quite right.  
(Brennan et al., 2020, p. 406). 
139 
 
This ‘permission’ to speak up when something does not seem right, without requiring the 
‘justification’ possible through the synthesis of prior knowledge or perceived risks, 
potentially brings developing IAEs to the attention of the surgical team more rapidly, 
which can facilitate faster, more informed responses to IAEs.  
The importance of SA in the intraoperative environment has resulted in role-
specific measures being developed for surgeons, anesthesia providers, and scrub staff 
(Geraghty & Paterson-Brown, 2020; Kang, Gillespie, & Massey, 2014; Lee et al., 2021; 
Mitchell et al., 2013). SA can also be measured at the team level with the Observational 
Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (Hull, Arora, Kassab, Kneebone, & Sevdalis, 2011). 
Decreased SA has been linked to nontechnical surgical error, and increased SA has been 
indicated to reduce the impact of preventable IAEs (Doumouras et al., 2017; Siu, Maran, 
& Paterson-Brown, 2016).  
Obstacles to Situational Awareness. Researchers have identified several obstacles to or 
‘enemies’ of SA that were also described by study participants (Endsley & Jones, 2016). 
These identified factors that directly impact SA include attentional tunneling, complexity 
creep, data overload, errant mental models, misplaced salience, out-of-the-loop 
syndrome, requisite memory trap, and workload, anxiety, fatigue, and other stressors 
(WAFOS).  
Attentional tunneling. Participants in this study described attentional tunneling as 
‘having tunnel vision’. Many participants became so involved in performing the taskwork 
connected to their professional roles that they became less aware of changes in the 
intraoperative environment. When attentional tunneling or tunnel vision occurs, 
individuals “lock in on certain aspects or features of the environment they are trying to 
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process and will intentionally or inadvertently drop their scanning behavior” (Endsley & 
Jones, 2016 p. 32). This reduced scanning behavior contributed to delays in participant 
recognition of IAEs. Some study participants became so involved with the factors within 
their immediate focus that they then described ‘turning around’ or ‘finally blinking’ to 
discover they had not attended to important environmental information. Attentional 
tunneling is likely unavoidably inherent to the surgical process because of the focus 
required by surgical team members, making the scanning behaviors of other team 
members even more important to the early recognition of IAEs.  
Complexity creep. Complexity creep is another identified factor that contributes to 
reduced SA. Complexity creep occurs in complicated, dynamic situations where there are 
so many variables that it becomes difficult for individuals to “form sufficient 
representations of how these systems work” (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 38). The 
participant narratives from this study of IAEs or developing IAEs often included 
descriptions of rapidly changing patient status, unclear surgical team goals, and lack of 
team member engagement that made it difficult to communicate effectively to coordinate 
team member actions. In addition, many participants in this study described being in 
situations using unfamiliar equipment or instruments, working with unfamiliar team 
members with unknown knowledge or abilities, and emergently caring for patients 
without opportunities to assess and understand factors related to patient status. 
Complexity creep makes responding to IAEs more difficult because of its influence on 
the development of an accurate mental model. 
Data overload. Data overload is a factor that contributes to complexity creep in the 
intraoperative environment. During dynamic situations, “the rapid rate at which data 
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changes creates a need for information intake that quickly outpaces the ability of a 
person’s sensory and cognitive system to supply that need” (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 
35). Many participants in this study experienced IAEs where they felt bombarded by the 
constant influx of information as situations changed, and some participants had trouble 
determining which changes were relevant to the situation and what actions were indicated 
to respond effectively. Data overload also was identified as contributing to confusion 
when surgical team members indiscriminately communicated about needed actions 
without designating intended recipients. Failing to designate recipients often meant that 
study participants struggled to process unclear requests for assistance during IAEs. 
Errant mental models. Errant mental models also impact SA in the intraoperative 
environment. Mental models are the basis for interpretation of situations that “tell a 
person how to combine disparate pieces of information, how to interpret the significance 
of that information, and how to develop reasonable projections of what will happen in the 
future” (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 39). Some participants in this study experienced 
inaccuracies in their individual mental models which led to them delaying or avoiding 
relevant communication with the surgical team. Some study participants also relied on 
other team members to ‘bridge the gap’ between what they were observing and what it 
might mean. Errant mental models are potentially unavoidable within action teams 
because the trajectory of many situations is dependent on variables like changing patient 
status, staff composition, and the proposed interventions.  
Misplaced salience. SA is also influenced by misplaced salience. The salience of 
information has been described as the “compellingness of certain forms of information” 
which has been linked to the information’s physical characteristics (Endsley & Jones, 
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2016 p. 36). In the intraoperative environment, the physical characteristics of incoming 
information can be both misleading and distracting. Participants in this study identified 
having their SA impacted by equipment alarms, case-irrelevant conversations, and 
movement in their peripheral vision. Attempts to remain focused during such distractions 
often cause individuals to use significant mental energy to “block out all the competing 
signals to attend to desired information” (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 38). This intermittent 
attention to environmental factors led to diminished SA and distracted focus for many 
participants in this study. 
Out-of-the-loop syndrome. Out-of-the-loop syndrome can be another obstacle to SA in 
the intraoperative environment. Originally used to indicate how automation influences 
SA, it also applies to situations where providers depend on electronic alerts from patient 
monitors to make them aware of changes in patient status. In many situations, patients are 
surgically draped, and awareness of patient status changes is dependent on equipment 
alarms instead of assessment of the patients. Some study participants also reported 
feeling disengaged from both the patient and the surgical team during robotic surgeries 
because of the size and configuration of surgical equipment. 
Requisite memory trap. Another factor that can impact SA is called the requisite memory 
trap. The phrase requisite memory trap describes the limitations of working memory. 
Working memory is used to process situational information; this is especially true of 
inexperienced surgical team members. Some participants in this study experienced 
situations where they felt they ‘should know’ what to say or do but reported they could 
not ‘retrieve’ the needed information. Research suggests that, unlike inexperienced team 
members, experienced team members do not seem to be constrained by the limitations of 
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working memory to synthesize information during SA (Endsley, 2015).  Experienced 
team members have another advantage because “the development of rich mental models 
of the environment over time contributes significantly to people’s ability to form 
meaningful chunks of information for more efficient storage” and more rapid retrieval 
during IAEs (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 33).  
Environmental stressors. The final factor influencing SA as described by Endsley 
addresses the stressors experienced in a complex environment: task workload, anxiety, 
fatigue, and other stressors (WAFOS) (Endsley & Jones, 2016). The other stressors 
identified include mental workload, time pressure, uncertainty, career advancement, self-
esteem, and participating in high-consequence events - such as when lives are at stake 
(Endsley & Jones, 2016). All of the identified WAFOS stressors are relevant to the 
intraoperative environment. Most participants in this study described being under varying 
levels of stress during surgical procedures, and this stress often increased significantly 
during IAEs.  Study participants identified feeling ‘being up against’ factors related to 
time, problems, ‘the system’, the personalities or practices of other surgical team 
members, and perceived performance or knowledge deficits within themselves. Working 
under these stressors has been identified to decrease both the availability of working 
memory and the ability to gather information as individuals tend to “pay less attention to 
peripheral information, become more disorganized in scanning information, and be more 
likely to succumb to attentional tunneling” (Endsley & Jones, 2016 p. 35). Individuals 
working under stress are also more likely to experience premature closure during IAEs 
and tend to arrive at decisions without understanding or thoroughly considering all of the 
available information. (Endsley & Jones, 2016). 
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These obstacles to effective SA at the individual level indicate the need to 
communicate earlier during developing IAEs to ‘shift’ the SA to a team or shared level to 
make sure the entire surgical team perceives, comprehends, and projects the meaning of 
events. Although the specific aspects of the situation that are relevant to each team 
member’s SA may be different in that they are determined by the unique goals of each 
role, there also seems to be a subset of information requirements that is common among 
all surgical team members. It is this overlap in SA requirements that defines the need for 
distributed SA or team SA (Gillespie, Gwinner, Chaboyer, et al., 2013). Researchers 
suggest the most accurate SA within teams is when surgical team members communicate 
deliberately to develop team or distributed SA (Sorensen & Stanton, 2013). Deliberate 
communication includes communicating clearly, checking for understanding of the 
current situation, and developing a shared projection of what is likely to happen next to 
create distributed SA (Gillespie, Gwinner, Fairweather, et al., 2013). This team or 
distributed SA raises the understanding of situations from the individual to the team level 
and makes better use of the knowledge and experience of all surgical team members.  
Bringing potential or developing IAEs to the SA of the surgical team allows an 
‘accessing’ of the cognitive capability of the entire team, and “occurs as a consequence of 
an interaction of an individual’s pre-existing relevant knowledge and expectations; the 
information available from the environment; and cognitive processing skills that include 
attention allocation, perception, data extraction, comprehension and projection” (Salas, 
1995, p. 125). This aligned, distributed SA heightens awareness for the entire surgical 
team, facilitates informed decision-making, and increases responsiveness to IAEs. 
Moving through the levels of SA as a team to make sense of developing situations is 
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necessary to respond more effectively to IAEs. One common pathway from perception to 
projection using SA is shown in the following table titled Table 5.2: Situational 
Awareness. 







 Sensemaking Mental Model 
  Communication   
  Team Mental Model 
 
Speaking Up Behavior. Accurate team SA surrounding developing IAEs often depends 
on the ability and willingness of less experienced or less tenured members to ‘speak up’ 
or ‘stop the line’, even if they are not sure of the importance of what they are witnessing. 
Speaking up has been defined as the explicit communication of doubts, opinions, 
problems, or suggestions that seem to challenge the status quo (Weiss et al., 2014). 
Speaking up can include raising concerns about performance errors, rule breaking, 
mistakes in clinical judgment, or failure to follow protocols (Okuyama et al., 2014). The 
importance of speaking up behaviors has been identified in healthcare, but in practice 
speaking up behaviors have been described as ‘unsafe and ineffective’ and as being 
impeded by power dynamics and hierarchies (Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014; 
Pattni et al., 2018). Speaking up to prevent harm to others in the workplace has also been 
identified as ‘safety voice’ and has been described as being influenced by shared safety 
knowledge, norms, work configuration, and psychological safety (Noort et al., 2019).  




interprofessional partnerships, increase accountability, improve conflict resolution, and 
increase recognition and reporting of adverse events and near misses (Fencl et al., 2021). 
“Psychological safety reflects the belief among team members that it is safe to take risks, 
voice dissent and make errors” (Barling et al., 2018, p. 15). Several studies show that 
safety culture and the related concept of safety climate are related to such clinician 
behaviors as error reporting (3), reductions in adverse events (4, 5), and reduced mortality 
(Barling et al., 2018; Rosen & Kelz, 2021; Weaver et al., 2013). 
Many studies in the literature contain findings that are consistent with the 
strategies and goals identified during the psychological process of Testing the Water. One 
compelling study emphasized that team members using safety voice or speaking ‘up’ 
across a power gradient often base subsequent speaking up behaviors on how those in 
power receive the initial communication attempts (Noort et al., 2021). These findings are 
consistent with a narrative synthesis study identifying the barriers to speaking up 
behaviors or safety voice as “hierarchical climate, a superior's interpersonal 
communication skill, gender differences, and a lack of adequate training in voicing 
concerns” (Pattni et al., 2018, p. 234). Other reported barriers to speaking up include 
feelings of intimidation, fear of embarrassing oneself or other team members, and fear of 
consequences (Hurley & Hutchinson, 2020).  
Even with these barriers, many study participants described situations when they 
risked negative responses to assertively advocate for their patients, which is similar to 
findings reported in the literature. One study reported that experienced nurses feel 
compelled to speak up when adjustments are needed to respond to evolving patient needs 
or team member performance, even if their suggestions might not be well received 
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(Ingvarsdottir & Halldorsdottir, 2018). Another study found that centralized leadership 
and a robust hierarchy ‘delay’ speaking up behaviors but do not affect nurse voice 
frequency (Krenz et al., 2020). Surgeons who perceive themselves to have lower ranking 
in the medical hierarchy seem to experience many of the same barriers as nurses. A study 
focused on the speaking up behaviors of young surgeons identified similar struggles for 
physicians when faced with upward communication they thought might be perceived as 
challenging to those above them in the hierarchy (Bould et al., 2015; Sur et al., 2016). 
Strategies described by participants in this study were similar to those identified in the 
Bould et al. study, with a reliance on framing concerns as questions in the attempt appear 
non-confrontational. In another study, the willingness of junior surgeons to speak up a 
second time was determined by the response to their first attempt (Pattni et al., 2018).  
Besides teaching surgical team members to speak up, it has been suggested that there also 
needs to be an effort to teach those higher in the hierarchy to ‘listen down’ to increase 
psychological safety for all team members (Hurley & Hutchinson, 2020). After the 
recognition of developing or potential IAEs, participants in this study moved into the 
reconnaissance phase, where they gathered information to try to make sense of what they 
were observing. 
Initiation of Communication During Reconnaissance  
Most participants in this study used reconnaissance strategies to obtain additional 
information to understand developing or potential IAEs. These reconnaissance strategies 
varied by tenure and professional role.  Most study participants not actively involved at 
the sterile field tried to evaluate the situation through environmental clues before 
initiating communication with the surgical team. Some study participants relied on their 
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interpretation of environmental clues to make assumptions that ultimately delayed 
communication with the surgical team. Many inexperienced nurse participants struggled 
during the reconnaissance phase when they lacked the knowledge and context for 
understanding potential problems. Some inexperienced nurses were faced not only with 
not knowing how or when to ask questions, but often they were unsure of what to ask or 
even if what they were seeing was important to the surgical team. Inexperienced nurses 
were apprehensive about disrupting the surgical team with questions that might be 
perceived as irrelevant or that concerned something they felt they ‘should know’. 
Inexperienced nurses also sometimes felt their concerns were minimized or overridden by 
other surgical team members. Experienced nurse participants were often able to use their 
prior knowledge to evaluate what might be important to the surgical team and were able 
to more easily navigate obtaining the information they needed to make decisions. They 
were also more likely to know ‘what’ to ask, be aware of who might have the information 
they needed and feel more entitled to seek that information. Surgeons were rarely 
reluctant to solicit information from the surgical team. Many surgeons relied on team 
members to provide information they could not readily access from the sterile field and 
experienced frustration when relevant communication did not occur in a timely manner. 
Conversely, they sometimes perceived ‘upward’ communication by other team members 
as distracting or confrontational. When initiating communication during reconnaissance, 
all participants in this study maintained an awareness of communication timing when that 
consideration was possible to avoid disrupting the flow of the surgical team. Most study 
participants felt they frequently did not have access to relevant information that would 
allow them to anticipate needed actions or make informed decisions. 
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Participants in this study used the reconnaissance phase to make sense of events 
and changes in the intraoperative environment. Sensemaking began to be explored in the 
late 1960s and is said to consist of seven interrelated properties. Sensemaking is 
described as social, driven by plausibility rather than accuracy, ongoing, grounded in 
identity construction, extracted by cues, enactive of sensible environments, and 
retrospective (Kilskar et al., 2020).  
Sensemaking can thus be described as consisting of three interrelated processes: 
creation, interpretation, and enactment. For issues, events, or situations to become 
triggers for sensemaking, there must be a discrepancy between expectations and 
reality, either in form of an unexpected event or the nonoccurrence of an expected 
event. There are many factors that influence whether violated expectations or cues 
trigger sensemaking, e.g., individual or organizational identity, cognitive frames, 
personal or strategic goals, and technology (Kilskar et al., 2020, p. 2). 
 
An intriguing aspect of sensemaking is that it is identified as originating in 
‘disruptive ambiguity’; it requires the violation of expectations. When processed 
individually, this ambiguity is noticed, bracketed, and responded to through connections 
with past experience. A problem with individual processing of intraoperative ambiguity is 
that reliance on connections with past experience can result in assumptions that lead to 
incorrect or delayed responses (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Sensemaking by an 
inexperienced team member is potentially problematic because individuals tend to try to 
make sense of situations based on their experiences, which might be limited or not 
applicable to current circumstances (Weick et al., 2005).  
Sensemaking by inexperienced team members also tends to be more retrospective 
than prospective, and research indicates the successful completion of surgical procedures 
requires the surgical team to engage in prospective sensemaking. (Rosness, Evjemo, 
Haavik, & Wærø, 2016). When collective, prospective sensemaking is socially supported 
150 
 
and deliberately constructed, surgical team members benefit from the experiences of 
others and are more prepared to respond to IAEs (Siegel & Schraagen, 2017). Collective 
sensemaking includes deliberate behaviors “such as questioning, analysis, making use of 
knowledge explicitly, reviewing past events with self-awareness and coming to terms 
over time with a new awareness” that allows surgical team members to better respond to 
IAEs (Siegel, 2017, p. 128). These improved responses through distributed sensemaking 
can be at least partially attributed to an evolving, explicit TMM. TMMs are discussed in 
more detail during the exploration of the rallying phase. 
Initiation of Communication During Rallying  
Surgical teams rally to coordinate their response to IAEs. Rallying often includes 
recruiting additional team members from the surgical unit and dividing responsibilities 
during increased work demands. Because some team members consider needing outside 
help as a ‘failure’ of the existing surgical team, not all study participants felt they had the 
right to rally others to respond to IAEs. Inexperienced nurse participants were the most 
reluctant to rally others. Some inexperienced nurses felt they were overstepping the 
boundaries of their role and lacked the judgment to know when additional providers were 
necessary to respond to IAEs. They also worried about offending senior surgical team 
members if they asked to bring in additional help. Inexperienced nurses felt they were 
most helpful during the rallying phase when they received explicit, directed delegation 
based on their abilities. Experienced nurse participants were quicker to initiate rallying 
others, both from the original surgical team and from the perioperative unit. Because 
many of them had experience with emergent IAEs, they felt justified in bringing in others 
to divide the increased responsibilities for a more effective response. Experienced nurses 
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often assigned relevant duties to themselves and other team members during IAEs. 
Surgeons were the most comfortable with rallying other team members and used 
informed delegation to support the stabilization of their patients. Many surgeons 
described needing to understand the abilities of others to delegate tasks successfully and 
felt less comfortable delegating in situations with unfamiliar team members. All groups 
felt that an understanding of hierarchy and professional roles was essential to successful, 
timely delegation. All groups experienced situations where rallying without clear 
delegation resulted in delayed or duplicated efforts by the surgical team.  
 Clear delegation with appropriate explanation during IAEs was described as vital 
to developing a dynamic TMM. At its most basic, a TMM is a shared understanding that 
enables purposeful, coordinated actions (Gardner, Scott, & AbdelFattah, 2017). TMMs 
reflect the extent to which surgical team members similarly categorize information that 
impacts the execution of interdependent team processes. When teams are “on the same 
page” and interpret incoming information and activities in a similar or compatible 
manner, research suggests that the team will engage in more effective and efficient team 
behaviors. Accurate TMMs are essential to interdependent adaptations to evolving IAEs 
because they allow the team to make the best use of all surgical team members’ collective 
abilities and knowledge (Fernandez et al., 2017). The most accurate TMMs are often 
developed through the integration of individual mental models, which can vary widely 
among surgical team members based on professional roles and tenure. 
Theories of expertise suggest that experts have mental models that differ in 
measurable ways from those of novices, consisting of a vast and organized 
amount of declarative and tacit knowledge, gained through accumulated 
experiences. Furthermore, expert knowledge is highly structured so that relevant 
information can be retrieved efficiently, thereby accelerating performance and 
reducing cognitive workload for a given task (Madani et al., 2017, p. 262).  
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Retrieval and sharing of relevant expert knowledge facilitate similar interpretations and 
expectations of events through the TMM, which ultimately enables the surgical team to 
rally for the most effective, focused reactions to IAEs. 
Maintenance of Interprofessional Communication During IAEs 
Maintenance of Communication During Reaction  
The second research question addressed the maintenance of communication 
during IAEs or potential IAEs. Although maintenance of communication is evident 
during many of the described phases, sustained maintenance of communication is most 
focused and critical during the reaction phase. The surgical team’s reaction is their 
coordinated response to the IAE. Reactions to IAEs were often experienced as cycles of 
recognizing and responding to emerging problems as situations evolved. Inexperienced 
nurse participants were often unsure how to perform their roles during emergent IAEs, 
and they experienced issues similar to the challenges of the previous phases. Their 
confusion often led to a reluctance to participate in problem solving as a team and in 
sustained interprofessional communication during IAEs; instead, they often relied on 
direct delegation to guide their participation. Once they completed an assigned task, they 
often waited to be directed about the next best action. Inexperienced nurses were also 
more likely to be left out of active participation in sustained communication. Some study 
participants felt ignored or overridden when they attempted to contribute to 
communication within the surgical team during the reaction phase. Experienced nurse 
participants were more likely to self-delegate, participate in sustained communication and 
group problem solving, and make suggestions to the surgical team during IAEs. 
Experienced nurses were also more likely to stay actively engaged with the surgical team 
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and to be able to anticipate the supportive actions needed to respond to IAEs. Surgeons 
most often communicated through delegation during IAEs and frequently shared 
delegation responsibilities with anesthesia providers. Surgeons felt responsible for 
managing tension and for providing updated, specific information during IAEs. Most 
participants in this study felt less ambiguity about interprofessional communication 
during this phase of responding to IAEs because the delegation strategies used relied 
primarily on the existing professional hierarchy and communication culture. Study 
participants also valued deliberate, directed communication such as closed-loop 
communication to establish and maintain SA and evolving TMMs. 
Closed-loop communication occurs when a message is transmitted, the recipient 
acknowledges the message and repeats it to verify understanding, and the original sender 
verifies the interpretation is correct (Härgestam, Lindkvist, Brulin, Jacobsson, & Hultin, 
2013). This deliberate focus on transmitting and verifying the interpretation of 
information is critical during reactions to IAEs. Closed-loop communication minimizes 
misunderstandings, encourages active listening, and helps to develop an explicit 
consensus about the next best actions for the surgical team (Jacobsson, Hargestam, 
Hultin, & Brulin, 2012). One study identified that when team delegation occurred 
through closed-loop communication that orders were completed 3.6 times sooner than 
those that didn’t use closed-loop communication (Abd El-Shafy et al., 2018). Another 
study reported that the initiation of closed-loop communication resulted in increased 
communication for both high- and low-performing teams (Kolbe et al., 2014). In another 
study, closed-loop communication training reduced medical errors by almost fifty percent 
in high-acuity pediatric patients (Diaz & Dawson, 2020). Closed-loop communication 
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can be implemented immediately and requires minimal training (Etherington et al., 2019). 
Most study participants who experienced closed-loop communication during IAEs 
described it as valuable to effective team reactions to IAEs. 
Maintenance of Communication During Resolution 
Many participants in this study did not experience any form of resolution after 
IAEs. Some study participants were required to immediately progress throughout their 
scheduled cases without opportunities to process even severe IAEs. Inexperienced nurse 
participants often sought the opinions and advice of others to make sense of IAEs when 
there was no debrief with other surgical team members. Because the communication that 
occurred during IAEs was often focused only on needed actions during the adverse event, 
debriefing with others offered opportunities to examine the ‘why’ of factors contributing 
to IAEs. Many experienced nurse participants examined their performance after IAEs to 
develop ways to better recognize and respond to future events. Surgeons were often 
absent during informal resolution after IAEs but described processing adverse events 
individually through self-reflection. All study participants used resolution as a chance to 
make sense of what happened during IAEs. Resolution was also used to make informed 
decisions about practice or policy changes to prevent future IAEs. Most participants who 
did experience resolution through debriefing with other team members considered those 
experiences valuable and often changed their individual or group practices as a result. 
Debriefing has been indicated to improve surgical team perceptions of patient 
safety and to reduce the mental workload of surgical team members when they 
experience future IAEs (Boet et al., 2017; Magill et al., 2017). Training surgeons to 
initiate structured debriefs has been linked with improved perceptions of team 
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communication and surgical leadership (Bui et al., 2021).  The benefits of debriefing 
seem to be significantly increased when senior team members are in attendance and are 
actively engaged during briefings (Phadnis & Templeton-Ward, 2018). 
Implementation of debriefs is critical to sensemaking. The connection of past events to 
future situations links retrospective sensemaking to prospective sensemaking and allows 
surgical team members to actively learn from IAEs, especially if team members with less 
experience can benefit from the knowledge, experience, and interpretation of more 
experienced team members (Rosness et al., 2016). Deliberate collective sensemaking 
through debriefing offers an enhanced perspective of IAEs that might be unavailable 
when processed individually or informally by those with less experience. 
Facilitators to Interprofessional Communication During IAEs 
The third research question sought to identify facilitators of interprofessional 
communication among surgical team members. These facilitators are discussed using the 
three groups that emerged from the narratives: inexperienced nurses, experienced nurses, 
and surgeons. Inexperienced nurses identified facilitators for interprofessional 
communication that were influenced by their level of experience in the intraoperative 
environment. Many of these facilitators were related to their perceptions of support or 
psychological safety in the operating room, with inexperienced nurses feeling 
communication was most effective when they had a trusted team member to ask 
questions. When faced with unfamiliar situations, inexperienced nurses often turned to 
their peers, preceptors, charge nurses, or medical residents to gather information instead 
of going directly ‘to the source’ by communicating with the involved attending 
physicians. Most inexperienced nurses identified more frequent and effective 
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communication when they were working with more experienced team members, with 
familiar team members, or in familiar surgical specialties. Inexperienced nurses were 
encouraged and empowered by positive feedback related to speaking up. They identified 
being compelled to ‘speak up’ when they were advocating for their patients, but this 
process was sometimes delayed as they tried to navigate timing or communication 
recipients. Inexperienced nurses often read nonverbal cues or sought the advice or 
followed the examples of others to navigate communication timing, including critical 
procedural times when silence was expected. Inexperienced nurses also benefited from 
having an explicit surgical plan, and many tried to develop this understanding through 
consultation with more experienced surgical team members if the plan was not provided 
by the leaders of the surgical team. Inexperienced nurses valued direct, closed-loop, 
delegation that was based on their abilities during IAEs. 
Experienced nurses also identified familiarity as a facilitator for communication. 
Experienced nurses felt communication was more effective when working with teams 
where there was a reduced ‘authority gradient’ because of experience levels, in services 
or situations that were ‘predictable’, and when team members understood professional 
roles well enough to ‘overlap’ duties or anticipate what other team members needed. 
Experienced nurses felt their knowledge was a facilitator when they needed to be able to 
‘tease out’ information, ‘fill in the gaps’, or to ‘be a chameleon’ when it came to 
communication with other team members. They benefited from being able to ‘read 
surgeons’ and from knowing how to ‘soften’ communication when monitoring the 
performance of other team members. Experienced nurses felt communication was more 
effective when they understood other team members’ abilities and were able to tailor 
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their communication or provide support during IAEs. Although experienced nurses were 
able to accurately anticipate needed actions in many situations, they preferred working 
with explicit, expressed plans for procedures and valued direct communication through 
an accepted leader during IAEs. Surgeons also appreciated the advantages team 
familiarity provides to interprofessional communication, and many study participants 
described using very deliberate strategies to engage and include other surgical team 
members. Surgeons identified value in outlining the surgical plan with the team, 
communicating to ‘prevent panic’, and giving team members time to ‘prepare internally’ 
when possible during IAEs. Surgeons felt they had more effective communication when 
they had working knowledge of team member abilities, available operating room supplies 
and equipment, and unit resources. Surgeons valued timely, direct, unambiguous 
communication during IAEs or potential IAEs.  
The study participants identified facilitators that were consistent with the 
perioperative communication literature. Participants in this study perceived value in 
practices such as setting the stage, looking down the field together, using backup 
behaviors, initiating purposeful pauses, using directed communication, using closed-loop 
communication, and encouraging team member questions. As discussed in chapter four, 
these practices allow teams to take advantage of all surgical team members’ collective 
knowledge and experience to form an accurate and evolving TMM during IAEs (Davis et 
al., 2017).  
Barriers to Interprofessional Communication During IAEs 
The fourth research question addressed the identification of barriers to 
interprofessional communication. The barriers experienced by participants in this study 
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often varied based on role and professional tenure. Inexperienced nurses described many 
barriers to communication that were related to their level of experience in the 
intraoperative environment and their communication was more impacted by unfamiliarity 
than the communication of experienced nurses or surgeons. They described 
communication difficulties resulting from ‘not knowing the little things’ that other 
surgical team members seemed know but that weren’t passed on to them (tacit 
knowledge). Inexperienced nurses often felt they were ‘thrown into’ situations where 
they were outside of their ‘normal zone’ and were not aware of the practices of surgical 
specialties or unfamiliar surgical teams. When this happened, they often were not aware 
of available resources, such as phone numbers to call to rally ‘outside’ help. 
Inexperienced nurses also felt vulnerable to mistakes due to miscommunication when 
they were suddenly reassigned to different rooms, roles, or were made ‘responsible’ for 
learners. They struggled with navigating communication during inconsistency, including 
working with multiple specialties, feeling there were ‘different rules’ for communication 
among surgical teams, and working with surgical team members who had volatile 
personalities. Inexperienced nurses were more likely to have their communication be 
affected by time pressure, distractions, tension, and ‘pushback’ from other team 
members. While they often felt more comfortable asking surgical residents questions, this 
strategy often resulted in receiving incomplete or inaccurate information that led to 
delays or mistakes. Inexperienced nurses also seemed to be more impacted by the 
perceived social consequences of upward communication. They felt stupid, like they 
were ‘disappointing the surgeon’, or like the surgeon might ‘take communication the 
wrong way’. Inexperienced nurses also often did not get opportunities to debrief with 
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more experienced surgical team members, which resulted in them often not 
understanding where the ‘ball was dropped’ or what went wrong during cases. 
Experienced nurses seemed to be impacted by unfamiliarity in different ways, 
possibly because unfamiliarity made them less able to anticipate what was needed from 
their professional role. Experienced nurses struggled to navigate interprofessional 
communication when people ignored the ‘usual’ communication channels or processes. 
They often felt they were ‘put in the middle’ during situations where responsibilities, 
roles, or ‘rank’ was not clear. Their communication was often influenced by being asked 
to perform tasks outside of their scope of practice, work with unfamiliar equipment, or 
being expected to ‘read minds’. Experienced nurses were concerned about revealing their 
knowledge gaps about what they felt they were expected to know. Experienced nurses 
sometimes feared being belittled or intimidated and often felt their suggestions were 
rebuffed or ignored. They sometimes felt left out of communication that directly 
impacted decision-making related to their responsibilities, that their professional 
experience was invalidated, and that they might not be supported by hospital 
administration in situations when they had to speak up. Experienced nurses identified 
inattention, side ‘banter’, and sarcasm as significant barriers to effective interprofessional 
communication. Some experienced nurses worked with surgical residents who tried to 
‘take charge’ of the operating room without the necessary experience and knowledge to 
successfully lead the surgical team. 
Surgeons identified many communication barriers that were unique to their role. 
Surgeons often experienced narrowed awareness of communication that was outside of 
their current focus. They often missed communication or didn’t communicate with others 
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because they were internally developing the surgical plan, were ‘hyper-focused’ on 
stabilizing the patient, or felt ‘compressed’ while working in a high-stress, time-sensitive 
situation. In spite of this focus, they often sensed uncommunicated tension in the room 
and were frustrated when important information was not related to them. Some of the 
information communicated felt ambiguous, was unclear, or was not communicated early 
enough to guide their decisions. Surgeons felt ‘dependent’ on others to communicate 
effectively while they were at the sterile field, and often had to use proxy communication 
to obtain the help they needed. Surgeons often experienced the need for increased 
communication as ‘overload’ based on their responsibilities, such as when they were 
responsible for communicating with anesthesia providers, teaching medical students, and 
coaching inexperienced surgical team members; this overload was increased when 
working with unfamiliar team members.  
The barriers commonly experienced by all study participants were consistent with 
the perioperative communication literature and included having unclear roles, having 
unclear responsibilities, having tunnel vision, receiving incomplete or incorrect 
information, being ‘overridden’, experiencing distractions and interruptions, delaying or 
avoiding confrontation, and ‘throwing people under the bus’ (Aouicha et al., 2021; Ford 
& Fencl, 2020; Healey et al., 2006; Jung et al., 2020; Keller et al., 2018; Mackenzie & 
Foran, 2020; Murji et al., 2016; Pasarakonda et al., 2020; Roberts et al., 2021). Cognitive 
distractions identified by surgeons included those described in the reviewed literature, 
such as teaching while operating, preplanning for the next case, equipment or device 
malfunctions, time pressure, and case-irrelevant conversations (Jung et al., 2020; Widmer 




 A compelling finding of this research was the identification of two psychosocial 
goals that influenced interprofessional communication; most participants in this study 
described using strategies intended to preserve the flow of cases and protect the face of 
surgical team members. Developing a better understanding of these underlying 
psychosocial goals is essential to improving the persistence of interprofessional 
communication training and interventions. Unfortunately, interprofessional 
communication training and interventions tend to ‘decay’ over time (Weller & Boyd, 
2014). This decay of communication improvements could be at least partially attributed 
to the influence of preserving flow and protecting face to prevent the perception of 
boatrocking by surgical team members when they need to speak up during IAEs. The 
concept of boatrocking explores how the successful navigation of hierarchy in 
organizations is often internalized as ‘go along to get along’, or that expressing dissent or 
asking questions can be perceived as not being a ‘good’ team member (Redding, 1985).  
Even effective communication training is likely to deteriorate when it is not 
socially supported through communication culture (Long et al., 2020; Weller et al., 
2014). The support of speaking up behaviors through culture is critical, and nurses are 
particularly vulnerable to pressures to conform to the traditional perception of being a 
‘good nurse’ by avoiding conflict and maintaining the status quo in the intraoperative 
environment (Chard & Tovin, 2018; Garon, 2012). When questions or speaking up 
behaviors are perceived as conflict, that perception potentially reduces interprofessional 
communication and delays the timely response to IAEs. Many study participants also 
experienced situations where communication was tailored to avoid embarrassing 
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themselves or others. Tailoring communication to protect ‘face’ through impression 
management can lead to communication that is ambiguous or protracted and can 
ultimately delay effective reactions to IAEs. 
Surgical team members describe flow as occurring when team members 
demonstrate the accountability, adaptability, and consistency required to make teamwork 
feel like a “well-oiled machine” (Paige et al., 2021). The importance of surgical flow has 
been recognized in the literature and disrupting surgical flow has been shown to 
significantly increase surgical error (Wiegmann et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Sundt, 2019). 
The accumulation of even minor flow disruptions has been suggested to “diminish the 
compensatory resources of the surgical team, increasing their vulnerability and 
susceptibility to committing errors” (Wiegmann, 2019, p. 260). Flow disruptions have 
been indicated to result in surgical team distractions, changes in strategy to address 
problems, and elongated surgical pauses; these disruptions often lead to surgical error or 
combine to contribute to major disruptive events (Joseph et al., 2019). Disruptions in 
flow have also been identified to distract surgical team members from their intended 
tasks, significantly increase cognitive workload, and potentially create even more severe 
IAEs (Koch et al., 2020). Surgical team members experiencing flow disruptions have also 
reported increased fatigue, higher stress levels, and longer operative times (Koch et al., 
2020). One study focused on the experiences of circulating nurses found that flow 
disruptions can cause patient care to be compromised when nurses have reduced SA as 
they attend to flow disruptions (Cohen & Boquet, 2021). 
A recommendation to address the psychosocial goal of preserving flow would be 
to implement planned surgical pauses before and during procedures to allow time for 
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team member questions or updates to the surgical team. One study identified surgical 
team perceptions of improved team communication and increased patient safety after the 
implementation of planned pauses (Erestam et al., 2016). A study by Guidolin et al. 
identified using structured pauses to establish and reinforce the TMM through five 
distinct strategies. The first suggested phase includes listing the indications, risks, and 
potential complications of the procedure. The second phase consists of explaining the 
plan, goals, and critical steps of the procedure. The third phase is identifying the 
proposed surgical approach and critical anatomy. The fourth phase includes identifying 
which surgical team members are responsible for important needed actions during the 
procedure. Finally, the fifth phase consists of explicitly identifying any new aspects 
related to the case, such as unusual approaches or related research (Guidolin et al., 2020). 
Pausing to exchange information and allow for questions allows the surgical team to 
preserve the surgical flow, answer relevant questions, and facilitate more rapid 
recognition and response to IAEs. 
Implications of this Research 
  This research identified many practical implications to improve the effectiveness 
of interprofessional communication during IAEs. These implications are explored below 
through the described communication phases. A relevant observation from the literature 
is that much of ‘operative training has moved rapidly from problem recognition to 
solution implementation, for the most part failing to explore how operative teams actually 
communicate’ (Davis et al., 2017, p. 1349). The findings from this study were an 
important first step to understanding how surgical team members currently communicate 
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and how interprofessional communication can be improved to facilitate the performance 
of highly functioning teams.  
Highly functioning teams are described with the following attributes: situational 
awareness by team members; effective leadership; empowerment of nonleader 
members of the team; closed loop communication; critical language and 
standardized procedures; assertive communication; adaptive and supportive 
behavior by team members; and follow-up with a reflective debriefing process 
(Hughes et al., 2014, p. 549). 
 
This research also begins to explain why many trainings and interventions lack 
persistence and suggests the implementation of cultural communication support strategies 
to improve the surgical team’s response to IAEs. 
Practical Implications 
 There were several indicated practical implications for changes that potentially 
improve the surgical team’s response to IAEs.  These implications are explored in the 
following sections through the identified phases of communication during IAEs.  
Implications for the Recognition Phase. A developing or potential IAE must first be 
recognized. Earlier and more consistent recognition of IAEs could be accomplished 
through deliberate training of SA. SA is dependent on attention and working memory to 
guide decisions about goal-directed behavior (Endsley, 1995). An obstacle to SA in the 
intraoperative environment is that often the surgical team members with more 
opportunities to notice issues might have less experience interpreting the available 
information. This discrepancy could be ameliorated through efforts to shift SA from the 
individual to the team (or distributed) level through focused training (Graafland, 
Schraagen, Boermeester, Bemelman, & Schijven, 2015). Focused SA training has been 
shown to produce team-level improvements, but the results are still considered difficult to 
measure (Gardner, Kosemund, & Martinez, 2017). Research by Rosenman et al., 
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identified a positive correlation between team SA agreement and surgical team clinical 
performance (Rosenman et al., 2018).  
SA could also be improved through the deliberate use of ‘call out’ communication 
by all surgical team members. Call out communication is intentionally verbalizing the 
initial observation of changes in the intraoperative environment (Härgestam et al., 2013). 
The use of call out communication could be refined through efforts to make the surgical 
plan explicit, which would guide team members related to specific issues of concern to be 
alert for and to notify the surgical team about during procedures. Surgical teams could 
also deliberately train and reinforce performance monitoring as one of their expected 
backup behaviors (Johnsen, Westli, Espevik, Wisborg, & Brattebø, 2017). Many 
participants in this study indicated reluctance to initiate interprofessional communication 
related to surgical team member lapses or errors; training performance monitoring as a 
team expectation could potentially promote earlier communication through speaking up 
behaviors and reduce the time to effectively respond to these issues (Salas, Grossman, 
Hughes, & Coultas, 2015). 
One recommended practice that has been shown to increase both SA and speaking 
up behaviors while decreasing IAEs is the preoperative briefing (Phadnis & Templeton-
Ward, 2018). Implementation of a preoperative briefing with surgical team member 
introductions, a specific outline of the surgical plan, and anticipated problems has been 
shown to significantly reduce preventable IAEs and reduce the likelihood that smaller 
issues develop into IAEs. Briefing before cases start also allows surgical team members 
to explicitly share their individual mental models and facilitates developing a cohesive, 
shared TMM (Rutherford, 2017; Salas et al., 2019). Other identified benefits of team 
166 
 
briefings include improved patient outcomes, reduced hierarchical communication 
barriers, and improved team member coordination during increased workload (Pimentel 
et al., 2021; Stout et al., 1999)(Magill et al., 2017).  
Another recommended strategy to increase the recognition of developing or 
potential IAEs through SA is to define specific surgical phases to be navigated through 
the use of the ‘sterile cockpit’ rule. The surgical phases would be defined from an 
interprofessional perspective and recognized as critical surgical phases when all non-
essential behaviors are prohibited (Boet et al., 2020; Keller et al., 2020). Suggested 
critical phases include the preoperative team briefing, the time out process, induction of 
anesthesia, surgical counts, specimen handling, and the emergence from anesthesia (Ford 
& Fencl, 2020). Prohibiting non-essential behaviors during critical phases can increase 
SA, redirect surgical team focus, and encourage effective performance monitoring.  
Implications for the Reconnaissance Phase. When an IAE or potential IAE is 
recognized, members of the surgical team frequently need to gather more information to 
determine the needed actions to intervene. The requirement for more information to 
decide on appropriate interventions suggests the need to normalize questions in the 
intraoperative environment. The normalization of questions is one of the most critical, 
immediate facilitators to timely interprofessional communication. Asking questions 
relevant to patient care should be the expectation of surgical team members; this might 
best be accomplished by linking this expectation to the concept of surgical conscience. 
Even study participants who were inexperienced and anxious about speaking up in the 
intraoperative environment identified specific issues they would ‘always speak up about’. 
If the concept of surgical conscience could be expanded to that of a ‘safety conscience’ 
167 
 
and taught as a professional imperative, the time necessary for reconnaissance could 
often be reduced. Implementation of these changes could ultimately reduce the time to 
appropriate IAE reactions by the surgical team.  
Reconnaissance could also be significantly improved through the use of 
deliberate, ordered communication by experienced surgical team members (White et al., 
2018). Ordered communication, such as what is used with the SBAR technique, includes 
“selecting terminology that facilitates sharing major chunks of information quickly, 
minimizing unnecessary communication, ensuring that team members share clear and 
audible information, and sharing information in a predictable order” (White et al., 2018, 
p. 380). This approach ‘filters’ information for relevance, groups information for easier 
synthesis, and creates a communication cadence that can make information easier to 
understand and act upon by surgical team members. Several participants in this study 
experienced situations where inexperienced team members were able to increase or 
accelerate their participation during IAE responses because of the deliberate, ordered 
manner used to present relevant information during IAEs. 
Implications for the Rallying Phase. Rallying in the intraoperative environment can be 
improved through the use of directed communication, an expectation to rally when 
necessary, and encouragement of collective agency (Diaz & Dawson, 2020; Lahno, 
2017). Directed communication is when specific instructions or requests are made to a 
particular person or group of people. Directed, specific communication makes it more 
likely that needed actions will be understood and performed; the use of directed call out 
communication has been reported to increase the likelihood of ‘check back’ (response 
and performance of indicated action) by 50% (Davis et al., 2017). Directed 
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communication is essential during IAEs because of the increased workload and 
mobilization of additional team members. 
Messages or orders of “can someone get me . . .” may go unheard if not directed 
to a specific person or role, or multiple people may attempt to perform the same 
task simultaneously if there is no clarity about who will or should perform the 
task. This leads to unnecessary redundancy and ineffective use of resources (Diaz 
& Dawson, 2020, p. 474). 
 
Surgical team members also need to understand the expectation, regardless of 
their role or tenure, to rally others for help when assistance is needed. This expectation is 
more likely to be met when all team members, even those with less experience, feel they 
have collective agency. In collective agency, “the individual mode of cooperation is 
transcended. People take on the goals and values of a group and submit their decisions to 
a scheme of actions that is collectively held to be best in view of these goals” (Lahno, 
2017, p. 129). Surgical team members who perform their duties using the ‘umbrella’ of 
collective agency feel entitled and even compelled, to make higher-level decisions that 
are in the best interest of the patient and the surgical team. These decisions can include 
determining the necessity to bring in additional healthcare providers during IAEs without 
waiting for permission from higher-ranking surgical team members.  
Implications for the Reaction Phase. The use of closed-loop communication has been 
shown to reduce medical error significantly and to increase the efficiency and speed of 
responses to pediatric emergencies (Abd El-Shafy et al., 2018; Diaz & Dawson, 2020; 
Etherington et al., 2019). Closed-loop communication’s importance has resulted in its 
inclusion in both Team STEPPS and CRM training (Cooke, 2016; Wakeman & 
Langham, 2018). Although many study participants described using closed-loop 
communication during IAEs, even non-emergent communication could be improved 
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significantly through verification of instructions within the surgical team. Suggestions for 
the most effective closed-loop communication include providing complete answers 
(instead of replying yes or no), repeating the understood information (instead of replying 
‘understood’ or ‘okay’), articulating one thought or direction per sentence, and using 
message markers (like ‘instruction’ or ‘warning’ to identify the nature of the direction 
(Boström, 2020). 
Implications for the Resolution Phase. For many participants in this study, the 
resolution phase of communication related to IAEs was limited to debriefing with peers 
or even to self-reflection. Debriefing as an interprofessional team could contribute 
directly to both retrospective and prospective sensemaking. Debriefing as a team also 
allows surgical team members to identify what parts of surgical procedures went well and 
any areas of improvement (Neily et al., 2010). Successful debriefing factors include the 
early engagement of team members, a persistent safety culture, a visible commitment to 
ongoing debrief practice, and focused feedback (Brindle et al., 2018). Debriefs should 
include focused discussion of the event, inclusion of developmental intent, exploration of 
multiple team member perspectives, and the expectation of active learning (Twigg, 
2020). The most effective debriefs have been identified as being based on critical 
performance issues, specific teamwork interactions, and focused feedback at both the 
individual and team levels held in a psychologically safe learning environment (Allen et 
al., 2018). Psychological safety has been identified as both a desired outcome of the 
process and an indicator of the ‘success’ of debriefs (Keiser & Arthur Jr, 2020).  
Other reported benefits of debriefing include increased team member agency, increased 
speaking up behaviors, increased perceptions of emotional support and teamwork, and 
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focused process improvements (Rock et al., 2020). Recommendations from this study are 
summarized in the following table, Table 5.3: Strategies to Improve IAE Response. 
Table 5.3: Strategies to Improve IAE Response 














































    
 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings from this research add to the understanding of how surgical team 
members currently experience interprofessional communication during IAEs or potential 
IAEs with a grounded theory that proposes that interprofessional communication within 
surgical teams is largely situational. The developed grounded theory of Testing the Water 
demonstrated connections with the ST, CHAT, and SAT theories presented previously in 
chapter two. Questions were posed at the beginning of this research to guide an 
exploration to determine if the motivations and perceptions involved in interprofessional 
communication during IAEs or potential IAEs demonstrated potential relationships with 
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the identified implications of ST, CHAT, and SAT. Participant narratives did identify 
perceptions of existing rules, norms, tools, and recursive, reciprocal influences among 
individuals, systems, and structures (Canary, 2010). Participants in this study also 
described working within systems including structures that involved meaning 
(signification), norms (legitimation), and power and authority (domination). (Seamons & 
Canary, 2017). The following table, Table 5.4: Connections to Theory, includes answers 
to the questions posed in the second chapter as they relate to the participants in this study. 
Table 5.4: Connections to Theory 
Structuration Theory Impressions from Participant Narratives 
Are there indications participants believe 
they are acting within/outside of the 
bounds of existing structure? 
Yes. Many participants described being 
aware of things they felt they 
could/couldn’t say or should/shouldn’t say 
because of their perceptions of existing 
structure (communication culture). Other 
participants were willing to ‘go around’ 
the existing structure to ensure the 
performance of needed actions. 
Do participants describe ‘filtering’ or 
limiting their interactions based on 
explicit or tacit expectations? 
Yes. Participants felt there were certain 
accepted actions or conversations and 
would often ‘filter’ what they needed to 
convey through humor, ‘acting dumb’, 
and the use of proxy communicators. 
Some participants also ‘opted out’ or 
‘dropped it’ if the surgical team did not 
seem to agree with their opinions or 
suggestions. 
Do participants describe their actions as 
proactive or reactive? Do they reflect on 
the interactions and outcomes? 
This seemed to be closely related to 
participant tenure and professional role. 
Participants with less tenure seemed to be 
more reactive, while participants with 
more tenure were often proactive. Many 
participants described reflecting on the 
responses to their attempts to 
communicate with the surgical team. 
Do participants reflect on how actions 
contribute to structure? On how their 
actions are influenced by structure? 
Participants with more tenure seemed to 
be more likely to reflect on how actions 
contribute to structure; they were also 
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more likely to feel they could influence 
the existing structure. 
 Participants with less tenure seemed more 
likely to feel their actions were influenced 
by structure. 
Do participants describe recursive 
practices that influence structure? Their 
contributions to structure? 
Many participants related experiences that 
demonstrated this. The contributions of 
recursive practice to structure were often 
demonstrated through practice changes. 
How do participants describe their 
perceptions of the influence of structure 
on interaction? 
This varied by the tenure and professional 
roles of the participants. Some 
participants felt the existing structure was 
enabling, while others found it 
constricting. 
How do participants experience the 
evolution of structure through their 
actions? 
Many participants were less likely to 
repeat actions or suggestions that seemed 
unacceptable to the surgical team, which 
tended to reinforce the existing structure. 
Other participants were deliberate in their 
efforts to ‘go around’ existing structure to 
accomplish actions they perceived as 
necessary to protect their patients. 
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory Impressions from Participant Narratives 
Do participants describe perceived social 
or professional boundaries? 
Expectations? As an individual? As a 
team member? 
Yes. Almost all participants described 
being influenced by social and 
professional boundaries based on 
perceived expectations of their 
professional role and their ‘status’ as a 
team member. 
Do participants describe conflicts 
between individual goals (professional 
responsibilities or concerns) and the 
object (interdependent surgical patient 
care)? 
Yes. Participants identified both internal 
and external conflicts related to the rights 
and responsibilities of surgical team 
member roles. IAEs often seemed to 
increase these conflicts. 
Do participants describe perceptions of 
being influenced by the procedural or 
language norms of the activity system? 
Yes. Most participants seemed to be 
deliberately conscious of how they 
thought things were ‘supposed to be’ and 
the things they were ‘allowed to do’ based 
on their professional role and tenure. 
Do participants describe perceptions of 
being enabled or constrained by the rules 
of the activity system? 
Yes, there were situations when 
participants felt enabled and others where 
they felt constrained. Again, this seemed 
to be related to professional roles and 
tenure. Some participants with more 
experience were likely to ignore perceived 
‘rules’ of communication when the need 
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for compliance with existing rules/norms 




Using grounded theory to identify patterns of behavior among surgical team 
members allowed a deeper understanding of how participants in this study experienced 
the psychosocial process involved in establishing and maintaining communication during 
IAEs. Identification of common communication strategies and behaviors revealed the 
common psychosocial goals of protecting the flow of surgical cases and protecting the 
face of surgical team members. Supporting these psychosocial goals through the 
development of a communication culture that promotes psychological safety should 
improve and extend the results of communication training and interventions.  
Strengths of the Research 
This grounded theory study had several strengths. Although there is a large body 
of quantitative research related to interprofessional communication in the intraoperative 
environment, much of that research focuses on the content and quantity of 
communication. Using qualitative research allowed the researcher to ‘take a step back’ 
and focus, instead, on the context and quality of interprofessional communication 
surrounding IAEs. Performing in-depth interviews with a smaller number of participants 
also allowed for a deeper exploration of each participant’s experiences through guided 
and flexible questioning. Another strength was that study participants were very willing 
to communicate openly with the researcher due to the depth of the researcher’s subject 
familiarity with the intraoperative environment and the perception of the researcher as an 
‘insider’. The researcher’s subject familiarity allowed for an informed, thoughtful 
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interpretation of the participant narratives. Another strength of this study was the wide 
range of professional experience or tenure among the participants in this study. This 
range facilitated an understanding of how tenure can influence perceptions and 
motivations during interprofessional communication, regardless of the participant’s 
professional role.   
Limitations 
There were recognized limitations to the completed dissertation research. First, 
the purposive, convenience, and theoretical sampling strategies indicated for use with 
grounded theory had the potential to produce a biased sample (Kolb, 2012). Second, since 
the primary researcher for the study practiced as a nurse within the intraoperative 
environment, it was essential to recognize, address, and adjust for possible researcher 
bias during data collection and analysis to ensure the researcher’s perspective and 
experience allowed for clarity in the interpretation and representation of the results 
(Levitt, Motulsky, Wertz, Morrow, & Ponterotto, 2017). Third, even when study 
participants honestly and completely related their experiences of interprofessional 
communication, the narrative accounts described only their perspective of the 
communicative interactions as well as their selection of the communicative interactions 
they choose to share; a more balanced view of the communication involved could 
perhaps be realized if participants were interviewed regarding the same interactions. 
Fourth, the understanding of interprofessional communication gained from the research is 
potentially only generalizable to participants from the specific operative units or their 
surgical teams because of the complexity of team communication culture. Fifth, because 
there was little diversity in the participants who volunteered to participate in the study, 
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their experiences might not represent the experiences of surgical team members of other 
genders, races, ethnicities, or those who speak English as a second language. Finally, 
because the study focused only on the experiences of surgeons and surgical nurses, the 
experiences of other professional roles such as anesthesia providers and surgical techs 
were not considered. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 There are several ways future research could address the identified limitations of 
this study. Future research could include multiple recruitment sites, represent more 
professional roles from the surgical team, recruit more diverse participants, and interview 
multiple participants involved in the same IAEs to better understand the different 
perspectives. Another compelling area for research is an in-depth exploration of the 
language surgical team members use when describing their perspectives and motivations 
during interprofessional communication. Many participants in this study used language 
that suggested emotional responses to ineffective communication interactions, such as 
feeling ‘stupid’ or incompetent, even when dealing with entirely unfamiliar situations.  
Conclusion 
 Interprofessional communication during IAEs is a complex psychosocial process 
that is profoundly impacted by professional socialization and existing communication 
culture. Efforts to influence this psychosocial process through communication trainings 
and interventions have resulted in varying levels of effectiveness and persistence. The 
purpose of this grounded theory study was to provide an initial exploration of the 
psychosocial processes experienced by surgeons and surgical nurses during the 
establishment and maintenance of interprofessional communication during IAEs. This 
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study provided insight into those experiences through the development of a grounded 
theory framework entitled Testing the Water. Testing the Water identifies the strategies 
and psychosocial goals involved in the situational negotiation of interprofessional 
communication as experienced by surgeons and surgical nurses. 
The identification of underlying psychosocial goals potentially explains why the 
effectiveness of communication training and interventions varies widely in the 
intraoperative environment. Support of the psychosocial goals of preserving flow and 
protecting face can be accomplished using practical strategies such as pausing to allow 
‘safe times’ to exchange information without disrupting the surgical process and 
normalizing questions and backup behaviors within the surgical team. These simple 
communication changes potentially allow the surgical team to recognize minor errors 
earlier and prevent error escalation into more severe IAEs. 
There are many aspects of the intraoperative environment that are unlikely to 
change. Surgical teams will continue to be composed of multiple professions shaped by 
socializing factors that contribute to perceptions of hierarchy. Surgical teams will also 
often, out of necessity, continue to function as dynamic, ad hoc action teams that must 
navigate the complexities of interprofessional communication that are unique to each 
iteration of providing surgical care. Research has suggested that the influence of human 
factors during the surgical process is inescapable but that the influence of these factors 
can be mediated by developing and supporting psychological safety. Supporting 
psychological safety addresses both IAEs that occur because of error and those that result 
from complexity. Recognition and response to the complexity of the intraoperative 
environment support the need to explore the surgical team as an interdependent, complex 
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adaptive system instead of reducing the perception of the functioning of the surgical team 
to the individual roles performed by surgical team members. Surgical team members are 
inherently social creatures, and as such, are likely to continue to Test the Water to 
socially integrate themselves into high-functioning surgical teams. The challenge is to 
provide opportunities to shift our communication expectations during interdependent 
surgical care provision from our social voice to our safety voice - and to the collective 




















Appendix A - Interview Guide 
Sample initial data-generating questions include: 
You indicated that you experienced an event in the operating in which interprofessional 
communication led to an IAE or a potential IAE. 
 
1) Tell me about the event. Researcher will encourage participant to give a ‘play-
by-play’ description of the event – to describe as closely as possible the actual 
conversations and interactions that took place. Possible prompts include: “Take 
me back to the time when…” and “Help me understand what really happened.” 
2) Tell me who was in the operating room at the time - you don't need to refer to 
team members by their names, but it would be helpful for me to know their roles - 
such as the nurse or the anesthesiologist. 
3) Tell me all you can remember about the communication that surrounded the 
event.    
4) How did the communication start?  What happened next?   
5) How would the discussion unfold? 
6) In that situation, what were the barriers to communication? 
7) In that situation, what were the facilitators for the communication? 
8) Did anyone in the room not participate in the communication? Why do you think 
they weren’t a part of the conversation? 
9) How did the event end? Was there any discussion about the event after it occurred 
(was resolved?) 
10)  Do you think what happened was due to the behavior of an individual who was 
involved, or could it have been something else? Some people I’ve talked to have 
mentioned things like distractions, time pressure, process failures, equipment 
malfunctions, or inadequate resources as contributing to their IAE. Do you think 
anything like that contributed to this event? 
 
You have told me about an instance in which interprofessional communication in the 
operating room led to an IAE or potential IAE; conversely, could you give me an 
example of when communication led to a good outcome, such as a near-miss or an 
‘averted’ IAE? 
 
1) Tell me about the event. Researcher will encourage participant to give a ‘play-
by-play’ description of the event – to describe as closely as possible the actual 
conversations and interactions that took place. Possible prompts include: “Take 
me back to the time when…” and “Help me understand what really happened.” 
2) Tell me who was in the operating room at the time - you don't need to refer to 
team members by their names, but it would be helpful for me to know their roles - 
such as the nurse or the anesthesiologist. 
3) Tell me all you can remember about the communication that surrounded the 
event.    
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4) How did the communication start?  What happened next?   
5) How would the discussion unfold? 
6) In that situation, what were the barriers to communication? 
7) In that situation, what were the facilitators for the communication? 
8) Did anyone in the room not participate in the communication? Why do you think 
they weren’t a part of the conversation? 





Time in current role: 
Time on current specialty team (if applicable): 
I work with many of the same team members: 
Less than 25% of the time   Between 25% and 50% of the time 
Between 50% and 75% of the time  More than 75% of the time 














Appendix B - Reflexive questions suggested by Charmaz 
1) Does the researcher adequately prepare participants for what to expect during the 
interview process? 
2) Do the questions in the interview guide reflect researcher interests and views or 
the participant experience? 
3) Are researcher assumptions shaping the content or focus of the interview? 
4) Has appropriate background information been collected to allow understanding of 
the participant experience? 
5) Are the interview questions clear and concise? 
6) How would the interview questions sound to participants who have had these 
experiences? Is the language appropriate? 
7) Do the interview questions adequately elicit participant accounts of the 
experience, including their concerns, and views? 
8) Are the questions open-ended? 
9) Are the follow-up questions being used suitable to probe for more information? 
Are they too intrusive? 

























Appendix D – Definitions of Terms 
Action teams Action teams are teams are teams “in which expertise, 
information, and tasks are distributed across 
specialized individuals, where team effectiveness 
depends on rapid, complex, and coordinated task 
behavior, and the ability to dynamically adapt to the 
shifting demands of the situation” (Kozlowski et al., 
1996, p. 254) 
Briefing  
 
Briefing describes surgical team communication that 
occurs before the surgical procedure to clarify 
procedural expectations, encourage questions from 
team members, and clearly define professional roles 





Closed-loop communication is a three-step 
communication model where the sender transmits a 
message, the recipient acknowledges the message with 
a ‘checkback’ that verbalizes their understanding of the 
message, and the sender verbally verifies the receipt of 
the message and its interpretation; this is described as 




Collaboration has been described as a “process in 
which autonomous or semiautonomous actors interact 
through formal and informal negotiation, jointly 
creating rules and structures governing their 
relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues 
that brought them together; it is a process involving 
shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions” 
(Thomson, et al., 2007, p. 25). 
Collaborative practice Collaborative practice is coordination of independent 
actions to accomplish shared objectives 
Debriefing 
 
Debriefing describes surgical team communication that 
takes place after the surgical procedure and allows the 
surgical team to collectively process events to better 




Emergent states are constructs that demonstrate 
dynamic properties of teams that vary as a function of 
inputs, processes, outcomes, and context. Emergent 
states are demonstrated through the affective, 
cognitive, and motivational states of teams rather than 
through the nature of team member interactions (Marks 





Influencing conditions are described as factors such as 
composition, culture, and context that influence how 




Interprofessional collaboration has been identified as 
“an active and ongoing partnership often between 
people from diverse backgrounds with distinctive 
professional cultures and possibly representing 
different organisations or sectors, who work together to 
solve problems or provide services” (Morgan, et al., 
2015, p. 1218). Interprofessional collaboration occurs 
when members of different professional groups use 
open communication to make decisions, manage 
conflict, and solve problems to positively impact 





ICP within healthcare delivery is when two or more 
people from different professions actively engage to 
coordinate and provide patient care within a practice 
setting (Morgan et al., 2015). 
ICP is a process in which autonomous or 
semiautonomous participants interact through formal 
and informal negotiation using socially-acceptable and 
socially-institutionalized enactment of professional 
roles as they jointly create rules, norms, and structures 
governing their relationships, goal-directed activities, 
and decision making. (Thistlethwaite et al., 2013; 
Thomson et al., 2007). 
Interprofessional 
communication 
Interprofessional communication is the exchange of 
information between and among surgical team 
members performing different professional roles that 
includes verbal, para-verbal, and non-verbal elements 
(Etherington et al., 2019). 
Intraoperative adverse 
event (IAE) 
An IAE is any intraoperative deviation or injury caused 
by healthcare delivery rather than underlying disease 
(Mavros et al., 2014). 
Practice The concept of practice in healthcare has been 
identified as the socially-acceptable and socially-
institutionalized enactment of professional roles 
(Thistlethwaite et al., 2013). 
Prospective sensemaking 
 
Prospective sensemaking occurs when the concern and 
attention of the surgical team is deliberately directed 
toward events that may happen in the future, collective 
expectations are formed, and interrelated team actions 
are refined to construct a more manageable situation or 
an optimal outcome. Prospective sensemaking 
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Proxy efficacy is one’s belief in the skills, abilities, and 
willingness of a third party or parties to function 
effectively on his or her behalf to facilitate desired 
outcomes (Bandura, 1995) 
SBAR SBAR is an acronym for the Situation, Background, 
Assessment, and Recommendation technique designed 
to facilitate interprofessional communication. The 
speaker describes the situation that prompted initiation 
of the communication, relays the background or history 
of the patient, reports his or her assessment of what is 
happening, and makes a recommendation for treatment 
or problem correction (Shahid & Thomas, 2018). 
Silence Silence is “the conscious withholding of information, 
suggestions, ideas, questions, or concerns about 
potentially important work- or organization-related 
issues from persons who might be able to take action to 
address those issues”. Silence often occurs because of 
because of “fear, concerns about negative 
repercussions, or feelings of futility”. It can be silence 
can be “an automatic withdrawal response, a habituated 





Situational awareness is the shared, dynamic, and 
evolving understanding of environmental elements that 
includes the (1) perception of those elements, (2) 
comprehension of their contextual meaning, and (3) 
projection of their significance to the situation 
(Endsley, 1995).  
Socialization 
 
Socialization into professional roles is the process by 
which individuals gain the social knowledge for 
assuming their roles within organizations. Socialization 
includes developing relationships with others; learning 
the values, goals, and technical language of the 
profession; and understanding the profession’s 
customs, myths, rituals, and traditions (Hall, 2005; 
MacArthur et al., 2016; Thistlethwaite et al., 2013). 
Surgical never events  
 
Surgical never events are defined as events that should 
never occur, and include retained foreign bodies, 
wrong-site surgeries, wrong-patient surgeries, and 
wrong-procedure surgeries (Mehtsun et al., 2013). 
Team mental model 
(TMM)  
 
A team mental model is the team members’ mental 
representation and shared understanding of relevant 
knowledge to the team’s task environment. The TMM 
includes shared team- and task-related knowledge that 
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allows the team to similarly interpret the information, 
develop shared expectations for the future, and have 
similar explanations for situations. TMMs also 
facilitate more accurate direction of resources and 
anticipation of other team members’ needs (Fernandez 
et al., 2017). 
Teamwork 
 
Teamwork has been identified as occurring among “a 
collection of individuals who are interdependent in 
their tasks, who share responsibility for outcomes, who 
see themselves and who are seen by others as an intact 
social entity embedded in one or more larger social 
systems and who manage their relationships across 
organisational boundaries” (Cohen & Bailey, 1997, p. 
239). Teamwork is the interdependent coordination of 
activities and decisions through deliberate sharing of 
resources and information to attain shared goals 
(Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997). 
Traits Traits are processes that are internalized by the team 
and stabilized over time. Traits include positive 
behavior norms, cohesion, and cooperation, and have 
been associated with perceived team effectiveness and 
team member satisfaction(Lemieux-Charles & 
McGuire, 2006). 
Voice Voice has been defined as upward discretionary verbal 
expression with constructive intent (Morrison, 2011) 
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